Executive Summary.

 

i.          This paper provides an insight into the manned fast jet component of Carrier Battle Group operations that ‘Project Power’ in support of British national interests overseas. It does not address the part that may be played by Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles (UCAVs) in the longer term.

 

ii.        It looks at a particular scenario where British interests are seriously threatened and addresses the problems facing the Command in deterring and opposing such a threat.

 

iii.       It refers to the importance of full control of all assets in the combat theatre being vested in the maritime (the sea) Commander (surface, subsurface and air) and emphasises the ability of the Task Group to poise in international waters for immediate action if called upon to meet a political requirement.

 

iv.        An operational analysis[1] is made of the capability of the differing fast-jet air groups that might be embarked in the Queen Elizabeth class carrier in the short to medium term. Significant conclusions concerning the ability of each air group to satisfy Command requirements are drawn from this analysis:

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents

Executive Summary. 1

Introduction. 3

Unilateral and Allied Operations. 4

Unilateral Operations. 4

Allied Operations. 4

Carrier Strike. 5

Command and Control. 6

Scenario:  A Blockade of the Hormuz Strait. 6

Setting the Scene. 6

Figure 1. Initial Disposition of Military Force. 7

Carrier Battle Group Constitution. 8

Planning. 8

Deterrence. 8

Air Defence. 8

Armed Reconnaissance over the Strait. 9

Limiting the Risk to Merchantmen. 9

Execution – Background. 10

The F-35C Air Group Capability. 10

Options Available to the Command. 10

Limitations. 11

Stealth Related. 11

Defence Suppression. 11

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs. 12

The F-35B STOVL Air Group Capability. 13

Options Available to the Command. 13

Deficiencies. 13

Defence Suppression. 14

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs. 14

The F-18E/F and EA-18G  Air Group Capability. 15

Options Available to the Command. 15

Defence Suppression – A Key Capability. 15

Figure 2.  EA-18G: key systems. 16

Capability available to the Command. 17

Limitations. 17

Execution – Discussion of Air Group Options. 17

Responsibilities. 17

Compatibility of the Air Group Options with Responsibilities. 18

Table 1. The capability or otherwise of each Air Group. 18

Conclusion 1. F-35B STOVL is incompatible with the Command’s needs. 19

Conclusion 2:  Defence Suppression – A Key Capability. 19

Annex A. Latent Trouble-Spots around the world East of Suez. 20

Near East. 20

Far East. 21

Annex B.  Air Power Capabilities and Roles – beyond NATO waters. 22

Annex C.  Sea Warfare – A Discussion. 23

 

 

Introduction.

 

“Whereas any European power has to support a vast army first of all, we in this fortunate, happy island, relieved by our insular position of a double burden, may turn our undivided efforts and attention to the Fleet.  Why should we sacrifice a game in which we are sure to win to play a game in which we are bound to lose?”

Winston Churchill.

 

1. One of the reasons that the Government and the Secretary of State considers Carrier Strike to be at the heart of Britain’s strategic defence policy is the proven operational effectiveness and flexibility of aircraft carriers and their deterrence value.

 

1. This paper is a follow-up to the earlier paper, “Why does Britain need aircraft carriers?” It provides an insight into future fast jet operations from an aircraft carrier in a likely combat theatre.

 

1. Intentionally, the combat theatre given is to the East of Suez where basing rights and over-flight rights might well not be easily available to land based air[2]. Operations to the West of Suez and within the NATO area of European influence may well be conducted with some efficiency from air fields where NATO bases are conveniently available for the support of unilateral or allied Expeditionary Force Operations.  This is not the case to the East of Suez where the perceived threat to our trade routes, our energy supplies and our overseas dependencies and interests has recently been brought into sharp focus.

 

1. The paper discusses the options and considerations that need to be taken into account by a Task Force Commander in pursuit of the early resolution of a crisis. It then goes on to examine the advantages and disadvantages of the three different air groups that could be embarked in the Queen Elizabeth class carrier.

 

1. It provides an understanding of:

a)    The necessary flexibility of air operations from a carrier deck.

b)    The critical importance of procuring the right air group/fast jet combat aircraft for such operations.

