Admiral the Right Honourable Lord West of Spithead.

This speech to the House of Lords, from Wednesday 15^th May, 2013, is reproduced with the kind permission of  its author. 

My Lords:

“It is upon the navy under the good Providence of God that the safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly depend”.

Thus ran the preamble to the Articles of War, written more than 300 years ago. There is no doubt that naval dominance of European waters was the longest, most complex and expensive project ever undertaken by British state society. As a result a small, weak, insignificant offshore island was able to develop into the world’s greatest power. More recently, the prime reason we survived the German wars of the first half of the 20th century was the strength of the Royal Navy.

We remain the sixth wealthiest country in the world; world shipping, which is the sinews of our global village, is run from London; we are responsible for 14 dependencies worldwide; we are the biggest European investor in South Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific Rim, where stability is crucial if we are to get the return we need from our investments; and we are a permanent member of the Security Council. We are, like it or not—and I know that many do not like it—a world power. We are of course an island, but the Government seem sometimes to forget that. The maritime sector was worth more than £10 billion in 2010, and 90% by value and 95% by volume of our imports and exports travel by sea.

How are we safeguarding this today? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, rightly said that there was hardly any mention of defence in the gracious Speech. The Prime Minister has stated on a number of occasions that defence and security are the first responsibility of government. These are fine words but I fear that they have not been backed up by actions. In the 2010 strategic defence and security review we took measures that severely weakened our ability to project power, yet within months our forces were being committed to action in Libya. There have been further cuts since, and further indications that the Government would be willing to commit British forces if we are not careful.

Similar cuts are being made by our European allies, and the USA is finding itself carrying more and more of the defence burden of looking after the military interests of the western democracies and other nations worldwide. The US, too, is having to find savings and is now looking across the Pacific rather than towards the Euro-Atlantic region. Europe will have to take on more responsibility for its own security. The US has consistently supported us in the European, African and near-eastern area. Are we really not going to support them in the Far East and Pacific if the call comes? Those areas are increasingly important to the UK as well as to the US.

None of us can predict the next crisis. It may happen tomorrow, and from my experience of the intelligence world I know that we have a very bad track record of predicting crises. In an increasingly chaotic and dangerous world we must carry our share of the burden. Simply and starkly, we are not carrying our share. I do not have time to list all our shortfalls that impact on the critical mass of the Navy. Manpower has to be one area of concern. We had 75,000 sailors in 1982, some 30 years ago, and have 26,500 today—a cut of two-thirds in naval manpower, with all the effects that that has on flexibility.

I will be fair to the Government and congratulate them on their realisation of the crucial significance of maritime strike, and their aspiration to run both new carriers. Not to run both would be a national disgrace. Let us hope that their gamble of getting rid of “Ark Royal” and the Harriers pays off. So far we have got away with it for three years; we have to get away with it for another four or five. It was a gamble.

I will focus on just one example of our many shortfalls in the maritime sphere. Noble Lords may remember the preamble about the importance of the Navy to our nation that I gave at the beginning of my speech. Do the Government really believe that 19 destroyers and frigates—that means only six deployed—are sufficient for our nation? At the time of the Falklands war, when the Royal Navy saved the Government’s bacon, we had about 60 destroyers and frigates. The difference in capability of our new ships does not make up for the huge lack of numbers; one ship cannot be in two places at once. We have cut to the bone and, in naval parlance, our nation is standing into danger. I have written to the Prime Minister stating that very point.

We can no longer be sure that our Armed Forces are capable of meeting the tasks that our nation and people expect of them. We are at a crisis point, and something has to be done. History has shown how our nation suffers if we forget the crucial importance of our military and, in particular, of the sea and our Navy.

A Discussion on Maritime Strategy 

By Rear Admiral P G V Dingemans CB DSO; assisted by Hal Wilson and several others.

The authors of this paper have not had access to, nor have they consulted with, the Naval Staff.  Their ideas and arguments are those of many other like-minded people concerned by the poor understanding of the United Kingdom’s maritime needs.

Since the Tudor period, Britain’s survival has been contingent on its ability to defend its shores and maintain free passage for its oceanic trade. At times, this was achieved by the singular mastery of the sea and, at others, in concert with allies. The past century saw a shift to the latter outlook, as the British Empire dissolved and the United States of America grew to become the “defender of the last resort”.  Now, the United States looks to the Pacific and rising Chinese power – at Europe’s expense.

Britain’s last significant naval operation – independent but for discreet allied support – was the liberation of the Falkland Islands in 1982. However, by the opening of the twenty first century, the campaign’s problems seemed broadly forgotten. Ranging from poor intelligence, to unreliable radar, to insufficient joint-service training for naval operations, its challenges were broadly rooted in successive governments’ starving the armed forces of vital resources.

This was surely the result of strategic imbalance. Understandable focus on the Soviet land threat in the NATO theatre, coupled with growing interest in the European Union, left the United Kingdom’s global concerns – Commonwealth, Overseas Territories and Defence Treaties – under-valued and under-appreciated. The purpose of this paper is to address such shortcomings, and their endurance today – noting that the UK’s maritime strategy has not been updated for some time.

Though everyone has experience of working on land, comparatively few have been to sea, a detail that applies even to policymakers and strategists.  Nor is this surprising – aircraft offer far quicker transport than ships.  This leaves most people unfamiliar with the maritime environment and entails  unique implications for National policy, maritime strategy and tactics. While states conduct war on land to achieve long-term political control over a territory, war at sea is concerned with the temporary control over oceanic traffic, whether by sea or air, or a denial of its use by an adversary. This remains a serious concern for modern Britain’s outlook, despite contrary opinion.

Maritime operations revolve around two key features. Firstly, in peacetime, they safeguard the transport and delivery of civilian shipping, ensuring its safety and legal rights. Secondly, and just as importantly, they advance a nation’s conduct of war. Note also that military history often follows the recurring theme of political actors pursuing control over land.  As such, despite limited, recent assertions of state sovereignty over oceanic areas, the natural state of the seas remains one of an absence of state control.

The implications of this are clear and unsurprising. Both key maritime missions, and the basic political status of the maritime environment, are easily often out of sight and mind – but in crisis or war, maritime forces might be decisive. They require neither overflying rights, nor lack staying power. Their inherent mobility and flexibility make them an ideal instrument to blend varying foreign office policies. Equally, they can be withdrawn easily, leaving behind no entangling physical reminders, but strong symbolic ones.

This is the essence of ‘Grand Strategy.’

Even today, considerable debate remains over that concept’s meaning. This extends even to the House of Commons, where the “Public Administration Select Committee” tried to investigate the subject. The term “grand strategy,” seemingly deemed inappropriate  for the modern era, was instead termed “national strategy.” Despite this outward shift, however, the precise meaning of the term remained unstated.

Nevertheless, the agreed title leans towards Basil Liddell Hart’s description of grand strategy. Here, we find useful insight:

“The role of ‘grand strategy’ is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation towards the attainment of the political object of the war: the goal defined by national policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of the nation in order to sustain the fighting services. So also with the moral resources, for to foster and fortify the will to win and to endure is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. And it should regulate the distribution of power between the several services and between the services and industry.

“Nor is this all, for fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy. It should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and not least, ethical pressure to weaken the opponent’s will. A good cause is a sword as well and a buckler. Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.”

Strategy (whether “grand” or “national”) clearly applies to the naval service as it does to the other services; all three make their contribution towards a national strategy. In utilising those contributions, the most difficult but essential step is – having acquired it – to engage overall strategic and operational insight in ways that can inform policy.  The old Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) sought and found a way to do this. Their definitions remain cogent and functional today.

For instance an earlier strategist, Sir Julian Corbett, stated that sea command did not involve conquest of sea area, but rather control of maritime communications. Such command does not mean that the enemy can do nothing – but that he cannot interfere with our maritime trade and overseas operations seriously enough to affect the operations of the war.   Conversely, his own trade and operations would be so exposed to such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of practical strategy. If he had lived to see the development of aircraft, as well as submersibles, he might well have addressed concerns above and below the seas. All three are now inextricably linked.  In this, we see strategy does not exist as a wholly isolated concept – it is inseparable from politics.

Note the remarkable finding of October 2011′s House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. This enquiry – on how the British government conducts strategy – concluded that the British system can no longer make effective national strategy as it once did. In August 2012 the same committee, now addressing the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010, reached similarly notable conclusions. It criticised the 2010 SDSR in conception and consequence: It declined to accept the Prime Minister’s view of its effects – or the testimonial agreement of certain other politicians and senior officials. Neither finding believed that Britain has a robust National Security strategy today. Neither concluded that this problem could be fixed by marginal adjustment.

Demonstrably then, Britain currently endures significant challenges in strategising and mainstream political conceptions of strategy. But, before we address its implications for policy, let us consider its narrower implications for British sea power. Indeed, let us define the concept itself.

One recent suggestion in naval thinking is that sea power offers a form of strategic depth, much like the vast Russian steppe: It allows withdrawal to avoid defeat, and space to prepare for ultimate victory. Naturally, sea power faced by land power is still essentially defensive, but the defence enjoys an elasticity, which, as it withdraws, gathers strength for the return blow. Here, through the over-reach of Napoleon or Hitler, we find one historical aspect to British sea power.

Conversely, British sea power has also been interpreted in terms of economic history; as part of Britain’s rise as an Imperial and Industrial Power. This approach tends to make naval power appear as an inevitable product of impersonal historical forces, bound to rise as the British economy rose, and fall as it declined. Indeed, just as it was an essential component of success in the era of dispersed maritime empires, it was doomed to irrelevance as railways and aircraft steadily replaced shipping for some purposes. Thus, seaborne empires and the navies that protected them became burdens rather than strengths.

Nevertheless in Britain’s historical strategies, sea power – within its limitations – played a useful defensive role. Rather than form the expensive part element of national strategy, it facilitated British desires to keep intervention on the Continent limited.  Sea power delivered vital protection for troops in transit, while assisting diplomatically in peacetime – or else actively in wartime. Thus, we can define British sea power (indeed, sea power in itself) as the simple ability to use the sea.

Clearly, as an island nation, our strategic reality compels us to look to sea power even today – for security, for trade or for protection of natural resources and offshore rigs. Britain’s sea power must also be compatible with NATO strategy, and capable of appropriate contributions to that alliance, as well as the European Union and Commonwealth. We have been regularly called upon to deliver such assistance – but only through sea power is that possible in far-flung theatres. Beyond alliance obligations, beyond acts of friendship to allies in need, that assistance serves as stark recognition that Great Britain is ready and willing to defend key national responsibilities and interests worldwide.

USS Farragut overseeing the destruction of a pirate skiff, 2010, Gulf of Aden.

The global nature of those concerns merely underlines the modern relevance of British sea power. Maintaining stability at geopolitical lynchpins, assuring protection and access to vital energy and mineral resources, combating international terrorism, piracy and smuggling, protecting fisheries and maritime heritage sites or supporting valuable Overseas Territories like Gibraltar or the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus – all are pressing challenges for Great Britain. All can be met only through proper equipment and sufficient manpower.

Indeed, those requirements of men and materiel must be delivered as rapidly, freely – and as high a quantity – as possible. Yet, such deployments are rarely possible by air transport and land routes alone. Nor, in today’s uncertain geopolitical context, can we guarantee the legal right to operate on land in-theatre. Accordingly, an offshore capacity to deploy air, sea and land assets is as imperative as ever. Only such a capability gives us choice and flexibility – while avoiding unwanted political entanglements.

This strategic reality must be forcefully underlined by the Royal Navy, an internationally respected institution with a compelling history and strong purpose – but too often failing to voice a clear case for its relevance. That failure has undermined its ability to explain the maritime aspects of national security – and helped contribute to the aforementioned dearth of British grand strategy.

The need to develop that strategy is pressing. Not only are most of the planet’s states coastal but also, with an increase of around 50 million per year, 40% of the earth’s population live within 100 km of the sea. Beyond demographics creating an ever-greater importance behind littoral concerns, we should also add that many poorer coastal states are simply too fragile to police their maritime regions. With poor governance, the full spectrum of seaborne crime becomes possible, jeopardising the security of resource-exploitation and oceanic traffic within that state’s maritime zone. Thus, in a vicious circle, state instability and the vulnerability of growing littoral populations will become ever more acute.

As a nation dependent on seaborne traffic, Britain’s material well-being is demonstrably inseparable from such regional challenges.  Maintaining freedom of navigation on the oceans – and enforcing international law at sea – is thus a pivotal role. Nor should it be left solely to one actor, even so staunch an ally such as the United States. Such an arrangement leaves maritime peace, trade and stability at the mercy of potentially capricious domestic politics – as the ‘sequestering’ of the United States’ military budget highlights. Alongside historic maritime partners such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, Great Britain is ideally placed to make valuable contributions in this area.

Such maritime contributions, moreover, could easily be delivered in the shape of enduring political outcomes through ‘Smart Power.’ Smart Power is the ability to employ both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ assets jointly and more effectively – a critical advantage of sea power amidst this age of austerity. Note that sea power, uniquely delivered by navies, is the enabling factor of international reassurance; of capacity building; of collaboration, collective security – and deterrence.  While not its primary role, the Royal Navy has frequently been able to assist in disasters large and small around the world.  ‘Showing the Flag’ often entailed assisting a school project or similar.  Indeed, it is this capacity for sea power to deliver effect in more nuanced ways that makes it Smart Power’s epitome.

For Britain to take full advantage of that abstract possibility, however, certain implications must be addressed and acted upon. First, and most obviously, the Royal Navy must be forward deployed at sea, and more often than not, working with other navies. Only persistent, meaningful presence in areas of interest can maintain confidence in the sea trade upon which we depend, or build trust in our international partners.

Secondly, we must address the fallacy that ‘soft’ power is autonomous. Particularly in European circles, ‘soft’ power is often deemed a complete replacement for ‘hard’ assets. (That is, influence, diplomacy and dialogue outclass military force.) As events through the last decade amply illustrate, however, this is hardly true. Consider the permanently stalled European Union discussions over Iran’s nuclear programme. Several years of talks have failed to produce meaningful results, let alone a halt in Iranian progress to developing nuclear infrastructure. By contrast, only a variant on ‘hard’ power – the Stuxnet and Flame viruses – has inhibited Iranian advances. No intellectually honest observer could point to the European reliance on soft power over Iran and claim success.

The aforementioned breakdown of grand strategy must surely explain this sorry state of affairs – clearly it extends beyond British policymakers. The alternative of Smart Power, however, promises far more decisive results. Through its proper incorporation of sea power in British strategy we can enjoy resolute, effective diplomacy.  Consider historical parallels as diverse as the Falklands and Crimean wars. In both cases, British leaders were unafraid to conceive of national interests outside of irrelevant alliance structures – NATO and an alliance with France respectively. In both cases, those leaders pursued decisive ‘hard’ power options – through sea power – to decisively advance political and diplomatic resolutions. It is this flexibility and independence that, now more than ever, we must recover – and which Smart Power can help us attain.

To turn away from the abstract and back to the practical, the keystones of pursuing British Smart Power are surely amphibious forces.  When host nation support is denied, only an amphibious capability can enable entry into theatre. Happily, British amphibious forces are widely regarded as among the best of Europe, a reputation reinforced by operational partnerships as with the Netherlands. This ability is enviable not just for allowing rapid entry, but assuring a sustained operational presence. What if airfields in-theatre are inoperable upon arrival? What if over-flight rights are declined? What if key infrastructure is available – but insufficient for large-scale logistic aerial support? One cannot dismiss these challenges out-of-hand.

Curacao, 2006: An international amphibious exercise underway.

This is not to dismiss the role of such a logistical tool – far from it – but simply to stress two pathways are better than one. Aerial insertion may prove quicker, but a robust amphibious capacity remains the only durable, economic and strategic form of deployment available to Britain. An amphibious force, supported by an aircraft carrier and equipped with landing craft and helicopters, is free from any dependence on airfields, ports and land-bases. Indeed, as recent experiences have reminded us, the deployment of an airborne force or any land-based equivalent is to cross a significant line of political commitment. Conversely, a self-contained and sea-based amphibious force offers unparalleled flexibility, logistical simplicity and relative economy.

Clearly, then, we have a primary target for the allocation of Britain’s straightened finances, and a critical mission for the Royal Navy to work towards in the public eye. However, the Royal Navy must also ensure the public is aware of the complexity involved in sustaining the nation’s sea power. The near-absence of such understanding is testament to perhaps the Royal Navy’s greatest failing after the Falklands War. The public support it attained was never properly capitalised upon. Now, even whilst we have two aircraft carriers being constructed, coverage is patchy and sometimes dominated by hostile views. Awareness of their strategic value – let alone the positive industrial and economic implications of these projects – is thus stunted.

