1.         The Royal Air Force has conducted a Public Relations campaign for decades now (from the times of Trenchard and Slessor) to convince Ministers and the public that

“Because they fly aeroplanes, they are the Air Power experts and sole Government advisers on military aviation”.

They choose to forget that the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm has been flying aeroplanes in combat from aircraft carriers for 100 years.  Air warfare expertise comes from combat experience and the RAF has had relatively little of this since World War II – hence, this PR campaign and its message is well past its sell-by date.  But this does not stop the RAF from persisting with their line: this is proving detrimental to our national military capability.

2.         Let us now briefly examine that experience/expertise and contrast it with Royal Naval Air Power (the Fleet Air Arm).

3.         On the recent Newsnight interview of Air Chief Marshal Sir Clive Loader, Jeremy Paxman asked a specific question and phrased it carefully as follows,

“When was the last time that an RAF aircraft shot down an enemy aircraft in combat?”

It was extremely disappointing to hear Sir Clive’s reply which was, “In the Falklands conflict of 1982”.  Sir Clive is a Harrier pilot and an excellent ambassador for the Royal Air Force and held in great regard. In many circles he is becoming recognised as an expert on the history of air combat. The latter point is a matter of concern and requires comment.

4.         All the air-to-air kills in the Falklands campaign (25 in total) were achieved by Royal Navy Sea Harrier aircraft of 800 and 801 squadrons embarked in HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible.  There were no RAF air-to-air fighter aircraft involved in the 1982 war – although a handful of ground attack Harrier GR3 aircraft were deployed in HMS Hermes for the latter stages of the conflict and acquitted themselves usually adequately against ground targets.

5.         Sir Clive should confirm that he miss-spoke when he attributed air-to-air combat successes in the Falklands to RAF aircraft.  Since World War II there have been 26 confirmed air-to-air combat kills by British military aircraft – one over Korea and 25 over the Falklands – all of which have fallen to the carrier borne aircraft of the Royal Navy.  See Annex A for a list of British Expeditionary Force Operations in which the Fleet Air Arm carriers have provided all or the majority of projected air power – thus earning/sustaining ‘air power experience and expertise’.

6.         Reference by senior RAF officers to their “Top Gun aircrew being sent to enforce the No-Fly Zone in Libya” is an example of the rather devious way that the RAF PR machine misleads the public and “assumes the mantle/lives off the expertise of others”. Explanation is necessary.

7.         During the Vietnam War, United States fighter aircraft (Phantoms) were initially enduring significant losses in air-to-air combat against the Russian MiG fighters.  The Air Warfare Instructor community of the Royal Navy fixed wing Fleet Air Arm offered to help and a 12 strong team of Naval Air Warfare Instructors (AWI’s), led by Dickie Lord, travelled to the United States to conduct a special training programme for the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. The air combat expertise provided by the Royal Navy team resulted in a major increase in air-to-air combat success in Vietnam.  This success led to the establishment of the United States Navy Top Gun course which continues to this day and is modelled upon the Fleet Air Arm AWI course. Only the most capable and aggressive fighter pilots are able to complete the course and attain “Top Gun” status.

8.         The Hollywood film, “Top Gun”, glamorised this cadre of first-class air warfare practitioners and brought naval air warfare fully into the public domain. The hands-on expertise of the AWI School and the Top Gun School has never been matched by any Squadron or organisation within the Royal Air Force. Over the past four decades this expertise has borne fruit in every single air combat training exercise conducted between Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm fighter aircraft and Royal Air Force fighter aircraft. The latter have been soundly trounced on every occasion.

9.         Sir Clive must recognise this in any of his writings on the history of air combat and senior public spokesmen of the Royal Air Force should in future refrain from the inference/suggestion that all their fighter pilots have achieved Top Gun or AWI status and expertise. This is clearly not the case.

10.       That is not to say that the RAF does not have available some fighter pilots with the right aptitude and flying skills to achieve AWI or Top Gun status. A good case in point would be Ian Mortimer who came on exchange from the Royal Air Force to 899 Naval Air Squadron  in 1980, flying the Sea Harrier FRS Mk1.  He was already a superb Harrier pilot and a Qualified Warfare Instructor in the Harrier ground attack role. As such, he brought immense Harrier expertise to the new Sea Harrier world but he was the first to admit that his personal inventory of expertise did not include any air intercept or carrier operating knowledge – and without such knowledge he could not aspire to AWI status; which encompasses the full swing role capability of carrier operations, fighter combat, air intercept, surface strike, electronic warfare, ground attack and reconnaissance.

11.       Over the next two years, Ian completed his AWI training with flying colours and went on to distinguish himself as the 801 Squadron AWI during the Falklands campaign. By the time we went to war he had also achieved the status of being a fully qualified Naval All Weather Fighter Pilot with over 100 deck landings by day and about 80 deck landings by night. This total process qualifies him in all respects as an AWI or a Top Gun. Those without such expertise and experience should not assume this title.

12.       The recent publicity over Libya concerning the shortage of Typhoon pilots trained in ground attack operations exemplifies well the major differences that exist between the swing-role, all weather, Navy fighter pilot and his single-role RAF counterpart.  The carrier pilot will have been trained in all the disciplines referred to at the end of paragraph 10, above, and will be ready to conduct such operations in combat at a moment’s notice.  Not so the land-based air-to-air fighter pilot (Typhoon) or air-to-ground pilot (Tornado).  The Qualified Warfare Instructors (QWI’s) associated with each of these aircraft types do not have the expertise and training under their belts to either conduct or instruct in the other aircraft roles.