 

 

Unilateral and Allied Operations.

 

1. As an Island Nation, Britain has to place greater reliance upon maritime trade and seaborne energy supplies than our continental neighbours and needs to be able to protect and police the same on a global basis. It would be irresponsible and naive to rely upon other nations to protect our specific interests for us.

 

1. At the same time, it would be sensible for Britain to contribute to European commercial security and prosperity by being able to police global trade routes. The quid pro quo result of providing such a carrier strike capability should be for Britain to be able to rely upon our continental European neighbours to provide adequate military air and ground forces for the policing and protection of the European area itself.  This would save the taxpayer much nugatory expenditure.

 

Unilateral Operations.

 

1. ‘Carrier Strike’ provides Britain with the ability to deploy military, political and diplomatic influence and deterrence at will throughout the oceans of the world. It prevents the need to rely upon or comply with the sovereign will of other nations.

 

1. The current tension between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands demonstrates the possibility that Britain may once more be drawn into military action to protect its interests there. Such a contingency could arise this year or at any time in the future. But the retention of the Islands, albeit important, is just one example of why Britain needs to be able to deploy visible military power and deterrence. There are many more latent trouble-spots around the world East of Suez that would represent a serious and positive threat to our trade interests and energy supplies (see graphics at Annex A). We need to have the capability to contain such trouble-spots and to deter any escalation into full military action. If deterrence fails, then we need to be able to react with sudden and effective military force.

 

Allied Operations.

 

1. During and following the Cold War, the pre-eminent naval power that protected our interests was the United States. It provided a comprehensive strike capability and an umbrella of air defence for the majority of NATO military operations. Britain contributed to this strike and air defence capability with the fourth HMS Ark Royal up to the end of the 70s and with the Invincible class carriers up until the withdrawal of Harrier from service under SDSR 2010.

 

1. This withdrawal coincided with the public recognition within the United States that its NATO partners were ‘not pulling their weight’ with regard to investment in and the deployment of appropriate military resources. Britain’s investment in the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers will help redress this balance as well as giving Britain the necessary option for unilateral action when our interests do not coincide with those of the United States.

 

1. The reluctance of various European NATO nations to commit combat troops to action in support of recent Allied operations should sound a ‘warning bell’ to the British public and the British Government. It is fair to say that such recent operations[3] have been launched for the ‘common good’[4] (even though the justification for such interventionist operations continues to be debated) rather than the direct protection of Allied partners from attack. But the lack of full-blooded military support for such operations by powerful allies such as Germany is a clear indicator that if our specific national interests are threatened overseas, we cannot and should not rely on third-party assistance in defending those interests.

 

1. With the tangible move of US military interest away from Europe to the Pacific and the Far East (as well as a discernible possibility of a drift towards isolationism by United States if Europe does not begin to pull its weight), the umbrella of carrier strike and air defence provided so long by our transatlantic Allied superpower may not be available when we most need it.

 

Carrier Strike.

 

1. Whether in unilateral or allied operations, for seven decades aircraft carriers have provided Britain and its allies with a powerful first echelon^[5] carrier strike and air defence capability in the Middle East, Far East and the South Atlantic that enjoys a flexibility and utility that cannot be matched by land-based resources in terms of cost effectiveness and operational effectiveness.

 

1. The main body of this paper provides an insight into such carrier operations and their operational effectiveness. (A detailed summary of the many carrier roles that would be applicable East of Suez and in the South Atlantic is given at Annex B.)

 

 

Command and Control.

 

1. Of overriding importance to the success of any military operation over land or sea, whether in the form of fully fledged combat or deterrence, is for the in-theatre Commander to have full and immediate control of all resources associated with the task force operation (surface warships, submarines, aircraft and ground forces). Generically, there are two forms of warfare: ‘Over Land Warfare’ and ‘Sea Warfare’. A pertinent discussion of this is provided at Annex C.

 

1. It is part of the heritage of modern Sea Warfare that comprehensive command and control facilities are provided in our major warships at sea so that all surface, subsurface and air systems can be fully and effectively integrated and deployed within the theatre of operations.  There is no place here for the ‘left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing’.