While combating this, advocates of British sea power must likewise involve Great Britain’s other service branches, to improve cooperation and mutual understanding. Note one instructive story from the Falklands – as HMS Intrepid was about to land the Scots Guards at Bluff Cove, one of the guardsmen turned to a sailor nearby and said ‘You chaps in British Rail are very lucky.’ He got a dusty reply. Being at sea does not come naturally, and success depends on skilled personnel – the public, Army and Royal Air Force alike should be made aware of the Merchant Navy’s central role.  But why?  Why risk detracting limited political capital from advancing the ‘fighting’ Navy?  Again, we return to Great Britain’s strategic reality.

Imagery report of daily traffic through the English Channel, taken April 2013.

Through the Dover Strait alone, over 80,000 traffic movements take place every year – unsurprising, since the English Channel is the second busiest waterway in the world.  With a 10,500-mile coastline hosting 600 ports of varying sizes, 95% of British visible trade is reliant on shipping. Indeed, through these busy ports, Britain’s burgeoning energy needs are met. In 1982, to combat Argentinean aggression successfully, 112 ships were involved.  All twenty-two ships of the civilian-manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary were employed, alongside forty-five merchant ships, carrying between them 9,000 personnel, 100,000 tonnes of freight, 400,000 tonnes of fuel and forty-five aircraft.  9,110 tonnes of combat supplies and ammunition were used by the land forces alone in a short, sharp land campaign.  The entire aerial refuelling fleet was put to work, while additional aircraft were hired to bolster the British airlift capacity.

Together, these details underline several key facts regarding Great Britain’s strategic context. Despite the trappings of modernity and advances in technology, geography will remain a defining feature: sealift and shipping are integral to both basic national survival – and striking out against foreign foes. In 1966, a Defence White Paper dismissed these facts while overemphasising technological potential.  Naval aviation was dismissed as redundant, while land-based aircraft were said to be capable of offering support worldwide to fleet operations. Today, bloody and expensive experience has confirmed that it is otherwise – but policy-makers seem bent on repeating past mistakes, as noted earlier.

This begs the question – how might advocates of sea-power best combat this ill-informed approach to defence policy?  We have already established Great Britain’s strategic context, and sea power’s crucial role within it. Further, we have noted the pressing need for improved public awareness of that role. But – what specific arguments and recommendations should we bring forward to policymakers, so as to avoid or at least mitigate another 2010 SDSR?   The answer is, simply enough, to work with what we have.

Firstly, we should turn prevailing arguments of austerity to our favour. We should stress the cost-effectiveness of amphibious or naval aviation capabilities, and the long life spans of naval platforms. More specifically, in the name of diminished bureaucracy and rationalised commands, we could demand the Royal Navy receive primary control of any future unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles (UAVs). Such an arrangement would be in keeping with Britain’s confirmed stance as an expeditionary maritime power – guaranteeing their use towards relevant missions, and preventing uneconomic waste.

Secondly, if geography is not to be given its strategic due, we must instead capitalise on apparent obsessions with new technology. One leading illustration is found in the UAV phenomenon – understandable given their aptitude for long-range missions and relative economy. Their long loitering times would, as with manned aviation, be further bolstered further by sea power’s strategic reach. Even escort ships could conceivably deploy smaller variants – advancing the versatility of both drone and sea power. With emerging challenges like Syria demanding careful, precise responses, such flexibility is self-evidently valuable.

Thirdly, the serious economic possibilities of increased shipbuilding must not go unnoticed. A proper emphasis on the Royal Navy would bolster British shipbuilding and the modern, large-scale, high-skill employment that goes with it. The United Kingdom’s many small, high-tech companies could in turn profit from this, providing highly specialised equipment and systems – and the maintenance thereof. (A valuable boost for civilian shipbuilding, also.) This reaffirmed ability to create advanced and highly capable warships would in turn offer considerable sales potential, especially amongst our European and Commonwealth allies.

Such arguments must surely be of ever-greater purchase as the last remnants of the Cold War fade away. With British withdrawal from German bases, the Central Front against the Soviet Union is finally – and quite literally – gone. Now, as developments in Mali have illustrated, expeditionary warfare against Islamic Fundamentalism may well become the norm. Similarly, as rising West African piracy suggests, action against piracy and maritime crime will be increasingly in-demand. Such challenges, considering the growing value and interest in the mineral deposits of the ocean floors, are cause for serious concern. Even the more prosaic economic value of global fisheries warrants attention. Note that Somalian piracy flourished after local fisheries were depleted by foreign raiding and pollution.

In conclusion, Great Britain’s position is akin to Caesar Augustus’ in the aftermath of Actium – insofar as we face no grand, existential threats. But we are surrounded by smaller, entangling challenges that could cause us grievous harm if left unchecked. As Great Britain faces up to the modern-day parallels of Augustus’ barbarians, it is intolerable that our hands should be tied behind our backs.  Only robust British naval strength can prevent that. Advocates of British sea power thus enjoy a host of key advantages – not least a strategic outlook best suited to our case.  Let us leverage each of them to full effect, and brook nothing less than clear victory in shaping the views of British policy-makers.

Maritime Security off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean.

(2nd. Edition)

By Richard Little, former Royal Navy serviceman

Two recent conferences in Paris and Cyprus tried to outline how to eradicate Somali Piracy. But 2012′s better statistics and one air raid on one pirate base do not spell its end.  Analysis of current events in Somalia and the two conferences build the case that more force is needed to achieve this objective before Somali Piracy meshes more with terrorism and before it is too late.

Introduction

While the UK no longer owns the almost total dominance of trade by sea that it had a century or more ago, it still depends for its survival on sea-borne trade for some 95% of its essential food, fuel and raw materials. This cargo is now carried mainly in ships of foreign flag but it is the safe delivery of that cargo that matters to our public. While some of this trade is coastal: from and to the EU, the majority still comes from far away.  With the increasing prosperity of Commonwealth and other developing nations, fixing a final end to piracy will become evermore important.

This paper argues that stronger medicine is needed to capitalise on containment, suppression and reduced piracy incidents. For containment or suppression are not enough to eradicate this business. The historic role of the Royal Navy in protecting merchant shipping, a role still respected by many nations and shipping companies, is relevant and should not be overlooked.

The context of the argument lies in two big developments arising from the London Conference Somalia (LCS) in February 2012. Firstly, the EU passed a more robust Mandate on 23 March 2012 escalating Rules of Engagement (RoE) for naval forces to attack Somali targets on land from the sea or the air. Such action upon ‘coastal territory and internal waters’ of Somalia would deny pirate attack groups (PAGs) the impunity hitherto enjoyed, by disrupting their efforts to get to sea to attack world shipping. Secondly, international Law Enforcement (LE) agencies are now harnessed to pursue the money, money-laundering and the overlords and financiers behind piracy.  INTERPOL and EUROPOL are devoting considerable efforts and resources to track financial flows and communications to identify forensically the controlling minds and networks. They recommend LE personnel be embedded in warships to improve evidence-gathering for prosecutions.  After the crackdown flowing from LCS, British-financed initiative now stages trials of pirates in Seychelles courts. Some 1,000 pirates are imprisoned in 20 nations as the heat is turned up on the criminals.

Discussion

Lawlessness at sea occurs due to lawlessness ashore. Piracy needs to be based ashore, where its labour force live, plan, prepare and supply operations. But Somalia’s piracy is like no other. With the initial thin excuse of retribution for illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping at sea (despite no Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) yet declared through the United Nations Convention of the Law on the Sea (UNCLOS)), it has rapidly developed into a transnational and highly organised criminal operation. Backers will not surrender business easily and will lie doggo in quiet periods.

Somalia’s piracy is launched from a failed state with no effective law enforcement for over twenty years. Its reputation as the world’s most corrupt state is but one of manifold challenges facing a new President, Parliament and Prime Minister. Its 3,300 kms coastline is the longest in Africa, which factor alone magnifies maritime operations. The coast also allows flexibility to move bases up and down to evade counter-piracy. And at what a crossroads Somali piracy stands: the nearby nexus of sea trade routes running in every direction at its doorstep. All these factors combine to give this piracy the special sanctuary status that sets it apart from others in different regions. Not

only can all operations be supported from numerous bases with impunity, but hi-jacked prizes lie close offshore in convenient capture. The dirty business of exacting ransoms for seized ships, cargoes and crews, carries on without let or hindrance.  The international community was at first embarrassed, even dumbfounded and remains still unable to rescue their seafarers from appalling conditions of ever longer captivity just off the coast. A pirates haven from heaven indeed!

The longer Somali piracy continues, the harder it becomes to eradicate. In parallel runs the Sisyphean task of building an economy and industry able to turn minds from crime to honest work.  Only a glance at history gives us lessons.  Pompey ‘the Great’ was the first of many later leaders to learn that, to eradicate piracy effectively in the Mediterranean, it was crucial to destroy pirate ports and ships within. In 67 BC Rome gave him unprecedented authority to expel pirates from the inland sea, which he successfully accomplished in three months. Admirals Blake and Lord Exmouth followed suit in 1655 and 1816 respectively, to destroy Barbary pirates in their North African lairs of Porto Farina, Tunis and the port of Algiers. We should also heed Cicero’s wisdom in his dictum on war: ‘Nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam’ meaning ‘ the sinews of war are unlimited money.’  This applies to all forms of ‘war’: total, terrorist, guerrilla or piracy and to all antagonists.

Threats and Factors demanding stronger measures.

In summary these are: – A new administration facing old problems; lack of delivery by and for Somalia; convergence of piracy and Al Qaeda (AQ) -backed Al Shabaab in a ‘spillover’ from South to Puntland; AQ ‘s East Africa network regrouping and rearming in North Somalia.  And, finally, withdrawal or weakening of naval assets from counter-piracy for whatever reason.

As ever in the Horn of Africa’s cockpit of conflict and chaos, events are moving fast and no single threat or factor can be examined in isolation. Leading news agencies support these arguments in reports from November/December 2012: – Reuters; the FT; the BBC; the Daily Telegraph and the EU Naval Force’s (NAVFOR’s) Media office. Across the board of authorities involved in counter-piracy, there is concern not only about the need to tackle pirates land source, but also to heed local warnings that piracy may change direction in sinister ways… soon.

The Federal Government of Somalia – FGS

Political tension is high as the new system, in place on 10 September, 2012, tries to stamp its claim on territories resistant to its weak authority. Al Shabab is not a spent force and still controls swathes of southern and central Somalia.  Further, it will seek to profit from spaces in any power struggle between disgruntled clans, various groups, militias and money lords. Control of Kismayo port and its large southern hinterland is a political flashpoint, as is control of the charcoal trade, which funded the Islamists @ $15m  p.a. Contestants are Kenya, Ethiopia, the FGS, local militias and trader kings linked to Al Shabab. All this saps the new FGS ‘s time, energy and resources, which also need to focus on old issues: acrimonious clan politics, rampant corruption, maritime piracy, a stubborn Islamist insurgency and 2.5 million people still in crisis from the 2011 famine.

Lack of Delivery

Somalis and returnees need to see results if they are to back the new FGS. As the biggest donor, the EU has said it will give $200m over the next three years to improve education, the judiciary and policing. An international officer working on Somalia states“ the greatest danger  in Somalia is lack of delivery.” We may take this to mean chiefly delivery by the FGS itself to drive the still failed state in a new direction. Equally it applies to others delivering for and to the state.

Convergence of Pirates and Al Shabab

Leaders in Puntland now refer to the ‘spillover’ of Al Shabab insurgents flowing north into hitherto ungoverned space from south and central areas in recent months. The Islamist movement has dispersed not disappeared. On 4 December, they confirmed their attacks on two military bases in the south and the north of Somalia: near Jowhar and also an ambush of a ministerial convoy near Merca port – both near Mogadishu. Near Bossaso they destroyed an army truck, killing 30 soldiers and assaulted an army base. This was repelled and insurgents fled to their mountain hideouts of Galagalo. These events make two points: they claimed responsibility and they will be back. A number of weapons consignments seized by Puntland forces show their arrival by sea from Yemeni sources. This connection could reveal connivance with pirates on the coast. Eradication of piracy will become ever harder if it merges further with Al Shabab, forcing a complex unpicking scenario. Time is of the essence. Since both groups survive on money and the Islamists are short of it after loss of the charcoal export and other rackets at Kismayo, it might be a marriage of necessity. 

AQ’s East African network regrouping and rearming in Northern Somalia

Two reports in late November, one quoting the President of Puntland, tell that key figures of Al Shabab have moved north. Among eleven insurgents arrested were two commanders: the alleged leader of the assassination squad and an alleged logistics expert. None were locals but came from across Somalia. Their aim was to connect with others already in the region. They were found with a full gamut of new weapons, ammunition and terrorist equipment. It is believed that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are arming and financing Al Shabab. In the past two months alone, authorities have intercepted two boats heading from Yemen to Puntland laden with weapons. The double attacks of 4 December claimed by Al Shabab clearly want the world to know they are still active. Meanwhile the blow to Puntland is that, in addition to fighting piracy, the ‘spillover’ from south Somalia’s problems is draining their resources and is detrimental to regional security.

Withdrawal or Weakening of naval assets from counter-piracy – (CP)

This could occur for many reasons: more defence budget cuts by EU/US – (UK’s coalition has just chopped another £1.3 billion from defence); a new world strategic shock elsewhere or just complacency that reduced pirate attacks warrant fewer ships on patrol. The numbers, type and size of available naval vessels for CP are crucial. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in his annual address to RUSI in December 2012, pointed to the ‘ the £1 billion warship doing CP stuff ‘, adding that the RN must rethink the case for ships with limited role in general war. ‘Corvettes are not new and Britain will look to acquire more ships designed for a range of non war-fighting duties’ he said.

Let us examine the current situation through the Commander EU NAVFOR, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts, Royal Navy, who gave a Media Counter-Piracy Update at Northwood HQ on 29 November 2012.

• over the first six months of 2012 a 60% reduction in pirate activity v. first half of 2011.
• no ships hijacked since May 2012, despite almost 200 seamen still captive.
• October and November 2012 ‘surprisingly quiet’ when usually very busy months.
• 2011 – 151 attacks on ships and 25 ships hijacked.
• 2012 – 31 attacks on ships and 5 hijacked to date.

*    Drop in piracy assessed as due to four factors: 100% success rate of the Private Military Security Contractors’ (PMSCs) armed guards onboard vessels; ship hardening and evasive action by adherence to the Best Management Practice version 4 (BMP 4); pre- emptive action by navies in close patrol and disruption preventing pirates leaving shore; lower tolerance at local/national levels in Somalia towards pirates: they cause higher food prices and their good-time girls, booze and fast cars are despised. Rougher seasonal monsoon weather also helped, but PAGs have returned to attack thrice since the Christmas period.

On 15 May 2012, after the revised mandate passed by the EU on 23 March 2012, (see Introduction – Context), the first and only attack on one pirate base was made by a helicopter launched from a EU NAVFOR warship by night. Small arms fire from the air destroyed at least 5 skiffs, fuel stores and other equipment. This attack was heralded as the first of many along the vast Somali coast. No further attack has occurred. Despite EU NAVFOR’s boast of pro-active prevention of pirates leaving shore for the open sea, Norwegian Professor Stig Jarle Hansen points to armed PMSCs as the bigger disincentive. He should know as he has walked the coast meeting pirates and their bosses over recent years, yielding in-depth knowledge of their habits. His contacts confirmed they are most afraid of PMSCs.

Let Admiral Potts have the last word. He repeated his August warning on 29 November.      “ International cartels investing in piracy will bide their time and then come back if warships left or if PMSCs were cancelled. Word would soon get round. Piracy is still one of the best ways to earn a living in Somalia. All this tactical and operational progress is easily lost if we do not irreversibly change the strategic context on the ground that allows piracy to exist in the first place.”

Conclusions

Admiral Potts knows the situation today is fragile and reversible. There were signs of renewed (pirate) activity as the BBC ‘s Frank Gardner completed his report of 29 November after Admiral Potts’s update thus: “As ever, the source of the problem is on land and until Somalia can reach a certain level of stability and prosperity, the spectre of piracy is likely to hover over its coast for years to come.” This will come as good news, even as little surprise to the counter-piracy business, seeking to protect shipping either by embarked armed parties or with the convoy concept.