13.       This should raise many questions by our masters in Whitehall including:

a)     Answer.  Clearly, yes:

i)      Slow to deploy: if in service, a carrier with its air group could have been deployed off the Libyan coast and ready for operations well before the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was agreed.

ii)    Expensive to deploy: six months deployment of land-based air to Italy and Cyprus will cost in excess of £1 billion. A carrier stationed close to the Libyan theatre of action for six months would cost approximately £0.1 billion.

iii) Even when deployed, too far from target areas:  Gioia dell Colle is approximately 600 nautical miles from Misurata – making rapid and flexible response to targeting requests impossible.

iv)  Typhoon and Tornado aircraft are each unable to conduct both fighter air defence and close air support/interdiction missions. Therefore, twice the number of aircraft are required in theatre compared with a multi role fighter.

a)     Answer. No.

i)      They have no swing role fighter expertise at all.

ii)    They have no carrier operating expertise at all.

a)     Answer. No.

i)      Please see Annex B attached comparing investment and return of land-based military air versus carrier borne military air since the 1970s.

a)     Answer. Clearly, yes:

i)      They have no naval air warfare, swing role fighter or carrier operating expertise or experience.

a)     Answer. Clearly not.

i)      It has already taken the Royal Air Force several years to introduce Typhoon to service and even now it remains strictly a single role air-to-air fighter with aircrew short of flying hours and with no real air-to-ground weapon delivery qualification.  The £650 million project to provide the aircraft with an air-to-ground capability is fully funded, is more than two years old and has failed to provide the limited capability required. It must be deduced from this that the Royal Air Force does not have the experience, expertise or capability to generate a true swing role fighter aircraft in timely fashion.

ii)    Without the broad multirole expertise and experience of the Fleet Air Arm and bearing in mind the RAF’s inability to provide a simple ground attack capability for their air-to-air fighter in timely fashion, how can one expect them to be able to absorb 100 years of successful naval air warfare carrier expertise and then deploy the same in our new carriers in a timely and effective manner?

14.       Continuous reliance by our politicians and Ministers upon the self-professed airpower expertise of the Royal Air Force would be naive.

15.       Demonstrably within the last decade, Ministers have been misled into taking the following actions, each of which has been detrimental to the ability of Britain to deploy effective military and political influence offshore in support of the national interest:

a)     Withdrawal of the Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier FA2 from service.

b)    Withdrawal of the Harrier GR9 and HMS Ark Royal from service.

c)     Retention of the ageing, obsolete and air-worthiness-troubled Tornado GR4 in service.

d)    Investing further serious money in the Typhoon project to duplicate a capability that already exists.

16.       Compared to the Royal Navy Fixed Wing Fleet Air Arm, the Royal Air Force has had little experience of successful offshore expeditionary operations since World War II and has little expertise to offer in this area, especially regarding flexible and responsive carrier operations. This does not augur well for the future if reliance continues to be placed on advice from the Royal Air Force concerning the employment of air power in support of Navy and Army operations.

17.       In the light of the lack of experience and expertise enjoyed by the Royal Air Force in expeditionary offshore operations, it is recommended that the funding now being channelled into the Royal Air Force for air resources needed to support combat operations of the Royal Navy and the Army should be transferred to the control of these two Services.  This would:

a)     prevent further flawed advice being given to Ministers,

b)    remove the massive and wasteful expenditure on land-based air resources and

c)     ensure the retention of respect and influence for Britain’s armed forces on the international stage.

Please see next page for Table of the costs adjusted for inflation.

http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/historic-inflation-calculator

Tornado F1/F3. None.

Tornado GR1/4. Iraq – Desert Storm. Eight aircraft lost with little return.

Kosovo. Close Air Support of own forces when the weather permitted land-based flying.

Afghanistan. Close Air Support of own forces but less effective than the Harrier GR9.

Nimrod MRA. 1982. Surveillance of the seas around Ascension Island.

Zero presence or participation in the battle for the Falklands.

Typhoon. None.

Sea Harrier FRS Mk1. Falklands, 1982.

1500 war missions/sorties flown. 98% mission availability to the Command.

25 air-to-air kills in combat.

Deterred/turned away over 450 Argentinian aircraft bombing missions.

Dozens of interdiction, close air support and reconnaissance missions flown.

Disablement and sinking of the Narwhal intelligence gathering trawler.

Sea Harrier FA2. Iraq.  Policing the no-fly zone over Iraq alongside our American allies.

Bosnia/Kosovo.  Policing the no-fly zone and conducting air-to-ground missions when land-based aircraft were prevented from flying.

Sierra Leone.  Flying armed reconnaissance missions in support of ground forces.

Falklands,1982. Up to 126 ground attack missions flown from aircraft  carriers.

Assisted Parachute Regiment victory at Goose Green.

Kosovo. Hundreds of Close Air Support missions flown.

Afghanistan. Hundreds of highly successful Close Air Support missions flown and much applauded by our allies and ground forces in Theatre.