 

1. The parallel to this command function in the civilian world is that a company or organisation has just one Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The company or organisation would founder if there were two CEOs in charge, each with a different viewpoint or perspective. For globally based companies, particular areas of the world would have a local CEO or Chief Operations Officer responsible for the effective tactical conduct of business in that area. Strategic control of the global interests of the company would remain vested in the CEO at Corporate Headquarters.

 

1. For military operations overseas, the Prime Minister is the strategic CEO based in corporate headquarters (Whitehall) and the Chief Operations Officer responsible for the effective tactical conduct of military operations in theatre is the on-site Commander of the Task Force.

 

Scenario:  A Blockade of the Hormuz Strait.

 

Setting the Scene.

 

1. Iran decides to hold back from any direct confrontation with the United States and creates a scenario in which it escalates tension with Britain alone and threatens to close access to the Hormuz Strait to all merchantmen and tankers carrying Britain’s vital energy supplies.

 

1. The first sign of Iran’s military intent is the harassment of British vessels transiting the Strait by numerous heavily-armed high-speed patrol craft.  Many are now permanently based in the Strait in anticipation of a need to conduct asymmetric warfare ‘swarm attack’ operations against the American fleet.

 

1. The United States sympathises with Britain’s predicament but “has escalating troubles within the Pacific region that it has to attend to”. It offers Britain moral support but indicates that this is a problem specifically of Britain’s making (as with the Falklands dispute) and is therefore something for Britain to sort out unilaterally.

 

1. Britain deploys a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) to the Arabian Sea.

 

1. Negotiations for the deployment of British military combat aircraft to Arab States such as the United Arab Emirates or to the Sultanate of Oman are bedevilled by the fear that such basing rights, if given, would attract a strong military response from Iran against those Gulf States. Eventually, after several weeks of intense negotiation, it is agreed by Oman that logistic support aircraft may use the airfield at Salalah as a transit base – but fast jet combat aircraft will not be allowed to operate from Omani territory. Meanwhile, the Carrier Battle Group has arrived rapidly on station close to the Gulf of Oman. See Figure 1, below.

 

 

 

 

Carrier Battle Group Constitution.

 

1. The carrier HMS Prince of Wales is escorted by a Type 45 missile destroyer, two general-purpose frigates, a hunter killer submarine armed with Tomahawk missiles and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker and support vessel.

 

1. The CVBG air group includes 24 multi-role fighter aircraft plus Merlin antisubmarine helicopters and Lynx surface attack helicopters.

 

Planning.

 

1. During transit to the theatre of operations the CVBG Command conducts a detailed Threat Reduction Exercise, analysing all available intelligence of Iranian force capability and disposition. This provides the Command with ‘worst-case’ threat scenarios for which the CVBG must be prepared to deter and/or repulse. Surface, subsurface and air threats are examined in detail.  These threat scenarios are continuously updated from active intelligence gathered in theatre and from satellite.

 

1. With this information in hand the Command is able to plan the most effective use of on-site resources[6] and to position the CVBG to its own advantage, i.e.

a)    Reducing the probability of direct attacks on the battle group itself and yet

b)    Still allowing maximum offensive firepower to be brought to bear in the Strait and on the Iranian mainland as and when the situation so dictates.

 

Deterrence.

 

1. The first duty of the CVBG is to deter any harmful action by Iranian forces against British merchantmen and tanker supplies transiting the Hormuz Strait. The very existence of the CVBG in the Arabian Sea represents the first level of deterrence. It demonstrates a significant show of force that will be used in the event of any attack on British shipping.

 

Air Defence.

 

1. It is important that the CVBG is able to stand off from the Strait at a distance which prevents the effective use of land-based air and missile systems against it. The initial distance from the Iranian mainland as shown in Figure 1, above, is less than the command would wish if full-scale military action does break out and so instead of moving further offshore, half of the embarked fighter aircraft are used to maintain a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) air defence barrier between the mainland and the Group.