Meanwhile, whatever happened to repeat attacks from the air or from the sea on pirate bases?  Somewhere, somehow, politics took fright and vetoed this after the EU issued its March mandate to do just that.  Such ambiguity and absence of firmness will have been seen as weakness by pirates, whose reserves of patience and cunning far exceed those of the international community. There is no doubt that pirates’ land bases have to be more effectively taken out if the objective to eradicate piracy is to be met. With the best-trained and best-equipped Special Forces available, fast operations in and out could destroy the means as well as seizing key players for interrogation and charging. The boots would hardly touch the ground. But all this needs political will and unambiguous strength such as the likes of Pompey, Blake and Exmouth possessed in spades.

In the predicted absence of either, the counter-piracy industry can look forward to many years of business, while the weakness of politicians leads to hand-wringing and to much of our taxes being spent trying to end a very messy business. The author recalls the last EUNAVFOR Commander:  Major General Buster Howes, OBE, (Commandant General Royal Marines), in his electric presentation to the RUSI’s Future Maritime Operations Conference on 6 July 2011, predicting that Somali Piracy could well last a further ten years.

Richard Little                                    Crailing                                  Roxburghshire

10  January 2013                               e-mail: narvik.02df@yahoo.co.uk

The Maritime Dimension of UK Defence Strategy.

(By Alan Hensher MBE, Captain Royal Navy retired.)

The Threat.

In today’s world the threats to our security, global interests and indeed our way of life have become more complex and less predictable than at any time in our history. Interwoven with the conventional and nuclear threats from rogue states is the terrorist threat, of which piracy is just one aspect, with yet another layer of complexity and uncertainty.  All these threats have been enhanced by the advent of the Internet and satellite systems bringing instant communications and cyber warfare.

The UK faces no immediate conventional threat but there is a need for strong anti-terrorist homeland security with a link to the Armed Forces. However, it remains a maritime nation totally dependent on trade by sea. In one vital area alone, for example, the UK’s chronic shortage of energy is met by the importation of LNG carried in large and vulnerable vessels that must be protected against pirates and a hostile state’s conventional naval force.

The Strategy.

The National Security Council’s (NSC) UK Defence Strategy that was the basis of the 2010 Strategic Defence Review (SDSR) established two fundamental drivers for the Review: Global Reach and the Ability to Intervene. Intervention should be with allies as available, but alone and coercive when necessary: in other language, we must have an expeditionary capability.  Issues also addressed included protecting sea lanes, Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, besides our commitments to NATO, the EU and other agreements.

Military Response to Crisis.

It is axiomatic that Governments of all political persuasion need to have effective military options to counter any crisis or unexpected threat that may arise.  A visible capability that sends a clear diplomatic and political message of government policy and intention can often deter unwanted actions.  It is here that the unique qualities of Maritime Forces come into play. The ability to deploy ships while remaining in international waters, to poise and to operate aircraft at a place of the government’s choosing is at the heart of maritime power. Operating in international waters confers independence of diplomatic clearances, and over-flying rights.  The carriers and the afloat support system provided by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) obviate or reduce the need for host-nation assistance for airfields or other logistic support. A Carrier/Amphibious Task Group can project a military force ashore by helicopter and landing craft and then give air and logistic support to all land forces ashore.  Carriers, amphibious ships, escorts and submarines have an extensive flexibility of roles ranging from high-intensity warfare to defence diplomacy, prevention or deterrence, with the added resources for co-operation with allies, humanitarian support or disaster relief. Aircraft carriers have high a level of command and control capability that can extend far inshore and gives flexibility of choice in the transfer of command ashore or retaining command at sea, an option that may be more technically efficient and reliable and is probably politically desirable.

The Maritime Option.

The Response Force Task Group (RFTG) represents the expeditionary capability required by the NSC.  It possesses most or all of the assets that can give effect to the maritime stance that have been outlined here. It is reasonable to believe both from the UK’s history of conflict since WWII and the recent experience of Sierra Leone and Libya, let alone the South Atlantic campaign, that, for an expeditionary mission, maritime forces deliver the optimum military option to the Government.  With a wide range of military weapon systems led by air power from the sea and amenable to a high state of readiness, a maritime Task Group is often more cost effective than a land based option. Vide the massive costs of in-flight-refuelling for air strikes launched from the UK against targets in Libya.

Political Values.

There is a valuable political asset inherent in the maritime modus operandi that allows a broad perspective and more time for making overt decisions on the commitment of land forces or carrier air power by virtue of remaining in international waters, yet within effective range of potential objectives or targets. The presence alone of a maritime Task Group with significant air power, cruise missiles and an embarked military force can have an important even critical deterrent or preventive influence to defuse a crisis situation before it ignites.

The essence of an effective Defence structure able to respond to such a sea of uncertainty and to fulfil the UK Defence Strategy is seen to lie in four key capabilities: Power, Presence, Projection and Flexibility. All these elements are embodied in maritime forces: aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, submarines, RFA logistic ships and associated naval assets.

Maritime Experience.

When fixed and rotary wing squadrons of any Service embark in a Carrier or Assault ship there is a well-recognised need for the squadrons to integrate with the parent ship organization. This involves an awareness at least of the operating conditions unique to embarked aviation. These include the fact that an aircraft carrier is mobile and may not be able to launch or land on aircraft at a time of their choosing, whereas an airfield is static and, bar an accident, is always open but prone to infiltration by the enemy.  Limitations of space and the associated intensification of safety factors, radhaz on the flight deck and conflicting demands on flight deck space for non-aviation activities such as training for embarked Royal Marine/Army units or replenishment at sea (RAS), all add to the different operating conditions. Such integration flows from a mindset that accepts there are factors outside aviation that can dictate the ship’s actions in both combat and peacetime conditions. This maritime orientation is inherent in Naval air squadrons. For RAF and Army squadrons a period of familiarisation is important for safety and proficient operation.

Command and Control of Maritime Air Operations. 

The Commander of any military operation must reasonably expect a full and unquestioning support to his concept of operations.  A joint approach to maritime air activity is well established in concept but less so in practice.  There are some problems to be overcome in resolving basic differences in aviation culture, particularly between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.  Essentially the RN increasingly uses aviation as an integral part of a Task Group albeit as its most powerful and flexible supporting arm. The RAF tends to regard an aircraft carrier as the mobile airfield entirely dedicated to its air squadrons whose roles are often seen as independent of an overall operational concept.

Although of mainly anecdotal origin, there is evidence that the RAF does not accord naval aviation much priority and the aircrew and squadron personnel are less than enthusiastic to embark in ships. These differences make for an uneasy application of command and control, especially if any form of joint command is attempted. There is of course a strong case for command and administration residing with the organisation most experienced in the required roles and expertise of ship air operations. This involves many of the ship’s company’s highly trained people other than aircrew.

Conclusion.                                  

The pragmatic answer to operational command and control is for it to remain in the hands of the Service with ownership of the main military assets deployed and the expertise of aviation in its familiar maritime environment. The Navy should (always) command ship-borne aviation.

The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain: Air and Sea Power Development 1909-1940.

Dr. Anthony J. Cumming

Author’s Biography

Following his PhD at the University of Plymouth in 2006, Anthony J, Cumming won the Julian Corbett Prize for Research in Modern Naval History the same year. His book, The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain (Naval Institute Press, 2010), was published to critical acclaim and the following article is based on a paper given for the Britain and the Sea Conference held in Plymouth in September 2012.

We suffer primarily not from our vices or our weaknesses, but from our illusions.

Daniel Boorstein.^[1]

Part I

The main problem with writing the history of World War II is that most Britons do not want any fundamental changes to the traditional interpretations about how Great Britain and her allies emerged victorious in 1945.  After all, the world shattering events that took place between 1939 and 1945 have already received intense scrutiny.  Possibly the main reason for this is that the British won, so it is easy to ask, why anyone should bother to investigate further or correct any myths?

Indeed, writers return to this literary well to satisfy an insatiable commercial demand for good war stories because Britons are rightly proud of their wartime heritage and the ability to carry on regardless of ferocious odds has become an integral part of British self-identity. Nowhere is this more apparent than the story of how a handful of young fighter pilots saved the world in 1940 by denying Adolf Hitler’s Luftwaffe the air superiority he needed to protect his invasion armada. The result is a continuous rehash of the same old themes – the supposed impotence of warships to land-based airpower and how Hitler postponed the invasion solely because of the RAF’s valiant efforts. So, in 2006, when three historians from the Joint Services Staff Command College at Shrivenham were reported to have stated that it was the Royal Navy rather than the Royal Air Force that prevented a German invasion in 1940, there was media uproar.[2]

My own comments in a national history magazine criticising the low standard of RAF gunnery training in 1940 – hardly a contentious matter amongst academics – were also perverted by the media into a supposed attack upon ‘our heroes’. [3] Unfortunately, this tendency to exploit the public susceptibility to ‘outrage’ continues to muddy the waters of genuine debate. From this evidence alone, it can be clearly seen that the RAF has achieved ‘cult-status’; an unhealthy situation because it means a branch of our armed services has become largely immune to criticism.

Indeed, it now seems that The Battle of Britain has become the final justification of independent air power. That is to say, air power independent of navy or army control and a convenient fallback position whenever the independent status of the RAF is called into question or whenever it is deemed necessary to defend it against spending cuts.  This occurred in 1998 when the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Richard Johns was quizzed at a Commons Defence Select Committee about the ‘unique functions of the RAF that make it important to preserve it as a separate service’. Johns’ successful defence of the RAF included a reference to the Battle of Britain and the circumstances that led to the RAF’s formation in 1918. [4] . It should also be noted that parliamentary discussion of the RAF’s front line restructuring for the 1990s was introduced with a traditional account of how it prevented invasion in 1940 by the Minister for Defence Procurement. During this debate, Neville Trotter MP, made the extravagant claim that the civilised world would not have survived World War II ‘but for the RAF in the Battle of Britain’.^[5]

It is easy to see how the spectre of having to fight another Battle of Britain in the air might still be used as a lever against politicians reared in the mythology of the world wars. In reality, there was no obvious direct air threat to the UK in the 1990s or any today. Indeed, the need for large numbers of strike aircraft is difficult to justify with the European barrier protecting the nation.^[6]

Using the air campaigns of 1940 in this way is hardly surprising given that it was once described (though not altogether accurately) as ‘a gentleman’s war’ by a popular writer.[7] By contrast, and despite the favourable publicity given by the press to the new Bomber Command Memorial in 2012, any mention of the air war over Germany is invariably tainted by the controversial tactics deployed against German civilians. Another reason why myth and legend continues to hamper academic research and British defence strategy, is the over- compartmentalisation of military history where authors adapt their narratives to core-writers of other disciplines. Put in simple terms air force historians ‘do’ aircraft and naval historians ‘do’ warships and do not intrude much upon each other’s preserves.

A fresh approach is called for and my book The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain viewed the defence of Great Britain in 1940 from both air and sea perspectives before concluding that it was the enormous strength of the Royal Navy that played the primary role in frustrating a German invasion.[8] My research continues on similar lines and reviews both air and naval development between Louis Bleriot’s (1872-1936) cross-channel flight in 1909 and the Battle of Britain in 1940 and tries to gain fresh insight into why Winston Churchill and the Air Ministry stole the glory of our finest hour. Of course, the circumstances enabling the nation’s once loved senior service to be marginalised in such a way did not occur overnight. Indeed the public’s appreciation of the entire maritime sphere may have begun its decline from around the end of the 19^th Century, ironically, sometime after the nation had become heavily dependent on foreign food imports. Of course, the maritime outlook in general is, at last, beginning to improve thanks to the sterling efforts of some individuals and organisations such as the Maritime Foundation. But it is fair to say that a positive attitude towards naval power is a shadow of what it was 100 years ago. Paul Kennedy viewed British naval power as steadily declining between 1897 and 1914.  But because it came out of a gradual process of policy changes and events in the wider world hardly anyone was aware of it at the time.[9] However, if we look for a year within Kennedy’s time frame in which attitudes really began to change, it must be 1909. Before 1909, progress in British military aviation was negligible and even in 1911, Field Marshal Douglas Haig (1861-1928) wrote, ‘flying can never be of any use to the army’. ^[10] But things were beginning to change.  From Louis Bleriot flying the English Channel to the year of the Battle of Britain–the Royal Navy was heavily criticised by those who believed the creation of airpower made navies obsolete and unnecessary. Bleriot flew the English Channel to win £1000.00 from the press baron and owner of the Daily Mail, Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe (1865-1922). Northcliffe immediately rang his private secretary and told her, ‘Our Country is no longer an island; Bleriot has flown the channel and history is made today.’ He continued, ‘Do you realise it is the first time an entry [to Great Britain] has been made otherwise than by ship.’[11]

The Daily Mail was the first ‘mass-market’ newspaper with a powerful influence and Northcliffe’s personal grip on the paper was strong. Northcliffe and his brother Harold Rothermere (1868-1940) were the first real press barons and even in 1902 the Daily Mail had a circulation of over one million making it the largest paper in the world at that time.[12] The brothers were great aviation patrons and the paper continued to offer prizes until 1930 to encourage development. Harold also became the President of the Air Council at the point when the two existing military air arms became the Royal Air Force. Rothermere took over the paper when Northcliffe died in 1922.

In the weeks following Bleriot’s flight, the Daily Mail ran articles by well-know writers such as Herbert George (H G) Wells (1866-1946) on the theme ‘we are no longer an island’ boosting the circulation and ramping up prevalent invasion paranoia and Germanophobia.^[13]Northcliffe had already commissioned flying enthusiast William Le Queux (1864-1927) to produce the best-selling invasion novel The Invasion of 1910 (1906) and subsequently serialized in the Daily Mail and credited with ‘doing wonders for the circulation of the newspaper’.^[14]

Northcliffe also invited the Secretary of State for War, Lord Richard Haldane (1856-1928) to a reception in Bleriot’s honour and tried to persuade Haldane of the threat to national security posed by the aeroplane. Haldane – best known for his army reforms and instigation of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) – was not noticeably impressed by Northcliffe’s advocacy of the air but Haldane was the founder of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (ACA), created only weeks before Bleriot’s landmark flight in order to undertake, promote, and institutionalize British aeronautical research. This institution was quickly copied abroad and in the longer term, the deliberations of the ACA led to the formation of the Royal Flying Corps in 1912, comprising both military and naval wings.  Haldane told the House of Commons shortly after Bleriot’s flight that very little progress had so far been made in the field of military aviation. So far, he claimed, ‘the aeroplane would have to rise much higher before it can be a safe instrument for reconnoitring’ but he believed Bleriot’s crossing and other recent events had shown it would eventually be ‘capable of great results’.^[15]A few months earlier, Haldane told the House that the army ‘is going in for dirigibles, and the authorities are considering the best pattern’ but this statement, described as ‘cold comfort’ had not protected him from criticism in the Times for the lack of progress to date.^[16]

While 1909 was a landmark year for military aviation the writing was already on the wall for the Royal Navy. Superficially, all was well and the institution had enormous public support.  Furthermore, ordinary people were chanting ‘We want eight and we won’t wait’ at music halls – a reference to the popular demand for dreadnought battleships.^[17] Despite ongoing Anglo-German naval rivalry there was increasing competition for money from other government departments. Surprisingly, and despite the defence focus moving towards land power and a continental commitment, it was welfare expenditure rather than army spending that became the Navy’s main competitor for resources by 1913.

Chart 1. ^[18]

As can be seen from the chart, Army expenditure was overtaken by the Navy from 1905 and remained flat between 1908 and 1913. In fact welfare spending grew by more than a third between 1909 and1913 and by 1913; more was being spent on welfare than on the Army. This is largely attributable to The Peoples Budget of 1909 and old age pensions starting that year.

Surprisingly, perhaps one of the main critics of high naval spending was Winston Churchill (1874-1965) President of the Board of Trade. With David Lloyd George (1863-1945) Churchill represented part of the ruling Liberal party that wanted more emphasis on welfare to retain working class support for the party.  Both fought the traditionalists that believed public spending must be reserved for police and defence. However, in 1911 Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty. This was attributable to several reasons but mainly to give the Navy a more dynamic political leader to champion its cause in committee and parliament against the growing influence of the Army. [19]

Chart 2. ^[20]

Chart 2 shows that Churchill proved unable to halt escalating naval expenditure despite looking for cheaper alternatives to the big dreadnought battleship such as submarines and aircraft. Churchill was heavily influenced by a former First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir John (Jacky) Fisher (1841-1920) who had already been working on these lines. Fisher pushed through the dreadnought battleship concept, which temporarily halted the arms race, and from 1906 to 1908, naval expenditure fell. But he was also a fan of the submarine and the lighter faster battle cruiser. Sadly, he was also an abrasive and divisive figure – blamed for pushing the navy into opposing continental and maritime schools.^[21]

In fact, both imperial protection and building a naval deterrent in home waters were crucially important but not for the last time it meant the Navy was being pulled in two directions simultaneously. 1909 was also the year in which the Two-Power Standard was quietly dropped. Herbert Asquith (1858-1928), the prime minister, denied this was the case but in 1910, it was admitted that Britain was only building against Germany.^[22] By the outbreak of war in 1914, the continental school achieved dominance with a huge concentration of capital ships in home waters known as The Grand Fleet. Unfortunately, a negative outcome was having to misuse the lightly armoured battle cruisers (designed primarily for trade protection) in the line-of-battle with tragic results at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. However, in one sense the Two-Power Standard vis-à-vis the German High Seas Fleet had been achieved by 1914 because the alliance with France allowed an approximate 2:1 numerical battleship advantage favouring the Entente powers. [23]

Part II

With the formation of the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 Churchill worked on the RFC’s naval wing with the visionary Captain Murray Sueter (1872-1960) – a dedicated exponent of aircraft. Along with army Captain Bertram Dickson (1873-1913) Sueter had given important evidence to the Aerial Sub-Committee of the CID and accurately predicted the nature of air warfare in the years to come. ^[24]The Royal Flying Corps had army and naval wings but with reconnaissance and artillery spotting at its core. This first experiment in joined-up airpower was to last until 1914 when Churchill removed the naval wing and renamed it the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). This expanded rapidly because Churchill and Sueter foresaw a wide variety of maritime roles for aircraft such as fleet reconnaissance, the hunting of submarines and ships, the launching of attacks upon enemy coastlines and defending the homeland against all kinds of enemy attack. The official air historian later stated, ‘The navy naturally paid more attention than the army to fighting in the air’ pointing out that as the navy had to operate further from the enemy on the ground, they wanted machines that were more than observation platforms ‘machines that could fly far and hit hard’.   The Admiralty  ‘diligently fostered the efforts of the leading motor car companies … and so were instrumental in the production of very efficient engines of high horse-power.’ [25] From the very beginning the Royal Navy worked on ways of operating aircraft from ships and during the course of the war, introduced and developed the aircraft carrier. This became one of the most effective weapons systems in the history of warfare proving its worth in August 1917 when an RNAS Sopwith Pup from HMS Yarmouth shot down Zeppelin L .23 off Denmark.

Meanwhile the RFC developed reconnaissance and artillery spotting over land. Air fighting developed to gain air superiority to carry out these tasks over enemy lines and to stop the enemy doing this. Bombing and ground attack evolved slowly but neither the Imperial German Air Force nor the RFC developed these to the point that the land battles were decisively influenced. The German Air Force gained a short term advantage using a Fokker Monoplane with a forward mounted machine gun firing between the propeller blades and this enabled German aces such as Max Immelman (1890-1916) and Oswald Boelke (1891-1916) to develop the first fighter tactics. But continuous technological leap-frogging meant the advantage of air superiority swung back and forth over the next few years.

When the air situation became critical during the Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917, the Admiralty sent naval squadrons to fight alongside the RFC. These tipped the balance back during the Summer of 1917 where it mostly stayed for the rest of the war. A total of six naval squadrons became attached to the RFC along the Western Front where they achieved great success. Furthermore, the Admiralty surrendered its private sector contracts for the famous Sopwith Camel to the RFC. Unfortunately, the RFC had depended heavily on the mediocre products of the state-run Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough.^[26] Except for the SE5a and (briefly, the FE2 series), their aircraft were not fit to engage the German fighters.

With the Germans generally outmatched in quantity and technical quality over the Western Front by mid-1917, they responded by using their larger Gotha bomber aircraft to bomb England and divert British resources away from the front. [27] Previous attempts to bomb Britain using Zeppelins and other airships had not met with much success because of the airships inherent limitations including susceptibility to the weather, structural fragility and small bomb loads. Therefore, the wartime Zeppelin offensives cost Germany far more in construction and maintenance than it cost the British in terms of property damage.^[28] Aircraft were a different matter and considerable resources including the crack 56 Squadron, RFC were diverted from the front despite protests from Field Marshal Haig and his RFC commander Sir Hugh Trenchard  (1873-1956).

The government panicked as press criticism mounted.^[29] The Gothas were bombing in broad daylight and brushing aside the feeble air defences. Prime Minister Lloyd George worried about the working class emulating the Russian Revolution because of recent battlefield disappointments and the imposition of food rationing. Lloyd George distrusted almost all his military leaders considering Haig too careless of lives and repeatedly calling for the admirals to be sacked. In desperation, he turned to lawyer and former Boer guerrilla leader Field Marshal Jan Christaan Smuts (1870-1950) to sort the situation out. While Smuts had no specialist knowledge of aircraft, this German bombing campaign had features akin to a guerrilla war that he was familiar with. Smuts quickly submitted two reports, firstly about reorganizing London’s air defence, and secondly, about the direction of future airpower. The first report resulted in a reorganisation of London’s air defences under army Brigadier-General E B Ashmore (1872-1953) that bore many resemblances to the command and control system famously used in 1940.[30] However, because of the exhaustion of German bomber crews and relentless wear-and-tear on machinery strained to its limit, the Germans switched to night bombing after 22 August 1917 and the system was never fully tested. [31]

But it was the second report that had the most far-reaching consequences.^[32] Because it was wartime (and a British cultural preference) Smuts heard his evidence in private at the Hotel Cecil on the Strand. Smuts seems to have been persuaded by evidence from Rear Admiral Mark Kerr (1864-1944) that Germany was building a massive fleet of Giant heavy bombers to devastate London and S E England and Kerr’s assertion that the only defence was to bomb German civilian centres first. ^[33] Sir David Henderson (1862-1921), a former head of the RFC gave evidence to justify his proposal to merge the army and naval wings of the RFC and form a bombing force independent of Army and Navy control. Evidence by the industrialist William Weir (1877-1959), forecast a surplus of aero engines for the coming year and this could provide the basis for the new bombing force. However, no mention was made of providing additional airframes to which these ‘surplus’ engines could be fitted.

All this was meant to eliminate the damaging inter-service rivalry that many claimed existed between War Office and Admiralty. It was widely believed the RNAS had monopolised all the good equipment and this was preventing the RFC from doing its job properly. There was some truth in this. Aircraft such as the Sopwith Camel were not specifically naval and since Churchill’s departure from the Admiralty in 1916, a certain innovative spirit had been lacking in the RNAS. Not sufficiently emphasised anywhere was the lack of drive and enthusiasm among pre-war senior army commanders for developing their air arm.  But there was also much press exaggeration and frustrated flying enthusiasts from both army and navy exploited the situation.

The intelligence provided by Kerr was certainly exaggerated as Germany launched a night bombing offensive in the autumn of 1917 using Gothas and a few Giant bombers. While they caused much property damage and panic out of proportion to their small numbers they failed to bring Germany closer to victory. Likewise the forecast of aero engines for the new RAF bomber force turned out to be erroneous as British industry failed to meet the service requirement, far less produce a surplus during 1918. ^[34] However, the outcome of all these deliberations led to the RAF being created in April 1918 and a portion of it christened The Independent Air Force (IAF) using former naval bombers. But the RAF fought the rest of the war in the same way as their predecessors. The IAF concentrated on supporting the army and never penetrated far into Germany because of the limitations of range and navigation. It only requires a map to see how much easier it was for the Germans to bomb England than for the IAF to bomb Germany. Providing there was a moon, the Germans could fly from Belgium and follow the Thames estuary to reach London. Meanwhile the rest of the RAF supported the army in bombing and ground strafing roles but without any conspicuous success. The Germans launched their last all-out ground offensive in March 1918 and despite the RFC warning of a German build-up and bombing their concentrations, the Germans still achieved a tactical surprise when they broke through the British line. Ground strafing delayed the attack in certain places and never for very long.^[35]

Ultimately the German offensives ground to a halt. This was the result of several factors, including stubborn British resistance and increasing numbers of fresh American troops. That they did so was the result of the Royal Navy winning the first Battle of the Atlantic. Except for those based around electronics, radar and missiles, most techniques involving aircraft at sea were pioneered by the RNAS between 1914 and 1918. [36] The introduction of convoying combined with food rationing had narrowly averted starvation for the population in 1916/17 but new anti-submarine techniques including the use of aircraft by the RNAS broke the U-boat threat in 1917 enabling 500,000 fresh American troops to cross the Atlantic during June and July 1918.^[37] At the same time the naval blockade, combined with a series of German agricultural failures and the severing of land routes by the war pushed the German and Austrian home fronts towards collapse. Unfortunately, the failure to achieve a clear unambiguous victory over the German High Seas Fleet at Jutland proved a huge disappointment to the British public at a time when the British Expeditionary Force was suffering enormous casualties and this caused resentment against the sailors. By contrast, public appreciation of the aviators’ efforts soared as the romantic ideal of the knights-of-the-air took root. ^[38] Genuine acts of chivalry by pilots of both sides were widely reported and seemed worlds away from the squalor of the trenches or the relative anonymity of the war at sea. Inevitably perhaps, chivalry declined as the air combats intensified during 1917 but the memories lingered. The RAF ended the war as the largest air force in the world but the war in the air over the trenches had been almost a private war with minimal impact upon the ground situation.[39]

Part III

Wholesale disarmament followed the armistice as politicians now had to consider how to finance the promises given to the working class in order to retain support for the war. Those few aircraft that were to remain were widely expected to return to Army and Navy control.  Furthermore, the professional head of the RAF was now Sir Hugh Trenchard, a one-time opponent of a new air ministry and independent air service but now, with the help of articulate academics such as Maurice Baring (1874-1945), was making his airpower case. He now became a fervent convert to independent airpower. With Winston Churchill’s assistance as Secretary of State for War, Trenchard won his fight by creating a new role whereby the RAF was to police the British Empire ‘on the cheap’. Theoretically, aircraft could bomb rebellious tribesman into submission rather than sending punitive ground expeditions by sea. This worked well for minor uprisings, suppressing caravan raiding and enforcing tax collection. But the most publicized airpower achievement was the suppression of the revolt in Iraq that had been going on since 1920. Trenchard and the Air Ministry took over Iraq from October 1922 and, while DH4 biplane bombers were used extensively, it was really a joint operation that made substantial use of armoured cars and troops. [40] The noted airpower and counterinsurgency expert Dr James Corum has highlighted financial arrangements that misled press, public and politicians. By replacing British troops with Indian troops the British government pushed the financial burden onto the Indian government enabling the Air Ministry to claim the campaign had been won at minimum expense through the application of airpower. [41]

This perceived success made it difficult to persuade cost-conscious politicians of the naval case. Trenchard therefore repulsed the Navy’s demands for their airpower to be returned, as he needed to keep the RAF to a viable size. The result was extremely damaging as naval airpower was subsequently relegated to Cinderella status within the Air Ministry and the Fleet Air Arm was not returned to full Admiralty control until 1939. Admiral Sir David Beatty’s (1871-1936) efforts were now doomed to failure but having foolishly agreed to lay off criticising the RAF for one year, he allowed Trenchard a vital breathing space to get the RAF’s reputation firmly established among press and cost-conscious politicians. [42]

But imperial air policing had many flaws. In Iraq, the insurgents were not over-awed by aircraft and modern weaponry. [43] Many had served with British and Ottoman forces a few years before and they possessed several weapons dumps with rifles, machine guns and ammunition. Corum has written that imperial air control was hardly justifiable as a policy in the 1920s and those who use it as a model for modern air operations in places such as Afghanistan make a grave mistake.[44] The experience of imperial air policing also meant there had been no need to develop the complicated and expensive equipment such as modern aircraft, bomb sights, bombs and navigation aids needed to fight more technologically advanced potential enemies. [45]

Despite the political enthusiasm for imperial air control, it did not help the RAF to expand. The RAF only received about 15% of the annual defence spends for most of the inter-war period. However, Trenchard had spent most of his limited funding on bricks and concrete for separate facilities intended to foster a separate ‘air spirit.’^[46] This meant there was little left for technical research with disastrous results for the next generation of airmen. But the relentless PR from the air lobby gradually changed public perceptions in favour of the potential of bombing. Trenchard launched the Hendon Air Day (later Empire Air Day) from 1919 to support an RAF charity but also to publicise the RAF. Crowds were treated to lavish spectacles including parachute displays, mock-dogfights, formation flying and displays of precision bombing. The crowds were unaware that the bomb whistles were recordings played over the public address system and the explosions were detonated on the ground. [47] Using wild theories from foreign airpower theorists such as General Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) and sensationalist claims from British theorists such as Major John F Fuller (1878-1966) the idea steadily took root that navies had become irrelevant. [48]

In the years before Hitler – it was the French, not the Germans that everyone assumed would be the future enemy. Because the French could not embrace wholesale disarmament owing to the danger posed to their land frontier by a potentially resurgent Germany, the press made facile comparisons between British and French air strength to manipulate their readers insecurities. At the same time, the Daily Mail and other publications were showing illustrations of bombers casually dispatching warships in the English Channel. In reality, the Royal Navy had paid great attention to the problems of defending warships against air attacks and practised new tactics against air attack in the tactically important Mediterranean fleet of the 1930s.^[49] Admiral Alfred E Chatfield (1873-1967) who became the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence accused the Rothemere Press for smearing the Admiralty for its supposed reactionary attitudes and newspaper demands that more funding be spent on the RAF at the expense of the Royal Navy. Indeed, the Admiralty sometimes had budget reductions deferred but Chatfield pointed out this was because the Admiralty had a clearly defined written responsibility – such as a two-power standard. This helped them argue their case in committee in a way the other services were unable to do. [50]

In the 1930s, Churchill was still identified with the air but as a political outcast did what bitter political has-beens usually do which was to stir up trouble for those in power. Britain rearmed from 1934 but only in line with its ability to finance military expansion. In general though, politicians stood firm against demands for greatly increased air spending but by 1938 even they surrendered to the national psychosis of bombing and the RAF became the only service to expand without regard to the nation’s ability to pay.[51]In the fiscal year 1938/9 the RAF spent 35% of the defence budget, the Army 31.7% and Navy, 33.3% – meaning that the RAF was, for the first time, the biggest spender of the three armed services.^[52] Whilst Churchill’s admirers have blamed the ‘appeasers’ of the 1930s, for Britain’s difficulties in the early phases of World War II, it must be remembered that a culture of severe military restraint was established during the 1920s because of the demand for increased social spending, international treaty arms limitations and the infamous Ten-Year Rule. It must also be remembered that Churchill was a prime mover in having the rule established and then having it made self-perpetuating in 1928. [53] Churchill was also Chancellor of the Exchequer during 1924/29 with considerable responsibility for the nation clinging to the Gold Standard, prolonging the economic depression and making it even more difficult for the Baldwin and Chamberlain administrations to finance increased military spending in the period Churchill notoriously described as “The Locust Years”.[54] Unfortunately, Britain remained on the Gold Standard until 1931. It therefore served his purposes for the appeasers to take the blame for the state of Britain’s armed forces in 1939.

Britain went to war in 1939, but to everyone’s surprise including the German High Command, the German attack in the west from 10 May 1940 was a spectacular success. Good generalship, planning and the use of newly developed techniques cut the allied armies in two and pushed the British Expeditionary Force on the continent back to the port of Dunkirk. A key part of the German success had been their blitzkrieg techniques, which used the Luftwaffe as airborne artillery in a way the RAF could not replicate because they had neither the equipment, training nor doctrines. Against all expectations, the bulk of the BEF, including 338,000 Anglo-French troops were rescued by the Royal Navy and Merchant Navy including the little ships that performed invaluable service ferrying men from the beaches to the larger ships. The brilliant success of Operation Dynamo was heavily downplayed by Churchill’s statement that ‘wars are not won by evacuations’.[55] Churchill brought out of political exile in 1939 and now prime minister was more concerned to praise the efforts of the RAF over Dunkirk and explain why it had not been able to prevent German bombers reaching the port and beaches. Considerable rancour between soldiers and airmen occurred at the time because low cloud hid the RAF aircraft from the soldiers’ view and they naturally assumed there had been no attempt to protect them. [56]  Such internal conflict during wartime was extremely dangerous. Shortly after the evacuations at Dunkirk (and other locations), and the French request for an armistice, Churchill announced that the Battle of Britain was about to begin.