 

1. The continuous presence of CAP aircraft with their state-of-the-art radar and sensors off the Iranian coast achieves four objectives:

a)    It demonstrates the sustained capability of the CVBG air group to defend against air attack;

b)    It allows for detailed air surveillance of the over land movement of aircraft, mobile surface-to-air and surface to surface missile systems thereby providing essential targeting information;

c)     It allows for the detailed surveillance of the coastal waters and the identification and position of threat surface units in those waters;

d)    It facilitates the early, positive identification of air contacts that might pose a threat to the fleet.

 

Armed Reconnaissance over the Strait.

 

1. The balance of embarked multirole fighter aircraft are tasked with armed reconnaissance missions over the narrow waters of the Strait. During the state of tension, these missions have three objectives:

a)    Deterrence through visible presence.

b)    Ascertain the position of and identify shore-based offensive and defensive weapons systems, whether mobile or static;

c)     Identify the number and disposition of threat fast patrol craft that might be used to enforce a blockade against British shipping.

 

Limiting the Risk to Merchantmen.

 

1. It is decided that a convoy system should be utilised for the merchantmen exiting and entering the Gulf in order that the most effective and concentrated protection can be provided.  The Command takes the decision that escorting these convoys with surface warships in addition to an umbrella of air defence would place those warships at unnecessarily high risk. It would provide Iran with the opportunity/excuse to conduct an overwhelming swarm attack “against military targets that threaten their national security”.

 

1. Fighter combat armed reconnaissance missions are timed to coincide with the passage of convoys through the Strait and the northern reaches of the Gulf of Oman. A continuous and sustained air presence is required during convoy movements.

 

1. Threat capability must be degraded by the jamming of all surveillance and missile direction radars on the Iranian mainland close to the Strait.

 

1. With the air threat countered by superior multi-targeting fighter air defence weapon systems and with the missile threat countered by airborne electronic warfare jamming, the most significant threat remaining to the safety of the merchantmen in convoy lies with the asymmetric force of well-armed fast patrol boats at the narrowest point of the Strait.

 

Execution – Background.

 

1. The effective execution of the plans drawn up by the CVBG Command will be governed by the capability of the embarked multirole fighter aircraft. It is envisaged that the constitution of the carrier air group could be either:

a)    F-35C aircraft with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability.

b)    F-35B STOVL aircraft without an air to air refuelling capability.

c)     F-18E/F/G aircraft with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability and a sophisticated Electronic Warfare Defence Suppression capability.

 

1. It is understood that the cost of conversion of the F-35C to provide it with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability is in excess of £1 billion. Such a conversion requirement is unique to the United Kingdom. The United States Navy does not need this capability because it plans to operate the F-18E/F aircraft (which has that capability already) alongside the F-35C.  Interestingly, the provision of a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability for the F-35B STOVL has not yet been addressed and, if it were possible, it is likely that it would cost the UK taxpayer at least as much as converting the Queen Elizabeth class carriers from a ramp to ‘cat and trap’.

 

The F-35C Air Group Capability.

 

Options Available to the Command.

 

1. The F-35C stealth fighter aircraft could provide the Command with many options/advantages, the principal ones of which are:

a)    The aircraft’s Low Observable (Stealth) qualities allow it to operate unseen by current threat radar: giving it considerable invulnerability to threat weapon systems[7].  Combat attrition of own air resources is therefore minimised.

b)    Combat Radius of Action for strike attack: unrefuelled – 720 nautical miles; refuelled – more than 1000 nautical miles.  This allows the CVBG to be stationed at a safe distance offshore/from the operating area whilst still enabling fighter aircraft to remain on task conducting armed reconnaissance/convoy protection (for at least one hour unrefuelled or more than two hours with buddy-buddy air to air refuelling – the latter being a very effective ‘force magnifier’).

c)     Air defence of the CVBG – time on station: unrefuelled – 2.5 hours; refuelled – more than four hours.

d)    Surface and air surveillance: state-of-the-art, excellent capability.

e)    Suppression of enemy air defence, missile guidance and surveillance radars: this is not yet a ‘given’.

f)     A full range of state-of-the-art air to air and air to ground/surface ordnance that can be carried internally, thereby preserving the stealth quality of the aircraft and its performance.

g)    A deep strike capability for attacking high-value targets within the Iranian mainland interior.

 

Limitations.

 

1. This aircraft is expected to have few limitations in the context its strike/attack capability in the context of Expeditionary Force Operations in the littoral.

 

Stealth Related.

 

1. Perversely, one of the limitations it might be perceived to suffer from is in the Deterrence Role and is a product of its stealth qualities. Aircraft without stealth qualities are easily detected by threat radar systems and as such can be used to demonstrate power and intent to an enemy. For example, aircraft operating in the air defence role off the mainland coast of southern Iran can demonstrate power and intent only if they are visible to the enemy on radar.

 

1. Fortunately, the Low Observable qualities of the F-35C can be overcome purposefully in several ways.  In the context of the air defence barrier placed by the Command between the Iranian mainland and the CVBG, one way to achieve this would be with the multiple external carriage of air to air missiles (AMRAAM). Whilst reducing stealth quality and making the aircraft more visible to enemy radars, this external carriage enhances the firepower of the aircraft considerably and strengthens the air defence cordon around the CVBG

 

Defence Suppression.

 

1. It has yet to be ascertained how capable the F-35C would be at the suppression of enemy air defence radars. Will it have a very broad spectrum capability equal to the F-18G Super Growler aircraft that enabled the rapid and complete suppression and, hence, the effective interdiction of air defence radars and missile systems on the establishment of the Libya no-fly zone?[8]

 

1. The Growler capability was fundamental to the destruction/incapacitation of Libya’s air defence capability thereby allowing unfettered access by Allied air support aircraft that would otherwise have been vulnerable to attack.

 

1. This type of capability would be invaluable, even possibly vital, for the safe conduct of effective operations over the Hormuz Strait. Significantly, it would also inhibit the capability of fast patrol craft (and shore-based missile systems) attempting to fire radar-laid missiles at our merchantmen.

 

1. The operational value of this capability cannot be overstated – denying the enemy the ability to launch state-of-the-art ordnance/missiles at own forces.

 

1. Further, when operating in conjunction with Tomahawk missiles launched from hunter killer submarines, the Growler capability endows the Command with the unique ability to provide a crushing first strike against the threat right at the commencement of any hostile military action.

 

1. As evidenced in Libya, if there is no intention of placing boots on the ground in the Hormuz Strait area, this defence suppression capability would appear to be of paramount importance – operationally necessary and extremely cost-effective.

 

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs.

 

1. With the F-35C air group, the CVBG Command could enjoy:

a)    Effective flexibility of movement of the battle group made possible by

1.                         i.         The long combat reach of the aircraft,
2.                       ii.         Its endurance in the air conducting air defence missions (providing for a lower number of aircraft launch and recovery cycles).

b)    State-of-the-art air, surface and ground reconnaissance/surveillance – enabling precise target identification and position.

c)     The ability to strike enemy targets with relative invulnerability (through the stealth characteristics of the aircraft).

d)    The ability to provide a continuous/sustainable air defence presence over convoys exiting and entering the Gulf.

 

1. However, a significant shortfall may exist within the air group capability if the F-35 does not indeed enjoy the full jamming capability of the EA-18 Super Growler aircraft. That is the ability to completely suppress Iranian surveillance and targeting radars. Whereas the aircraft itself may remain undetected by such radars, other units within or detached from the battle group (including helicopters, surface ships and possibly logistic supply aircraft) may remain visible and vulnerable to long-range attack. Significantly, within the Strait itself, the numerous fast patrol craft that represent the threat of asymmetric attack on merchant vessels may continue to have full use of their targeting radar.

 

 

The F-35B STOVL Air Group Capability.

 

Options Available to the Command.

 

1. The F-35B STOVL stealth fighter aircraft provides the Command with fewer options/advantages than the F-35C:

a)    The aircraft’s Low Observable qualities could allow it to operate unseen by threat radar: giving it considerable invulnerability to threat weapon systems.  Combat attrition of own air resources is therefore minimised.

b)    Surface and air surveillance: state-of-the-art, excellent capability.

c)     Suppression of enemy air defence, missile guidance and surveillance radars: this is not yet a ‘given’.