The defence of Great Britain in 1940 is a very large topic and cannot be given detailed coverage in one short paper covering the wider topic of air and sea development.[57] Nevertheless, the relative importance of the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy in the summer of 1940 can be shown with reference to just a few main points.

a)      The Limitations of the Combatant Air Forces in a Maritime Role

Firstly, neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe had the doctrines, expertise or equipment, such as torpedoes, to sink shipping on the scale required.[58] Most people understand that Hitler’s invasion prerequisite of air superiority was made to balance German naval inferiority. In some situations, German dive-bombers had caused alarming casualties to British destroyers and other smaller units at Norway and Dunkirk but this had never been enough to prevent the Royal Navy landing or evacuating troops whenever the land situation required. Naval casualties off Norway had often been the result of operating in fjords where the ability to ‘dodge’ falling bombs was heavily circumscribed by lack of manoeuvring space and the mountains shielding the approach of aircraft, thus reducing the time available for early-warning.[59] After initial losses were incurred it was soon realised that the best defence against bombing was to bring the smaller ships closer to the larger ones where they could shelter under their protective barrage.[60] Furthermore, at Dunkirk, a heavy dependence on destroyers was necessary because they could operate more effectively in shallow waters. Many of these destroyers were hit while stationary or moving very slowly during the embarkation process, hardly a situation likely to occur in a naval Battle of Britain.

The Luftwaffe might have improved their anti-shipping capabilities with reliable torpedoes and larger and more suitable bombs but these were lacking in 1940.[61] The first use of specialised heavy amour piercing bombs against a capital ship was not made until January 1941 against the aircraft carrier Illustrious and even then the ship was not actually sunk.[62] Large numbers of efficient torpedo bombers may well have changed the situation but beyond a few seaplanes and (from late 1940) a few Heinkel He.111 medium bombers using an unreliable aerial torpedo, the Luftwaffe had no torpedo bombing capacity to speak of.[63]This contrasted with a Japanese Naval Air Force that used well-manned torpedo bombers to sink the capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941. Eighty-five aircraft including fifty-one torpedo bombers had swamped their antiaircraft defences and while both ships received bomb damage, it had been the torpedoes that finally sent both ships to the bottom. ^[64]

Though less effective than torpedo bombing, the Luftwaffe’s best weapon against warships was the dive-bomber, most famously, the iconic Junkers Ju.87 series. Originally developed by RFC/RNAS pilots during 1914-18 as an ad-hoc improvisation to improve the poor levels of bombing accuracy, the dive-bombing technique was virtually discarded by the RAF but further developed by the Fleet Air Arm and Luftwaffe during the 1930s.[65] But the main German focus had been against targets on land and in 1940, German crews lacked the necessary training in attacking warships. Consequently, most British warships proved able to dodge out of the way.[66]Dive-bombing also required a high cloud ceiling and good visibility, not factors that could be heavily relied upon in the unpredictable meteorological conditions that tend to prevail in the English Channel and North Sea.

The only other option available to Germany would have been an all-out magnetic mine offensive using submarines and aircraft during the summer of 1940 but the Germans ‘shot their bolt’ with their deployment of these mines in 1939. By the middle of 1940 effective counter measures including de-gaussing techniques had already been implemented and the magnetic mine was no longer the formidable weapon it once was. [67]  No wonder that the German Naval Staff were relieved that the Luftwaffe failed to obtain the necessary air superiority as they did not believe this factor would compensate for their enormous naval inferiority.[68]

But there would be no good reason for the British to feel smug about these German anti-maritime shortcomings as the RAF had little to show for their efforts. Outside of the Fleet Air Arm, the British had shown no discernible interest in dive-bombing. Whilst the Fleet Air Arm managed to sink the light cruiser Kӧnigsberg in Bergen harbour and support the BEF at Dunkirk with Skua dive-bombers, the German army advanced into Europe without hindrance from this form of attack by the RAF.

Gallant attempts to bomb the German fleet in harbour at the beginning of the war were abject failures as their small bombs had bounced harmlessly off armoured decks. This was because the Air Ministry had decided before the war that no bomb heavier than 500-1b would be needed.[69] There was also confusion about the importance of time-delay fuzing and an exaggerated notion about the damage that blast effects could do to a capital ship. [70]Only in 1944 when massive earthquake bombs and Johnny Walker anti-maritime bombs fell in repeated attacks on the battleship Tirpitz in harbour could the RAF claim any success against capital ships. In fact no German capital ship at sea was sunk at sea by free-falling bombs for the entire war. Gallant attempts were made by Bomber Command to sink invasion barges in harbour and there is no doubt that barges equivalent to the German reserves was sunk. However, the invasion ports had also come under constant attacks by naval forces operating at night and in all weathers from Plymouth, Portsmouth and the Nore, in many cases breaking into the harbours and sinking them with point-blank gunfire. [71]  A satisfactory analysis of barge sinking by bombing or naval gunfire respectively seems not to exist but Churchill challenged at least one Air Ministry claim. After examining an aerial photograph submitted as evidence of a successful bombing mission, he wrote ‘I should have thought that sticks of bombs thrown along these oblongs would have wrought havoc, and it is very disappointing to see that they have all remained intact and in order with just a few damaged at the entrance.’[72] This lack of an effective anti-maritime capability was the result of the Air Ministry’s dead hand and a pre-war obsession with bombing that relegated Fighter Command, Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm (and predecessors) to Cinderella status for most of the inter-war period.

b) The Disparity of the Combatant Fleets

Secondly, it is not widely realised just how high the Germans needed to climb in order to conquer the naval mountain. Whilst the Kriegsmarine possessed a fleet that included a higher proportion of modern vessels, the naval operations off Norway had decimated it. In September 1940, the German surface fleet was two elderly and two modern battleships, five cruisers (including a gunnery training ship) and no more than ten destroyers. A small number of E-boats and other small vessels could be added to this number but there were no plans to use the handful of available U-boats owing to the difficulties operating in the shallow waters of the English Channel. Against this, on 14 September, the forces available for repelling invasion were ‘one aircraft-carrier, five battleships, 16 cruisers and 48 destroyers or corvettes, plus another 700 lighter, but increasingly strongly armed patrol vessels’.[73] Most of the destroyers were based in or near the English Channel, but 12 destroyers, three battleships and two cruisers were ready to sail from Rosyth should the situation demand their intervention with most of the other capital ships at Scapa Flow.[74] Those who doubt the ability of British capital ships to survive the relatively constricted waters of the English Channel should perhaps consider the success of a German heavy cruiser and two Scharnhorst class battlecruisers sailing from Brest to Germany. When these powerful ships ran the Channel gauntlet in daylight during February 1942, attacks were made by British destroyers, bombers and Fleet Air Arm torpedo-bombers together with bombardments from coastal artillery. Bomber command had launched 242 aircraft but owing to a variety of circumstances only 39 were able to engage. All the German ships received damage but made the journey back to Germany.[75] Despite inadequate RAF fighter cover, six Swordfish torpedo bombers from 825 Naval Air Squadron attacked the warships but were all shot down. No damage was incurred by the German ships as a result of these suicidally heroic Swordfish attacks but their courage and determination was acknowledged by the award of a posthumous Victoria Cross to their leader, Lt. Cdr. Eugene Esmonde (1909-1942).

c) The Actions of Political and Military Leaders in the Battle of Britain

Churchill’s opening sentence in his Battle of Britain chapter of Their Finest Hour published in 1949 reads, “Our fate now depended upon victory in the air”.^[76] Nine years earlier and with the air battles at a crescendo he had broadcast to the nation that ‘This effort of the Germans to secure daylight mastery of the air over England is of course the crux of the whole war… we must regard the next week or so as a very important period in our history.’[77]

These statements have endowed the air campaigns with an unwarranted significance because it is now clear that Winston Churchill did not seriously expect a German invasion at this time. While the daylight air battles were raging inconclusively over England during August, Churchill ordered Britain’s remaining tank force to the Mediterranean in preparation for an offensive against the Italians in North Africa. In a memorandum to Field Marshal Edmund Ironside (1880-1959), a few weeks before, the prime minister stated “I find it hard to believe the south-coast is in serious danger at this time”.[78] If an invasion had really been expected this would have been a serious gamble given that the bulk of Britain’s modern heavy equipment had already been abandoned on the beaches of Dunkirk. Furthermore, if the invasion question had really hung on the outcome of the air battles, why then, did he not wait for the RAF to win the Battle of Britain? Churchill later admitted to Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, C.in.C (1880-1960) Home Fleet in 1940 that he never thought there would be an invasion.  Forbes then provoked a slightly inebriated Churchill by retorting that he had ‘camouflaged it very well’.[79] The diaries of Churchill’s private secretary also contain an entry during the invasion crisis stating that the prime minister did not think there would be an invasion but wanted to keep everyone on their toes.[80]But whatever Churchill’s private thoughts it was necessary to maintain this illusion as Britain desperately needed to cultivate American sympathy and logistical support if Britain was to continue fighting. Having honed its PR skills fighting for the RAF’s very existence between the wars, the Air Ministry worked with the press, British Crown Film Unit, the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office in a campaign to convince the USA of Britain’s ability to fight.

By August 1940, the Foreign Office viewed the RAF as Britain’s best weapon in the propaganda campaign to engage American sympathy. The easiest way to clarify the ‘British predicament’ and show British prospects was to encapsulate both ‘in a single statistic: the ratio of the losses of the Luftwaffe to the losses of the RAF’.[81] The figures were hugely exaggerated but Churchill reinforced these perceptions with his personal appearance in an American propaganda film shown to British cinema audiences. Why We Fight-The Battle of Britain (Frank Capra, 1942) drew heavily on an Air Ministry pamphlet –The Battle of Britain (HMSO, 1941). In his introduction, Churchill assured British cinema audiences that facts and figures had been carefully recorded.[82] One section of the film warned of the consequences of failure in the air by graphically depicting the destruction of the British fleet by aerial bombardment in the English Channel. Another section glossed over the RAF’s failure to protect the civilian population from night attack with a heroic portrait of cheery cockneys ‘taking-it’.[83] This failure to protect the civilian population was an unforgivable Air Ministry let-down. Despite the harsh experience of night bombing during 1917/18, adequate night air defences did not exist and the Luftwaffe pursued its night attacks on London and other cities with minimal losses. This did not improve until the introduction of airborne interception radar (AI) in 1941, but only Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 ended the Blitz.

But what factors were influencing Adolf Hitler? With the fall of France, Hitler initially expected the British to see sense and come to terms. By July, he realised there would be no prospect of the British doing this, especially now the British had fortified their coast and reorganised their army. He therefore ordered the German Naval Staff to prepare for an invasion. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder (1876-1960), faithfully put the preparations for Operation Sea Lion into practice but not without acquainting the Fuehrer of the operational problems at every opportunity. Sabotaged harbours precluded the possibility of an immediate invasion and required clearing. The need for extensive preparation meant that the invasion could not be launched before September 1940 but Raeder made it clear he would prefer to wait until the spring of 1941. Lack of dedicated landing craft meant civilian river barges required extensive conversion. Long trains of barges containing troops and equipment had to be towed by tugboats across one of the most unpredictable and difficult stretches of water in the world. [84]To protect the crossing routes, Raeder suggested flanking mine barriers but there were not enough mines to maintain a continuous barrier, and as Vice Admiral Frederick Ruge, acknowledged “mines are not an absolute barrier.”[85] To obtain the freedom for his to operate and generally offset his naval inferiority, Raeder demanded air-superiority and had this pre-condition included in Hitler’s invasion directives. However, the problem that Raeder would always allude to in his meetings with Hitler was the immense British naval superiority in the crossing area. The final plan was to land forces on a narrow front between Folkestone/Dungeness, Dungeness/Cliff’s End, Bexhill/Beachy Head, and Brighton/Selsey Bill. At the German Army’s insistence, the landing’s were to be made at dawn meaning that the invasion flotillas would be vulnerable to the night fighting naval forces from Rosyth, Plymouth, Portsmouth and The Nore because the Luftwaffe could not provide air reconnaissance during the night crossing. [86]Should the British naval forces be engaged with the German barges and their numerically paltry escorts at dawn, then neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe could engage shipping without the risk of friendly fire.[87]

All this was known to Hitler when he made the fateful decision to postpone Sea Lion on 17 September. Ostensibly, the decision was made because the Luftwaffe had lost fifty-six aircraft on the daylight raid on London during 15 September and this seemed to indicate that air superiority had not been obtained.  But it is clear enough that Hitler knew the difficulties of invading with or without air superiority and he was seeking an exit strategy without losing face. The German Naval Staff had already observed both Hitler and Goering’s lack of enthusiasm for the plan and by 10 September, did not expect to have to go through with it anyway.[88] In any case, Hitler was already planning Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union during August.[89] Luftwaffe chief, Herman Goering (1893-1946), may or may not have believed his own rhetoric regarding the Luftwaffe’s ability to bomb the British into submission but with a seaborne invasion unlikely to succeed it is easy to see how a terror-bombing campaign seemed to have the potential to bring down the Churchill coalition and bring about a negotiated settlement. In the event, the Blitz was defeated by the ability of the civilians to soak up the punishment from the air. It was just as well because the RAF could provide civilians with scant protection for the rest of 1940.

Conclusions

• Military aviation had got off to a slow start in Great Britain and if a little more prescience had been shown by the generals and admirals prior to 1914 there would have been far less chance of the aviation ball being snatched away from them in 1917.
• British naval development in 1909, though proceeding at a vigorous pace because of the Anglo-German naval race, created resentment among politicians because of the staggering cost of warship building. The huge costs led to the consideration of submarines and aircraft as alternatives to battleship construction.  But British naval aviation did not gather pace until Churchill removed the naval wing from the RFC and the new RNAS began to explore a wide range of roles for the aeroplane as war loomed in 1914.
• Although the Royal Navy played a key role in the eventual allied victory in 1918 it had failed to win an unambiguous clear-cut victory over the German High Seas Fleet and was slow to deal with the U-boat blockade that brought Britain closer to defeat than the Germans would manage in 1940. Nevertheless it successfully developed the naval air power that helped win the first Battle of the Atlantic and by 1918 the British were, for the time being, well ahead of every other nation in this respect.
• But at the close of hostilities it seemed that Jack Tar had lost the affection of the British public in favour of the aviator. Attempts to regain the fleet’s airpower from the RAF foundered in the face of Trenchard’s determination and political indifference for many years.
• Government panic induced by German air raids had led to the implementation of the Smuts Report, causing British policy thinking to veer sharply away from land and maritime defence. The situation could still have been rectified in the immediate post-war period but for the volte-face of former RFC/IAF commander Sir Hugh Trenchard. His policy of imperial air policing had many shortcomings but the politicians were convinced it offered a viable means of policing the British Empire in a cost-effective manner.
• Inter-service rivalry, far from subsiding, erupted as a result of the inevitable battle for declining resources in between the wars. While the Army and Royal Navy had been criticised for arguing there were now three competing services. But Trenchard won public support for the new air service with impressive public air displays aided by the Rothermere Press, a long-standing ally of the air lobby. Much of the press argument was in favour of increasing RAF funding at the expense of the Royal Navy and encouraging the unfounded belief that warships were impotent in the face of air attack. The RAF had maintained its independence by concentrating on bombing while neglecting their supporting roles for the army and navy.
• This gradual propaganda drip in favour of air expansion had little effect on the politicians of the 1920s who were determined to keep down public spending. But the Wall Street Crash of 1929 hit western economies hard and helped create the circumstances that led to Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, which in turn led to limited British rearmament from 1934.
• By the Munich Crisis of 1938 the government panicked over the state of the air defences much as a previous administration had done over 20 years before. However, greatly increased air spending did not in itself make the RAF an effective force by 1940 though it was certainly impressive enough on paper. Unfortunately, its experience of imperial air policing had not prepared it to fight a major industrialised nation such as Germany and in 1940 Bomber Command was neither adequately equipped nor trained for its role of strategic bombing.
• Another significant consequence was the inability of Fighter Command to conduct an effective night defence but equally serious was the RAF’s inability to sink warships at sea – a major deficiency for a traditional maritime power. Neither did the British Expeditionary Force, enjoy the level of air support the Luftwaffe provided for the German army in 1940.
• Indeed, as a continental power, it is clear that in the early phases of the war, Germany had an air force better suited to its needs than the British possessed. The Luftwaffe’s key weakness in the summer of 1940 was an inability to sink warships on the scale required for an invasion of Great Britain while simultaneously destroying the coastal defences. Nevertheless, prior to Dunkirk, few people would have believed the Luftwaffe could ever be in a position where it needed to support such an invasion.
• Treaty constraints and international pressures to disarm meant that the Royal Navy entered World War II with a fundamentally old fleet that had been partly modernised. But, in 1940, it was still the largest fleet in the world and early experience at Norway and at Dunkirk had showed that it could successfully operate in the face of land-based airpower. So powerful were German perceptions of British naval might that Hitler could not bring himself to launch Operation Sea Lion.
• Despite the highly publicised air battles viewed by British civilians and American war correspondents over southern England, there should no longer be any doubt that the defence of Great Britain in 1940 rested firmly on the foundations of British naval power. When will the media get the message?