 

Deficiencies.

 

1. Compared with the F-35C, the STOVL ‘B’ aircraft is severely limited in the following areas:

a)    Combat Radius of Action for strike attack: 380 nautical miles – and no buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability. This restricts the flexibility of movement of the CVBG preventing it from being stationed at a greater/safe distance offshore.  The CVBG must remain within 380 nautical miles of the Hormuz Strait and therefore within the restrictive confines of the Gulf of Oman to enable the attack and interdiction of targets in that area. A conflict therefore exists between the safety of the CVBG and the effective conduct of strike/attack operations.

b)    The reduced combat radius of action prevents the aircraft from remaining on task over the Strait for the conduct of continuous/sustained armed reconnaissance/convoy protection missions.

c)     Air Defence of the CVBG – time on station: 1.25 hours.  For 24/7 operations this requires the ship to conduct 19 launch and recovery cycles every 24 hours. (As opposed to just under 10 launch and recovery cycles for the F-35C).

d)    If the stealth qualities of the aircraft are to be preserved during strike/attack missions, external ordnance cannot be carried. The internal weapons bay of the STOVL ‘B’ aircraft is shorter than that of the F-35C preventing it from being able to carry the same quantity as and/or some of the larger state-of-the-art air to surface weapons. This is likely to be a critical shortfall when attempting to counter the possible asymmetric swarm attacks that may be conducted by Iranian fast patrol craft on vessels in the convoys.

e)    It has no deep strike capability for attacking high-value targets within the Iranian mainland interior.

 

Defence Suppression.

 

1. Partially as a result of the more limited space within the airframe, it is possible that the ‘B’ STOVL aircraft may not be able to provide the defence suppression capability enjoyed by the Growler aircraft.

 

1. As explained at paragraphs 43 to 48 above, this would be a significant shortfall in operational capability: denying the command the ability to conduct a substantial first strike blow to the enemy air defences. The result of this would be a continuation of attacks on convoys until multiple attritional strikes by the STOVL ‘B’ aircraft have been flown (this could take many days, if not weeks – in which time Britain’s economy could have been brought to its knees through lack of energy supplies).

 

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs.

 

1. With the F-35B STOVL air group, the CVBG Command would probably experience:

a)    Less flexibility of movement of the battle group because of the shorter combat radius of the aircraft: increasing risk to the battle group.

b)    The inability to provide a continuous/sustainable air defence presence over convoys exiting and entering the Gulf without moving the CVBG dangerously close to the threat in the northern confines of the Gulf of Oman.

c)     As with the F 35C, the possible inability to completely suppress Iranian surveillance and targeting radars. Significantly, within the Strait itself, the numerous fast patrol craft that represent the threat of asymmetric attack on merchant vessels may continue to have full use of their targeting radar.

d)    Double the intensity of flight deck launch and recovery operations: introducing more fatigue for all concerned with such operations.

 

1. However, the CVBG Command would enjoy:

a)    State of the art air, surface and ground reconnaissance/surveillance – enabling precise target identification and position.

b)    The ability to strike enemy targets with relative invulnerability (through the stealth characteristics of the aircraft).

 

 

The F-18E/F and EA-18G  Air Group Capability.

 

Options Available to the Command.

 

1. An air group centred upon F-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Super Growler aircraft provides the Command with considerable flexibility and versatility.

 

Defence Suppression – A Key Capability.

 

1. The key advantage enjoyed by the Command with this air group is the availability of the EA-18G Super Growler electronic warfare variant that has additional electronics within the aircraft to help it detect and jam enemy radars and mounts 4 specialized ECM (Electronic Counter-Measures) pods under the wings. This aircraft replaces the EA-6B Prowler which has become the only Western electronic warfare aircraft capable of accompanying fighters into combat. A graphic representation of this aircraft’s EW and Jamming equipment is provided at Figure 2, below.