A J Cumming ©

Endnotes

IT HAS HAPPENED AGAIN.

LORD CHATFIELD AND HIS CRITIQUE OF BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY MAKING

Professor Eric Grove

N.B. All references are from Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield’s Autobiography ‘It Might Happen Again, Volume II. The Navy and Defence’, Heinemann, London, 1947.

            Although his name is nowadays largely forgotten, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield has a claim to be the most significant Naval Officer of the Twentieth Century. Less of a self publicist than Fisher, Chatfield, after an extended period as First Sea Lord masterminding rearmament, became a cabinet minister, succeeding Inskip as Minister for the Coordination of Defence in Chamberlain’s cabinet in 1939. He remained in office as a member of the War Cabinet and Chairman of its Military Co-ordination Committee. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill saw himself as the leading member of this body and eventually he manoeuvred Chatfield out of office.

Chatfield was effectively rusticated for the rest of the war. If Halifax had possessed the stomach to replace Chamberlain, Chatfield might well have been Minister of Defence, but Churchill combined the posts and saw Chatfield as a threat. No one else combined such political status and undoubted defence expertise. When Churchill was in political trouble in 1942 and in danger of being forced to relinquish the defence portfolio, Chatfield, a critic of the Prime Minister’s serious mistakes, such as the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, was an obvious candidate. He was therefore kept as far away from power as possible, being placed in charge of a Civil Defence awards committee. His prestige within the Navy remained high, however.  First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound drove down to see him to ask whether he should receive a peerage offered by the Prime Minister. Chatfield said no, given feelings in the Fleet about the Prince of Wales fiasco and Pound’s complicity in the disaster. Pound took Chatfield’s advice.¹

As time went by and the actors in the drama of the war took centre stage, Chatfield was forgotten, although he lived to the ripe old age of 93 as a Naval elder statesman, remembered more within the service than without it. Mountbatten, who had served under his command, was always careful to keep Chatfield informed of events when he was guiding naval and defence policy. On leaving office Chatfield wrote his memoirs ‘The Navy and Defence’ part of which (the sections on higher policy) were censored until Churchill was safely out of the way in opposition in 1947. It came out as a second volume, under the title ‘It Might Happen Again’ with the frankly didactic purpose of making sure that what Chatfield regarded as the errors of the inter war period, were not repeated. As he concluded in his new foreword: – ‘If we do not mend our ways: if we fail to construct a better way of ensuring the country’s safety: if we allow defence to remain a matter of party controversy, and are unwilling to pay an adequate insurance premium, we may live more comfortably, but we shall live dangerously, and one day it will all happen again.^’2

The Cold War prevented this dire prediction coming true for half a century, but the current financial climate has caused British governments to revert to type. The so called Strategic Security and Defence Review with its savage cuts to naval and air capabilities and the resulting grotesquely ill balanced defence posture, have shown that it has indeed happened again. It is effectively a new ‘Ten Year Rule’ promising ready forces in a decade’s time. Chatfield would find such things only too familiar. It is useful therefore, to examine the recent disastrous policy errors through the lens of Chatfield’s critique of his contemporaries. This will demonstrate that the structural problems of the first half of the Twentieth Century still remain in the second decade of the Twenty First. Once again Chatfield has been a prophet without honour in his own country. Those who ignore the errors of the past are compelled to repeat them.

The Making of an Admiral

Ernle Chatfield came from a naval family. Immediately after Ernle’s birth his father was placed in command of both the corvette Amethyst and the South America Station. Moved to the Pacific Station, together with the frigate Shah, Chatfield senior fought the rebel Peruvian turret ship Huascar in 1876. Reunited the following year, Ernle’s family moved to Malta when his father was appointed to the turret ship Thunderer. The boy acquired a deep love of both the service and the sea as he followed him to Devonport and Pembroke Dock. It was only natural that he should join the officer training ship Britannia in 1886. His father’s influence obtained good midshipmen’s appointments, the armour-plated ship Iron Duke closely followed by the corvette Cleopatra bound for South America. Both ships relied on sails for long distance cruising and the latter almost had a disaster on passage that did much to reinforce Chatfield’s recognition of the dangers of sailing ships, even with experienced crews. One of his first decisions when he became First Sea Lord in 1932 was to abandon plans for sail training ships.

Rear Admiral Chatfield retired from the Royal Navy in 1886 to run the Royal Mail Shipping Company. His son moved to the Pacific in its flagship, the new first class cruiser Warspite, whose absence of sails prevented traditional skills in seamanship being maintained.  Having taken his promotion examination, which did not go as well as he had hoped, Chatfield returned to England for sub lieutenants courses at the end of which, as a lieutenant, he joined the battleship Royal Sovereign, flagship of the Channel Fleet. He was anxious to specialise in gunnery and, after pleading his case with the captain of HMS Excellent, the gunnery school, became the junior member of the gunnery course that began in 1895 at Greenwich and then moved on to Whale Island.

Chatfield’s first appointment as a gunnery lieutenant was to the Mediterranean Fleet battleship Caesar, where he made the acquaintance of both gunnery reformer Percy Scott, whose techniques he adopted and Fisher, the C-in-C who recognised Chatfield’s qualities and used him as a command gunnery adviser and inspector. This led in 1901 to an appointment at Sheerness Gunnery School that was cut short so that he could join the brand new armoured cruiser Good Hope. Although she would soon become obsolete and come to a sad end in 1914 at Coronel, Good Hope was one of the finest capital ships in the fleet in 1902. Chatfield carried out long-range gunnery experiments. Promoted Commander, he next became executive officer of the battleship Venerable to improve the efficiency of the ship. This he did as the ship was involved in important gunnery trials in the Mediterranean that established the techniques of centralised fire control.

The same officer, who had allowed Venerable’s efficiency to lapse, had done the same at Whale Island and Chatfield, in 1906, was once again called in to clear up the mess as executive officer. This he did with great success and was rewarded by promotion to captain in 1909, aged only thirty-five. As one of the most capable officers in the service, Chatfield had got the attention of Admiral Colin Keppel, who appointed him his flag captain, first in the battleship Albemarle and then HMS London.  He was then appointed Keppel’s flag captain in the P & O liner Medina, commissioned as a royal yacht to take the King Emperor and the Queen Empress to the Delhi Durbar in 1911. After a brief period bringing the light cruiser Southampton into service, Chatfield was appointed flag captain to Admiral Beatty in the battle cruiser Lion, commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron.

This began a close association with the charismatic but erratic admiral that would last for many years. Chatfield provided the quiet competence and stability that Beatty needed in a right hand man. He could not overcome the lackadaisical way the Squadron, later the Battle Cruiser Fleet (BCF) was run. Although Chatfield listened to his Warrant Officer Gunner and altered the way the flagship’s ammunition was handled before the Battle of Jutland, in the process saving Beatty’s and his own life, these procedures were not spread round the fleet, leading to the loss of a third of the Battle Cruiser Fleet’s strength. As the BCF’s senior gunnery officer, he also cannot escape criticism for its generally bad shooting.

Nevertheless important lessons were learned about the need for improved gunnery practices and equipment, notably better projectiles for use at longer ranges (a factor that Chatfield seized upon to excuse the poor performance of Beatty’s ships). When Beatty moved to replace Jellicoe as Commander in Chief, Chatfield moved with him as flag captain, first to Iron Duke and next to Queen Elizabeth, on condition he would be senior fleet gunnery officer ensuring improved practices on a fleet wide basis. He was thus at the heart of the major improvements in Grand Fleet efficiency that took place in the last two years of the war. He also developed the conviction that pre war the views of the ‘skilled user’ of weapons had not been taken sufficiently into account.

To achieve this, it was planned that Chatfield would accompany Beatty to the Admiralty when he became First Sea Lord in order to reconstruct the Naval Staff, but Beatty’s appointment was delayed and Captain Chatfield preceded his senior to the Admiralty as Fourth Sea Lord in charge of pay and logistics. He took his naval officer Secretary with him from the flagship, as part of the process of undermining Treasury control of policy via civilian Sea Lord secretaries. Chatfield administered the implementation of the new and generous 1919 pay rates and when the Second Sea Lord went sick, was in charge of personnel for three months.

A KEY FIGURE AT THE ADMIRALTY

His time as Fourth Sea Lord provided excellent preparation for Chatfield’s appointment as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff in 1920.  He was promoted Rear Admiral in September. As well as achieving his major aims of unified doctrine and ‘skilled user’ control, he was particularly anxious about the problems for naval aviation created by the formation of the Royal Air Force. Chatfield created an Air Section of the Naval Staff and a corps of specialised Naval observers to be carried in RAF aircraft. This was however unfinished business.

The most important matters of this period in Chatfield’s career were, however, the negotiations for the Washington Treaty of 1922. He assisted Beatty as the conference opened and then headed the naval delegation after the First Sea Lord went home to ensure too many concessions were not granted in London. It was Chatfield who insisted that Britain build two 16-in gun capital ships to match Japan’s and America’s ships with similar armament and that the tonnage used to govern both their displacement and the agreed limits be ‘standard displacement’ that favoured British interests. Chatfield thought that as ‘war was unlikely to recur for many years, some limitation on navies was reasonable.’ ³ The problem was how long this happy situation would last and the speed at which the navy’s political masters would or could respond to future challenges.

The immediate crisis was with resurgent Turkey, whose new Nationalist government was opposing the draconian Treaty of Sevres. Chatfield now found himself at the centre of this at the beginning of 1923, when he was appointed to command the Third Cruiser Squadron deployed to Constantinople. The dangerous period of the ‘Chanak’ crisis had passed, but as the negotiations for a new treaty at Lausanne proceeded Chatfield was left in charge of the British naval presence, his assets attempting to prevent arms shipments to the Nationalists. Chatfield’s squadron covered the British withdrawal once the new treaty was signed and then settled down to a more normal peacetime routine of visits and exercises. Its commander was informed that his next post would be back at the Admiralty in 1925 as Third Sea Lord and Controller in charge of the navy’s materiel.

Chatfield found the Admiralty under a ‘shadow’; as he later wrote ‘It was the Treasury that cast its shadow on the defence shield. It was consequential on the feeling of peace and security that filled the country. The statesmen had shackled themselves to the chariot of the League of Nations. Collective security (whatever that might involve) was the watchword. Fighting services were no longer wanted……Meanwhile, the Government anxious to spend money in other ways, bade the Treasury take advantage of the atmosphere to bleed the Fighting Services further. On the Chancellor lay the responsibility for carrying out the spirit of the Government and Parliament.” ⁴

In 1925 that Chancellor was Winston Churchill who Baldwin had pulled out of the political gutter after the fall of the Lloyd George coalition in 1922. Appointed to the Treasury in 1924, Churchill opposed the Admiralty’s building plans and suggested they be amended to deny the likelihood of war in the next twenty years.⁵ The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) decided in April 1925, that there would be no naval war with Japan until 1935.

The most important issue of this period was the cruiser question. The Washington Treaty had encouraged the construction of cruisers larger and more heavily armed than previously, 10,000 tons and 8 in guns. Churchill, convinced there would never be a war with Japan, the most likely opponent, in his lifetime, used the new form of the Ten Year Rule to oppose continuing the Admiralty’s programme of these ships. The First Lord and First Sea Lord dug in their heels and threatened resignation. Beatty asked the other Sea Lords to consider their positions. Chatfield coordinated this process. They decided they would not continue, unless a memorandum was presented to Baldwin saying they could not remain in office, ‘unless Parliament was fully informed of Admiralty views on the danger to the safety of the Empire of continuing to neglect our ship-building. If parliament supported the Government, and it seemed inconceivable that they could do so, it would be our duty to continue in office. I had already drafted a document and read it to my colleagues. They all agreed that this attitude was constitutional and correct. We then broke up and awaited events.’ In July 1925, the emollient Baldwin suggested a compromise acceptable to the Admiralty. Chatfield covered this in some detail in his memoirs and said that he mentioned ‘this action for the consideration of future Boards of Sea Lords in similar circumstances. History repeats itself.’ ⁶ Indeed it does, but not perhaps in Sea Lords’ political strength.

The Colwyn Committee had been set up in 1925  ‘to bleed the three Services a good deal whiter.’ The Committee duly reported that further cuts were possible and necessary in order to balance the budget and to provide ‘for more vital services’. ⁷ Shades of the recent SDSR! Another echo, this time of the BAE letter that saved the second carrier Prince of Wales in order to keep a naval shipbuilding industry in being, was Chatfield’s description of the challenge facing the Admiralty in the mid 1920s: -

‘Confident in its permanent value to the country and Empire, the Admiralty knew well that great navies cannot be built in a night. Sea power is like an oak of slow growth. Once the tree is grown and sea superiority is attained, a nation’s position is assured, secure from challenge. But if it is allowed to fail, its roots to wither it cannot rapidly recover…The power of the Treasury; acting for the cabinet was being used not only to pollard the branches, but also to injure the very roots on which the future of the tree depended. The Admiralty, powerless to save the branches, endeavoured to save these roots: the dockyards, the great private firms on whom in emergency our guns, our armour and our naval instruments depended, our highly skilled labour in vital factories.’ ⁸

It was not possible to save all the nation’s industrial potential. ‘But what did it matter?’ As Chatfield later wrote in irony, ‘War was not on the horizon. This was a time to think how to spend our money in more popular ways; there is always an election on the horizon!’  The old Admiral realised there was an alternative view to his critique, that ‘the decade after the war, with a vast war debt on our hands, was an anxious financial time’. His counter argument was that ‘after the great demobilisation and reasonable disarmament, a halt should have been called and wise preparation for the future planned. Indeed the millions scraped out of the services were not really saved. They were spent in other ways; useful ways no doubt, from which the citizens of this country have greatly benefited but at an unjustifiable risk.’

Chatfield argued that all this was not the fault of the Treasury itself that was only doing its job but of successive governments who used the powerful and effective Treasury to achieve their objectives against the armed services. Chatfield successfully fought a Treasury led attempt to civilianise the Naval dockyards, although improvements in their management were brought in. Self-maintenance was also adopted for warships and provision made to keep old destroyers in reserve for anti-submarine duties. All these policies were vindicated by later events. It took personal negotiations with Churchill, however, to obtain a limited number of multiple two pounder anti-aircraft mountings for the fleet.

Another example of Chatfield’s resolution – and power- was shown during the negotiations for the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927. He and Beatty strongly opposed making concessions on cruiser strength. The Americans, who saw cruisers as adjuncts of the battle fleet, wanted parity with the British Empire on principle. Beatty and Chatfield argued that the Empire’s greater dependence on maritime trade meant larger numbers of such ships were necessary for security. Beatty delegated to Chatfield the task of guarding ‘the Home Front’ and it was well that he did so. He was given access to the telegrams concerning the conference and read one from the Ambassador in Washington that he had information that we had conceded cruiser parity. Beatty was absent collecting his sick wife in Germany and Chatfield sent the newly appointed ACNS, Dudley Pound, to catch the First Sea Lord at Victoria station for his reaction to the telegram. Beatty told Pound to inform Chatfield that he had the First Sea Lord’s full authority to act. Chatfield gained access to the Prime Minister that very afternoon. Baldwin was persuaded not to send to Washington the telegram already drafted on his desk signalling approval of the key concession. As Chatfield later wrote in triumph: – ‘Parity in cruiser strength was not conceded and the unfortunate Geneva Conference broke up, having completely failed. The Admiralty was able to breathe freely again.’ ⁹

But not for long, Churchill wanted more. In disagreeing with Chatfield’s assertion in discussion over the 1928 Estimates that the new version of the Ten Year Rule had been fixed and would expire in 1935, the Chancellor insisted that the end of the ten year period ‘was continually receding.’ ¹⁰  In July, the CID endorsed Churchill’s view as to any major war with anyone.

As Chatfield put it: – ‘So the Cabinet decided that the Ten-Year rule should commence afresh each year, so that when it was revoked the three services would always be at “ten years notice.” Protest was unavailing. Gagged and bound hand and foot, they were handed over to the Treasury Gestapo. Never has there been such a successful attempt to hamstring the security of an Empire.’

A worried Chatfield left for sea to command first the Atlantic and then the Mediterranean Fleets. These important rites of passage for a future First Sea Lord left weaker spirits in Whitehall, It was no coincidence that the cruiser programme was cut and the Admiralty accepted both the London Treaty of 1930, which delayed capital ship replacement and conceded cruiser parity, and the unfair pay cuts that led to the Invergordon Mutiny in 1931. Typically, Chatfield was able to prevent serious unrest in the Mediterranean. When, with Japan already on the march in the Far East and days before Hitler came to power in Germany, Chatfield returned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff at the beginning of 1933, there was much to be done. What he achieved over the next five and a half years was remarkable. Ably assisted by his colleagues, Chatfield rebuilt the Royal Navy for war.

REARMAMENT

            Chatfield’s first task was to cancel an expensive and ill-advised plan to re-introduce sail training. To improve morale, he and other service members of the Board of Admiralty began to wear uniform when they visited the Fleet and the civilian Board members adopted a complementary yachting rig. The London Treaty of 1930 had encouraged the Americans and Japanese to build large ‘light’ cruisers armed with almost twice the number of guns of existing British 6-in cruisers. Chatfield persuaded both Treasury and Board of Admiralty to adopt similar large ships for trade defence. Design work began in mid 1933 and the first, HMS Southampton, was commissioned less than four years later, in March 1937. One wonders how long a modern programme would have taken!

Chatfield’s priorities were to return total British Empire cruiser numbers to seventy, a mix of large trade defence and smaller fleet units, to rebuild the battle fleet and to assert full Admiralty control of the Fleet Air Arm. In direct face-to-face contacts, Chatfield tried hard to convert the pacifically minded Coalition Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald to his views on the cruiser and battleship questions.

‘Gradually Mr MacDonald came round. He invariably gave me the impression of feeling a great defence responsibility as Prime Minister; one could feel it in his questions and answer, and I had a conviction that I had only to stick to my guns and he would be willing to be convinced. He undoubtedly was. When we later met the other powers in secret conclave, I was astounded by the courageous and determined manner in which he supported the views on cruisers and battleships that I had urged in the past few months.’ ¹¹ Again this kind of interaction between service chief and Prime Minister belongs to another world.

To begin his case for new battleships, and for a more general higher national priority for defence, he made a speech at the Cutler’s Feast in Sheffield, whose steel would be vital for the new fleet, battleships especially, and where the Navy then maintained permanent inspection facilities. Chatfield had a capacity for homely comparisons. As the following shows: -

‘The three Services are each part of a team on which the Empire depends. No one can say, if we ever again have the misfortune of war, which of them will take the position of forward, half-back or goal-keeper. But remember this: that as far as the Navy is concerned, the battle-fleet is the backbone of our defence or, as it has been called, the full-back of the Fleet.  The full-back is now getting past his prime and when a new one is constructed it must be built without flaw. That responsibility and that trust will be upheld in the future as it has in the past by Sheffield and her men.’ ¹²

As he later wrote this ‘created a mild sensation. I was surprised and interested to find it very well reported in papers all over the country with large headlines and leading articles. By some it was accepted as a wise and timely warning, by others I was severely censured for venturing to criticise national policy. Hostile questions were asked about it in the House of Commons. It was the first salvo of a new open attack on the national complacency towards our defences. Perhaps I exceeded the customary discretion of the leaders of the Services, but the speech was perfectly constitutional. Like all sailors I hate public speaking, but you can accomplish nothing without it. I took every opportunity; however unpopular my task; but it was a lonely battle.’ ¹³ Modern service chiefs might take note.

Chatfield became Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Sub Committee of the CID in a context where the Ten Year Rule had been abandoned in 1932, but there were still many pressures against increased defence expenditure, not least the continuing economic crisis and its concomitant financial austerity. Chatfield got his colleagues to accept a very strongly worded 1933 Annual Report that asserted that the Empire could not be defended with the forces in being. He presented this to the CID, which recommended the establishment of a Defence Requirements Sub Committee (DRC), which reported in 1934. Despite the deteriorating international situation there was still much pressure to limit the defence budget and the DRC’s report received only a ‘lukewarm’ reception.¹⁴  The situation was complicated by Lord Rothermere’s campaign in favour of the RAF, which slewed the eventual policy decisions against the other two services. Chatfield wanted a more even handed approach and obtained the support of the other Chiefs to call the DRC back into existence in the autumn of 1934. It was now to make recommendations without regard for financial considerations, and after submitting an interim report asking for further clarifications from the Government, submitted a final report in November 1935.

This called for major re-armament and a new two power standard of naval strength and further major expansion in the air.  It reflected the main defence needs of a global Empire security of the home base and the defence of maritime communications. This led to some watering down of the proposals, whose costs  ‘appalled the financial minds’ in the Cabinet who took the report in February 1936 ¹⁵ The Treasury insisted the Economy was the fourth arm of defence and that ‘the financial dangers of the country were greater than the military ones. So long had the Treasury remained the real factor in the Government, in deciding what our armed strength was to be, that other influences only slowly became effective. The government seemed unable to face the fact that every million spent now reduced the danger of war, and that if war came, it would not be spent in time, while the cost would be much greater.’ ¹⁶

All this went on against the background of an increasingly cloudy international situation. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 forced a fleet concentration in the Mediterranean. Much against its strategic better judgement, the Admiralty was forced to threaten war against a third power, a former ally, in circumstances when the Government was showing reluctance to provide it with the wherewithal to fight Germany and Japan. No other League power demonstrated serious support for action against Italy. Despite much empty rhetoric ‘collective security thus showed itself but a heavenly dream, as it was the British sailor’s nightmare.’ ¹⁷ Similarly the Spanish Civil War pitted the Admiralty against Eden’s Foreign Office, which insisted that Franco’s Navy that had command of the sea, be denied belligerent rights of blockade upon which Britain would rely in any war. This also led to difficult situations and incidents.

Chatfield and the Admiralty were anxious that international idealism not backed by sufficient defence expenditure, was a recipe for disaster. Nonetheless they saw the right kind of arms limitation to support the British Empire’s relative position as a most useful policy instrument. When Hitler made an offer of a thirty five per cent Anglo-German ratio in naval strength it was too good to refuse, as it gave some predictable  ‘two power’ figures for British naval policy makers to plan against. This agreement caused a frisson in Anglo-French relations, as it was a pragmatic acceptance that Versailles was dead. France, however, had no intention of taking any action to maintain the discredited peace treaty and the agreement encouraged the Germans to build a balanced fleet in inferior strength rather than concentrate on commerce raiding super pocket battleships and U boats. This seriously weakened the German threat.

Chatfield summed up his and the Admiralty’s thinking on a treaty, which came for a great deal of superficial criticism later. ‘It was a unique treaty, this voluntary acceptance of armed inferiority on the seas, advantageous on balance to this country and the Empire, and from practical considerations equally so to France and Italy. It might of course be said that Germany could not be trusted to keep her word, but at this time Hitler had not shown his treacherous mind, neither indeed had Japan, with whom by general international consent we were about to endeavour to make a naval treaty also.’ ¹⁸

The Second London naval Conference opened in November 1935. Japan, who had already announced her withdrawal from the former Treaty system, demanded a common upper limit in strength, which neither the British Empire nor the USA was willing to concede. The Japanese went home and the Conference moved on to qualitative limitation, which Chatfield thought to be in Britain’s interest, as it potentially limited the cost of rearmament. The Admiralty would ‘soon be free to build, at long last, what was vital to the Empire’s safety, a right long denied us.’ ¹⁹

The Admiralty planned to lay down new capital ships the very day the old Treaty system expired in 1 January 1937, but there was a final challenge to be overcome. There was considerable public debate over the relative merits of sea power and air power, symbolised by the bomber and the battleship. There was also public criticism of supposed inter-service haggling and for the creation of a Minister of Defence to obtain a better distribution of funds. Chatfield saw this as a campaign to divert even more funds to the Air Ministry and a measure that would create more inter service problems, as the pressure for voluntary compromise in the Chiefs of Staff Committee was removed (a good prophesy given the record of the unified Ministry of Defence). However he welcomed the appointment of Sir Thomas Inskip with his legal background as Minister for the Coordination of Defence as an independent arbiter on certain issues of continued inter service conflict.

One was the bomber v battleship controversy. A ‘Vulnerability of Capital Ships’ committee chaired by the new minister was set up and met in June and July 1936. Again Chatfield exploited his position with ministers to get his way. He travelled with Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary to Epsom to see the Derby before an evening meeting of the committee. Asked to sum up the Admiralty’s position he put it this way: -’If we rebuild the battle fleet and spend many millions in doing so and then war comes and the airmen are right, and all our battleships are rapidly destroyed by air attack, our money will have been largely thrown away. But if we do not rebuild it and the airman is wrong and our airmen cannot destroy the enemy’s capital ships, and they are left to range with impunity on the world ocean and destroy our convoys, then we shall lose the British Empire.’   The Committee agreed with the Admiralty and the stage was set for the laying down of HMS King George V and HMS Prince of Wales on 1 January 1937, followed before the year was out, by three sister ships. These played key roles in the coming war, first damaging and then sinking Bismarck in the Atlantic, and then in sinking Scharnhorst in the Arctic. The true question was not battleships or bombers, but battleships and bombers.

Also laid down in 1937, were no less than four aircraft carriers. The vexed question of the control of the aircraft these would carry was decided the same year. Chatfield and the Admiralty were unwilling to accept the uneasy compromise of the ‘Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force’ set up in 1924. Of all the problems he faced, this was the ‘only one which gave me real anxiety.’ ²⁰ He considered the dual control of the FAA had been a failure. It had certainly created problems, not all of them the Air Ministry’s fault. Chatfield was undoubtedly correct, however, that the RAF, devoted to ‘strategic’ air warfare, was not the right context for a capability increasingly vital to the efficiency of the fleet, second only to its guns. As soon as he was in office, he had begun a campaign for complete naval control.

The first problem was getting the issue officially re-opened. In March 1935 quoting personnel problems, Chatfield and the First Lord produced a paper asking for an enquiry into the issues, but no progress was made. At the beginning of 1936, the Admiralty asked for an impartial enquiry into the workings of dual control, but again no progress was made before Inskip was appointed. The Minister for Coordination promised to help on specific issues, but then Monsell, the First Lord who had supported Chatfield, was replaced by Sir Samuel Hoare, a former Air Minister who thought he was in no position to take on his former department. The Sea Lords assisted in an investigation into the manning questions, but the Admiralty wanted more. Divided responsibility between two ministries led to delays, inflexibility, a confused chain of command, confusion, contention and ill-feeling. The current system was also not attracting enough recruits to sustain the proposed expansion of naval aviation.

Chatfield was concerned that if there was any failure in the air components of the fleet, it would be the navy not the RAF that would be held responsible (a consideration still valid with today’s carrier programme). He thought the navy should not have to take responsibility for this vital aspect of naval capability ‘without full and undivided powers in regard to all the forces which are normally required for its service. The Navy’s efficiency was being seriously and increasingly impaired…, which in my considered judgement, necessitated a complete and immediate change in the organisation, administration and control of the navy’s air services.’ ²¹

Chatfield threatened resignation, which brought a meeting with Baldwin who granted a ministerial investigative committee, but this was watered down to a preliminary Chiefs of Staff investigation chaired by Inskip. Its report was delayed and Hoare was replaced by Duff Cooper in June by the new Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, before any real progress had been made. Chatfield made it clear to the new minister that if a decision was not taken before the parliamentary recess he would resign. Inskip agreed to report on the question and Chatfield pushed hard to obtain a decision. On 11 July the Minister for the Coordination recommended that the Fleet Air Arm should come under the administrative control of the Admiralty. Shore based maritime aircraft and aircraft procurement remained with the Air Ministry. Chatfield accepted the compromise a little reluctantly, but it was the only offer available. ‘Time was urgent and the Navy could not wait.’ ²² The changeover actually occurred almost two years later in May 1939, just in time for the war.

This had been Chatfield’s greatest struggle and he had threatened resignation twice. His remarks on this threat are worth quoting: – ‘some people imagine that resignation is an easy and forceful step. This may or may not be so. It is no use resigning, unless your resignation is based on grounds the judgement of the country will support,…nor can such a serious national step ever be taken light-heartedly. To leave your post and for another to step in who from inexperience, could not fight the battle so well, may not help your side. To resign, however, may be a duty and may bring things to a head, bearing in mind that it is the only check to delaying tactics by your opponents because it brings into play the public mind. In this case it was a proper indication of the serious view I took of our naval security, and I used the weapon in that spirit.’

Although rearmament proceeded after 1936 at a pace that in retrospect seems most impressive The Naval Estimates more than doubled between 1934 and 1938.  A Defence Loan had been floated in 1936 and another in 1938, but in return for the latter the Treasury demanded a limit on overall expenditure, which would be rationed between the services. This meant reductions on agreed Naval programmes and the Admiralty was worried that the RAF would gobble up most of the ration given the immediacy and scale of the air threat. Chatfield, in direct negotiations with the Chancellor, obtained an increase in the Navy’s ration to safeguard vital programmes. Indeed, although the New Naval Standard was never formally approved, Chatfield and Sir Reginald Henderson, the highly able Third Sea Lord in charge of procurement, were able to obtain under the guise of ‘acceleration’ of agreed programmed scales of construction that could not have been exceeded either in terms of more ambitious programmes or shipbuilding capacity. This had the acquiescence, indeed the support of Neville Chamberlain, both as Chancellor and Prime Minister.

Lord Chatfield, as he had been since 1937, resigned as First Sea Lord in August 1938, but he was too important to be put out to grass. He chaired a committee to investigate the modernisation of India’s armed forces. . While in India, Chamberlain offered him the post of Minister for the Coordination of Defence to replace Inskip.  Chatfield very much approved of Munich and the extra time it had granted the Empire to rearm and wanted to do what he could to help exploit this situation and valuable opportunity further to improve the Empire’s defences. Despite his complaints as First Sea Lord, Chatfield recognised that air and sea rearmament was proceeding satisfactorily with the Air Ministry and Admiralty more or less free of financial limitation.

Unlike today, the Chamberlain Government’s defence posture was an accurate reflection of the strategic situation of an island at the centre of a global Empire with sea and air threats the greatest menace to its security. The Army, that – most oddly- today stands as the centrepiece of Britain’s defence, was very much a poor third with anti-aircraft defence of the UK and colonial security its major concerns. The circumstances of 1939 dictated a change in policy to a greater emphasis on an expeditionary force to the Continent .The Army as it stood was bureaucratically incapable of absorbing the resources that were now suddenly being made available.  So Chatfield ensured that a Ministry of Supply was formed to equip the sudden expansion of the Territorial Army and the introduction of conscription announced in something of a panic by the Prime Minister. He also created a sub-committee set up to discuss a new Strategic Appreciation carried out for the CID into a standing defence council, including the three service ministers and the chiefs of Staff plus a Foreign Office Representative. This morphed into the Military Coordination Committee on the outbreak of war.

THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

            As he reflected on his experiences following his resignation in 1940, Chatfield worried that after the war the same mistakes that had helped lead to the current conflict might happen again. He argued for a plan for national and imperial security that was above party politics.  Neither the CID, the Service Ministers nor parliament had been effective in safeguarding national security from countervailing political pressures. He criticised the overwhelming, indeed tyrannical, power of the Treasury ‘to counter the demands of the fighting departments’ and in those departments ‘to employ’ familiars who could if they used their power, oppose or delay action involving the spending of money. It was a power that was greatly abused.’ ²³ He argued for better informed ministers who would stay longer in post, even to the extent of those liable to being junior or senior defence ministers attending courses at the Imperial Defence College (now the Royal College of Defence Studies).

Before the publication of his book in 1947, he added an extra chapter with its title ‘It Might happen Again’ Here he gave an excellent summary of the United Kingdom’s true defence requirements, ‘Apart from the need of sufficient strength to obtain respect and play a proper part in a Security council, there are special reasons why the United Kingdom shall maintain an adequate military strength. Each nation has, by its geographical position, a liability to some form of attack by sea, land or air. It cannot unnecessarily trust to another great and friendly Power to save it from this special vulnerability, because that Power’s strength may be of the wrong type. The Bear cannot easily help the Whale, or vice versa. Despite world organisation for security, proper provision for national security is still therefore required.’ ²⁴

After some sensible comments on Imperial Defence that sadly would all too soon be overcome by events, he then concluded with some recommendations on the administration of national defence. He did not trust the cabinet as a whole to take the right decisions. He argued for annual reviews of requirements by the CID or its equivalent and the Chiefs of Staff. This would then be agreed by the party leaders and become the first charge on the exchequer to maintain the services at the required strength and to provide a reserve for emergencies. He argued that the cabinet Committee chaired by the Minister of Defence would review the service estimates before they were presented to Cabinet and that the three services’ programmes should be adjusted into a coherent joint policy.

In a postscript he wrote approvingly of the Attlee Government’s proposals for the Central Organisation of Defence published in 1946 and implemented the following year. The new Defence Committee of the Cabinet corresponded with his recommendations, as did the newly constituted Minister of Defence. But he was still not satisfied that it removed defence from party politics, made defence the ‘first charge on national income’ or ensured the education of ‘future statesmen’ ²⁵  ‘We are still without properly organised security, and unreadiness for war – which is in our blood – can happen again and bring us to the edge of the precipice…. To-day the Government is already struggling against uninformed opinion. Only by education, will defence expenditure cease to be unpopular and this dangerous democratic weakness be for the first time overcome.’