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. The defence suppression capability of this aircraft may be said to negate the need for Low Observable/Stealth characteristics in the F-18E/F aircraft. However, the latter have received some low observable modifications that convey upon these aircraft the stature of a 4.5 generation aircraft. They have a lower radar signature than any fourth-generation fighter aircraft such as the Typhoon.

 

Capability available to the Command.

 

1. The F-18 aircraft would provide the Command with many options/advantages, the principal ones of which are:

a)    The Growler Electronic Warfare and Jamming capabilities allow friendly aircraft to operate unseen by threat radar: giving them considerable invulnerability to threat weapon systems. This offsets/compensates effectively for the aircraft’s lack of true Low Observable stealth qualities. Combat attrition of own resources is therefore minimised.

b)    Combat Radius of Action for strike attack: unrefuelled – approximately 400 nautical miles; refuelled – more than 600 nautical miles.  This allows the CVBG to be stationed at a safe distance offshore/from the operating area whilst still enabling the aircraft to remain on task conducting armed reconnaissance/convoy protection (for at least one hour with buddy-buddy air to air refuelling – the latter being a very effective ‘force magnifier’).

c)     Air defence of the CVBG – time on station: unrefuelled – 1.25 hours; refuelled – approximately three hours.

d)    Surface and air surveillance: state-of-the-art, excellent capability.

e)    A full range of state-of-the-art air to air and air to surface/ground ordnance.

 

Limitations.

 

1. This Air Group has few limitations in its strike/attack and air defence capability in the context of Expeditionary Force Operations.

 

1. Although the aircraft’s unrefuelled combat radius is similar to that of the F-35B STOVL, it does have a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability that is commonly used during all flight operations from the deck and this extends the combat radius of the aircraft to beyond 600 nautical miles. This is satisfactory for most Expeditionary Force Operations over the sea and in the littoral area. For example, 40% of all offensive air to ground operations in support of ground forces in Afghanistan is conducted from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers by the F-18 aircraft at a range of approximately 600 nm.

 

Execution – Discussion of Air Group Options.

 

Responsibilities.

 

1. The CVBG Command has two indivisible responsibilities:

a)    The protection of UK merchantmen and associated energy supplies transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

b)    Preserving the safety and integrity of the battle group itself.

 

1. The effective fulfilment of these responsibilities is directly related to the constitution and capability of the embarked air group. The Command must be able to deter hostile action against our shipping in the Strait. In a state of tension this requires the visible and sustained presence of armed reconnaissance combat aircraft over the Strait during convoy passage.

 

Compatibility of the Air Group Options with Responsibilities.

 

1. These responsibilities can be satisfied by an F-35C or an F-18 air group (whilst maintaining flexibility of movement and therefore, the safety of the battle group), both of which enjoy the advantages of buddy-buddy air to air refuelling for the extension of combat radius and endurance on task.

 

1. The F-35B STOVL air group has a relatively short combat radius and does not enjoy the capability of buddy-buddy air to air refuelling.  This combat radius is insufficient to provide an adequate convoy protection presence over the Strait of Hormuz without the carrier battle group being stationed in the restricted waters of the northern Gulf of Oman, close to the Iranian mainland and within range of Iranian threat weapon systems. This would place the CVBG at unacceptable political and military risk.

 

1. The key capabilities of each air group in relation to the needs of the command are given in Table 1, below.

 

Table 1. The capability or otherwise of each Air Group.

 

Air Group Capability	Robust Defence Suppression	Sustained Patrol over Convoys	Deterring Swarm Attack	Adequate Combat Radius	Causes Risk to CVBG	Preferred Option
F-35C	?	YES	YES	YES	NO	2nd
F-35B	?	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
F-18E/F &          EA-18G	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	1st

 

 

 

 

Conclusion 1.

 

1. The F-35B STOVL air group capability is incompatible with the indivisible responsibilities of the CVBG Command.

 

Conclusion 2:  Defence Suppression – A Key Capability.

 

1. The examination of the options available to the Command as given above clearly indicates that the safety and defence of all CVBG units/assets/weapon systems and the safety of our merchantmen transiting the Strait of Hormuz is best served by having a defence suppression capability at least as good as that of the EA-18G Super Growler available within the embarked air group.

 

1. This is a key capability for combating the hostile intent of Iranian military forces against British shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz (and in all other scenarios where military force may be used against our National Interest).

 

Annex A. Latent Trouble-Spots around the world East of Suez.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Annex B.  Air Power Capabilities and Roles – beyond NATO waters.

	Sea-Based	Land-Based
Leaves undesirable political footprint	No	Yes
Requires pre-positioning of support	No	Yes
Requires Basing & Over-Flight Rights	No	Yes
Aid to Civil Power	√	No
Disaster Relief	√	Limited
Evacuation of British Nationals	√	Limited
On site powerful Visible Deterrence	√	No
Maritime air surveillance	√	Limited
Maritime surface surveillance	√	Limited
Maritime sub-surface surveillance	√	Limited
Suppression of enemy air defences	√	Limited
Air Space Denial	√	No
Rapid Offensive Air Support	√	No
Airborne Early Warning (AEW)	√	Limited
Defence Against Missile & Aircraft Attack	√	No
Over the Horizon Reconnaissance	√	Very Limited
Responsive Over the Horizon Strike	√	No
Responsive Intruder Identification	√	No
Command & Control	√	Limited
Combat Search & Rescue	√	No
Full Combat Medical Service	√	No
Full Amphibious Operation Support	√	No

 

 

Annex C.  Sea Warfare – A Discussion.

 

1. The Armed Forces purpose is to ensure the Defence of the Realm and to project power to meet ‘The National Interest’ – the country‘s goals and ambitions economic, military, and cultural.  While primary is the State’s survival and security – the pursuit of wealth and economic growth and power are also important as is preservation of the nation’s culture.

 

1. Currently the UK has three Armed Services whose primary purposes are as follows:

a)    The Royal Navy to project power over the sea (Maritime) and to support the Army,

b)    The Army to project power over the land and

c)     The Royal Air Force to provide UK Air Defence and to provide air support to combat operations over the sea and over the land.

 

1. In keeping with HMG’s “Defence Reform” published on 18 July 2011 to align with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), MOD is being reorganised to ensure a leaner and less centralised organisation with devolved processes for greater accountability and transparency.

 

1. The restructured Defence Board will be responsible for the strategic direction of defence policy and the Service Chiefs empowered to run their individual Services more effectively as part of a clear framework of financial accountability and control.

 

1. MOD Head Office will be smaller and more strategic in its role and a new 4-star led Joint Forces Command is intended to strengthen joint warfare development.

 

1. In keeping with HMG’s requirement for significant cost savings together with political and military flexibility, there would be merit in blurring the edges of single Service responsibilities – particularly for the RAF’s procurement and operation to be more of a support provider for Over Land or Sea Operations – rather than is increasingly the case – “A thing apart”.

 

1. In the Maritime case there should be a move away from Naval Operational Commanders being insularly ‘old style’ to embracing all assets directly supporting power projection over the sea (surface, sub-surface and air).

 

1. As HMG has directed that there be major cultural change – particularly in procurement – there would be significant merit in the Land and Sea commanders having a direct input and some responsibility for the procurement of all assets – particularly those air assets which they will require for their discharge of full responsibility in envisaged operations in the Land / Maritime theatres.  Such a ‘support philosophy’- which some might see as radical – would totally align with the Service Chief’s new responsibilities, enable them to ‘get on with the fighting’, stop all inter-Service squabbles for limited resources and ensure Ministers were routinely presented with clear and unambiguous guidance, unfettered by single service interests, on that procurement necessary to project power over the Land and the Sea.

 

1. During subsequent operations where HMG requires the Armed Forces to project power in the National Interest there should be clear Unity of Command to ensure unity of effort so that, at all levels of war, employment of military forces can be conducted quickly to mass combat power toward a common objective.  This would require all the forces operating over land and over sea to be directed by one responsible land and one responsible sea commander in every theatre so the requisite authority was immediately available to direct all forces to maximum effect in pursuit of a unified purpose.

 

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