Over half a century later, the situation is not much improved, indeed, it has got worse. It can fairly be argued that some of Chatfield’s recommendations are politically unrealistic. They should not, however be totally dismissed. After all, Chatfield is worth respect; he did as much as anyone to give Britain the wherewithal to fight the Second World War. Politicians, especially those of the present generation, who know nothing else but Westminster, need education in defence and national security issues. Moreover, the best Defence Reviews are those that like of 1998, which self consciously claimed political consensus and reflected the views of a broad swathe of informed opinion. I think Lord Chatfield would have approved.

The worst are like those of 2010, that threw the armed services to the Treasury wolves and made them fight for the programmes most important in their eyes, thus producing a completely incoherent and distorted defence posture that was totally out of synchronisation with declared national security policy.  This ‘SDSR’ made the policy decisions of the inter-war period criticised by Chatfield look positively enlightened. Moreover, the disastrous Review was presented in grossly distorted party political terms.

It has ‘happened again’ and it is to be hoped that, although Whitehall has changed since the 1920s and 30s, – not necessarily for the better, – defence decision makers may learn something from the career, activities and advice of one of the greatest British defence policy makers of all time.

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Paper by Captain Alan Hensher MBE, RN.

Introduction

Si vis pacem. Para bellum

(If you wish for peace, prepare for war)

 Flavius Vegetius Renatus. 380 AD

This well recognised maxim arguing for deterrence has endured from the 4^th century to be as important as ever in a dangerous and uncertain world. Moreover, it finds full and modern day expression in the UK’s amphibious forces as one of the most capable and flexible tools of war. An amphibious task group has the ability to deploy, support and rapidly re-deploy a self-contained highly trained force that has not only proved crucial to British success in many crises and conflicts but instrumental in preventing several more.

An amphibious task group is a complex maritime force requiring well-honed and close co-ordination of its many functions and weapons systems. These are designed, first, to counter the air, surface and sub-surface threats including mine clearance in the Amphibious Operating Area (AOA), then to deliver the ground force ashore. The critical manoeuvre is of course the ship to shore movement of the military unit. For the UK this means landing craft (both utility and vehicle/personnel), hovercraft and the primary method that is the main subject of this work, the helicopter.

The Royal Navy has led the way in the UK in the introduction, procurement, development and operational deployment of military helicopters from the late 1940’s. This paper, therefore, starts by presenting an historical overview of the development of naval helicopters, their mission and their evolution. It then goes on to outline the current role of the Royal Navy and Royal Marine’s commando helicopters as part of the Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) including Air/Ground co-operation. This will lead to the conclusions, which will consider the future relevance of this force and it role.

An important purpose of this paper is to illustrate that the commando helicopters in particular have roles in both amphibious conflict and more conventional manoeuvre dependent conflicts, for example Afghanistan. These squadrons have been a vital component of the UK forces that have been committed there for the last ten years, adding further laurels to a history already resplendent with them.

Historical Overview

The Royal Navy and Royal Marines as full-time operators have encompassed the full range of military helicopter activity within the Defence structure of the United Kingdom for over 50 years.  Indeed, they have been the innovators of many of the important developments including radar, Electronic Warfare (EW) as exemplified by the successful Airborne Search and Control (ASaC) Sea King

Naval Helicopter Roles

Search and Rescue (SAR); Military or Commando Helicopter Support; Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW),  Ships’ Flights in destroyers, frigates and RFA’s capable of dropping ASW weapons or firing Anti-Ship missiles and more recently, Airborne Search and Control (ASaC) have evolved as the five main strands of Naval Helicopter activity during the past half century. Initially ASW was the dominant Naval role. By exploiting the helicopter’s unique qualities to hover and transit at up to 100 knots to effect detection of submarines by dipping sonar or monitored sono-buoys and to attack by homing torpedoes or depth charges, ASW protection was extended to well beyond the detection range and attack capability of the conventional surface ship screen. With the demise of the Soviet Union the submarine threat has diminished over the past 2 decades but a seed-corn ASW capability has been retained, with the ASW Sea King now replaced by the more capable Merlin Mk1 (soon to be replaced with the Mk 2). The Sea King remains in service until 2016, in the SAR, AEW and Commando role.

Search and Rescue

SAR techniques that are now used globally, such as the double lift, stretcher casevac and SAR divers for submerged rescues were pioneered mainly by the Royal Navy. In the 1950’s the SAR helicopter became a more effective and economic replacement for the Plane Guard destroyer, formerly required to be close astern of the Aircraft carrier during flying stations in case of an aircraft ditching or aircrew bale-out.

Helicopter Operations from HM, RFA and Merchant Ships

The development of helicopter operations from small ships and RFA’s has expanded widely from the 1950’s so that now almost every HM ships of frigate size and above and many Royal Fleet Auxillary ships can and do operate helicopters.  Originally intended for ASW this facility has now become as important for the deployment of commando/military support helicopters: a facility that proved its value in the Falklands Campaign, the Gulf war and most recently the Libyan conflict.  The ship-borne Lynx helicopter with its radar, sophisticated EW and air-to-surface missiles has become an important extension of a ship’s weapon system by adding an over the horizon search and strike capability that has been equally effectively employed [through the Mk 7] over land in the Commando role in Afghanistan. Any ship with an embarked helicopter has an enhanced Anti-Piracy capability.

Military Support

Naval helicopters have been employed for military support of ground forces continually from the ‘50s in Malaya, Suez ’57, Borneo Confrontation ’62 – ‘66; Falklands ’82, Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day, often operating from and with the support of a Commando Ship or Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH).

the helicopter has become an essential component of almost any military activity, now progressing well beyond the earlier basic tasks of lifting troops, equipment and casevac, to perform a wide range of roles; Intelligence, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), armed helicopter strike and close air support (CAS), airborne radio relay (rebro) and convoy escort and protection.

Figure 1. A Sea King Mk4 the mainstay of operations in the Falklands, Iraq and Afghanistan

Commando Role

It is in the Commando Role that the projection of ground forces by helicopter from the sea has demonstrated an optimum military capability and political flexibility. The trio of Commando ship; RM Commando or Army Unit and Helicopter Squadron including Army Armed Helicopters (such as Lynx and Apache) constitutes a small but powerful force. This effectiveness is multiplied many fold if accompanied by an Aircraft Carrier and a full Amphibious Task Group. The ability of maritime forces to operate in international waters close to the combat area for sustained periods without the need for establishment of a land base within a host nation confers significant political and military advantages by a timely presence in strength for prevention and deterrence.

Genesis of Commando Ship (LPH) concept

The technique of landing troops and equipment by helicopter from the sea was originated by the US Marine Corps in the early 1950’s

(known as the Vertical Envelopment Technique) and adopted by UK, first in 1956, from a conventional carrier at Suez. In 1959, the conventional aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark was converted to the Commando role to be followed a year or so later by the similar conversion of HMS Albion. Both ships played a decisive role in the deployment and support of Royal Marine Commando or Army Units and Naval helicopter squadrons and in the success of the Borneo Confrontation campaign from 1962 to 66.  For the first time the versatility of the Commando Ship was demonstrated in providing logistic and technical support over a sustained 4 year period to the embarked military unit – RM or Army –and to its helicopters, both onboard and onshore, Army and RAF helicopters and light fixed wing aircraft can also operate from or be lifted to the combat area in a Commando ship.

The Current Role

Commando Helicopter Force (CHF)

The CHF is very much part of the FAA, but under the operational command of Commander in Chief Land Forces as part of the JHC. It comprises 4 squadrons: 848 (SK OCU), 845 and 846 (front-line SK sqdns) and 847 (front-line Lynx sqdn) and over 850 personnel. Each of the 3 front-line squadrons has its own deployable capability, with an ability to be self sufficient in the field (in support of the land forces) through deployment of their own tented Forward Operating Bases (FOB). Theses FOBs can either be deployed from sea by vehicle or lifted by the aircraft as underslung loads. This is a capability within the JHC unique to the CHF; no other JHC unit is able to project itself ashore from being afloat and then operate as a self-sufficient force in the field, which of course provides ultimate flexibility and versatility in an efficient and effective package, eg. Falklands, Gulf 1 and 2. Naval air Commando squadrons are trained regularly in Mountain and Arctic Warfare conditions in Northern Norway.

Air Ground Co-operation

Over the many years embracing Suez, the Borneo campaign, the Falklands, the Gulf wars, Iraq and Afghanistan the Royal Marines and the Navy’s Commando helicopter squadrons have become well practised in operating together. The essential ingredient of this rapport is mutual trust and in particular that the RM or Army ground commander is given helicopter tasking authority, albeit with recognition of specialist air factors. This procedure is always practised by the Royal Navy but not usually by the RAF in their belief that professional aviation experience is a pre-requisite for air tasking or similar functions.

Maritime Experience

When air squadrons of any service embark in a Carrier and Assault ship there is a well-recognized need for the squadron personnel to integrate with the parent ship’s company.  This requires an awareness at least of the operating conditions unique to embarked aviation. These include the limitations of space and associated intensification of demands on safety, Radhaz on the flight deck and conflicting requirements for flight deck space for non-aviation activities such as training of embarked Royal Marine or Army units or Replenishment at Sea (RAS).  Such integration flows from a broad mindset that accepts there are factors outside aviation which dictate the ship’s actions in both combat and peacetime situations.  This maritime orientation is inherent in the Naval Air Commando squadrons.  For Army and RAF air squadrons it is best engendered by actual embarked experience of some few weeks duration.

Figure 3. An Apache Helicopter flying from, whilst two more sit on the deck of HMS Ocean, the Royal Navy’s premier helicopter assault ship (Landing Platform Helicopter, or ‘LPH’) in the Mediterranean

The Aircraft

Each of the 3 front-line SK squadrons of the CHF comprise 10 SK Mk 4 aircraft (although this is set to change with a gradual drawdown in numbers expected in the run up to the SK out of service date of 2016 and transition to Merlin Mk4, of which there will be 25), with 848 NAS operating 9 airframes. The SK Mk 4 can be fitted with GPMG for self defence and can also be fitted with an electro-optical camera for the ISTAR role – the Merlin Mk4 will most likely be similarly equipped. 847 NAS comprises 6 Lx Mk 7 (these numbers too are set to change as the Squadron transitions to the replacement battlefield helicopter, the ‘Wildcat’) and carries a GPMG; the removal from service of the TOW missile system some years ago saw both the strike and ISTAR capability removed. An air to surface missile system for the Wildcat is under consideration.

Helicopter Blade Fold Facility

The efficient use of a commando ship’s flight deck to generate a high sortie rate requires the safe and rapid movement of helicopters around the deck with ready access to aircraft lifts and the hangar. Helicopters that operate from ships should therefore have a blade fold facility. For large helicopters this should be powered blade folding as in the Sea King and Merlin Mk 4. The smaller Lynx can be folded manually. The Chinook has great lift capability but as a very large aircraft with no blade fold facility it is a net liability for continuous deck operations. The scale of the problem can be gauged from the fact that the deck space required for one Chinook can accommodate four folded Merlin Mk 4s.

Figure 5. Merlin Mk 3 Commando helicopter, as they served in RAF colors prior to their transfer to the RN as replacements for the Sea Kings

Joint Helicopter Command and operations have been in practise for over ten years and work well. Even so events have shown that Joint arrangements, if taken too far, can become a casualty to overriding decisions such as those taken in the recent Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). It is important to ensure that the Royal Navy’s expertise and experience in the amphibious dimension of helicopter operations remain undiminished by joint agreements or practices. Equally joint concepts should embrace fully the versatility and flexibility of our amphibious capability to involve the Army’s ground units and Apache armed helicopters and the RAF’s Puma and Merlin helicopters with fixed wing air support as appropriate. In recent months the success of Apache armed helicopters operating from HMS Ocean in Libya with some being flown by Naval pilots is a testament to ‘jointery’ at its most effective. However, such success is not happenstance and requires a proper understanding of the associated challenges, with the presence of certain key enablers being critical to the safe and effective delivery of joint aviation from the sea. Most important is the presence of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in key positions; not only in the cockpit but importantly also in the planning process, the supervisory chain and of course the chain of command. Currently such skills are provided by a team of CHF- the Junglies- and Commando Ship personnel to form a cadre of experts. The development of the Junglies ethos and their associated maritime expertise has evolved over some 6 decades of commando operations; if allowed to dissipate or fall out of practice its renaissance would require a heavy investment of time in the re-creation of the cadre of experts.  It could not be done overnight.

Conclusion

The Naval Service’s Commando helicopter squadrons, known as the ‘Junglies’, have gained a high reputation with their principle clients, the Royal Marines and the Army, as a determined and efficient outfit. With an ethos of ‘can do’ that has inspired their actions over the past fifty years, and operating as frequently from a Commando ship as they do from a forward operating base or an improvised vessel, they have given stalwart support to the Royal Marines and the Army in their operational commitments all round the world:- Malaya; Suez; Borneo; East Africa; Falklands; Gulf Wars; Iraq; Sierra Leone; & Afghanistan.

What is important to evoke from this impressive record is the enduring value of the Navy’s commando helicopters as part of a joint force structure and as a vital component of the Amphibious Forces that remain a core capability of the UK’s Defence Strategy.

The nature and source of future conflict has become more than ever difficult to predict in a complex, uncertain and often dangerous world.    The unexpected military or political crisis remains a spectre which demands a flexible and rapid response.  The Commando Helicopter Force as part of the UK’s Amphibious Capability, is ideally structured to respond to such events.

Recommended Reading

Booth, K. (1994). Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence. In J. Gow, J. Sharp, K. Booth, T. Haiverson, P. Towle, J. Howorth, et al., & L. Freedman (Ed.), Military Intervention in European Conflicts (pp. 56-75). Cambridge (MA) and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Freedman, L., Gow, J., Sharp, J., Booth, K., Haiverson, T., Towle, P., et al. (1994). Military Intervention in European Conflicts. (L. Freedman, Ed.) Cambridge (MA) and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Hill, J. R. (2002). The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knowles, E. (Ed.). (2009). Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (7th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lovering, T. (Ed.). (2007). Amphibious Assault: Manouvre from the Sea. Woodbridge: Seafarer Books.

Soanes, C., & Stevenson, A. (Eds.). (2008). Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th, Revised ed.). Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press.

Thompson, J. (1999, Hedgewick & Jackston 1998). War Behind Enemy Lines. London: Pan Books.

Thompson, J. (2007). 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands. London: Pen & Sword Military.

Thompson, J. (2009). Dunkirk; retreat to victory. London: Macmillan.

Thompson, R. C. (1994). The Pacific Basin Since 1945; A History of the Foreign Relations of the Asian,

some few weeks duration.

(front-line SK sqdns) and 847 (front-line Lynx sqdn) and over 850 personnel. Each of the 3 front-line squadrons has its own deployable capability, with an ability to be self sufficient in the field (in support of the land forces) through deployment of their own tented Forward Operating Bases (FOB). These Australiasian and American Rim States and the Pacific Islands. London and New York: Longman.

Till, G. (2002). Retrenchment Rethinking Revival 1919-1939. In J. R. Hill (Ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy (pp. 319-47). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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]]> http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2012/07/commando-helicopters-of-the-royal-navy-royal-marines/feed/ 0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2012/04/the-thirty-years-on-threat-to-the-falkland-islands/ http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2012/04/the-thirty-years-on-threat-to-the-falkland-islands/#comments Sun, 22 Apr 2012 09:58:40 +0000 EAO http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/?p=2483 Phoenix Naval ThinkTank

The ‘Thirty Years on’ Threat to the Falkland Islands will be Economic and Diplomatic Isolation,  not Military.

But if Argentina did re-invade, would Britain have the political stomach for such a fight     after so [...]

Executive Summary.

i.          This paper provides an insight into the manned fast jet component of Carrier Battle Group operations that ‘Project Power’ in support of British national interests overseas. It does not address the part that may be played by Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles (UCAVs) in the longer term.

ii.        It looks at a particular scenario where British interests are seriously threatened and addresses the problems facing the Command in deterring and opposing such a threat.

iii.       It refers to the importance of full control of all assets in the combat theatre being vested in the maritime (the sea) Commander (surface, subsurface and air) and emphasises the ability of the Task Group to poise in international waters for immediate action if called upon to meet a political requirement.

iv.        An operational analysis[1] is made of the capability of the differing fast-jet air groups that might be embarked in the Queen Elizabeth class carrier in the short to medium term. Significant conclusions concerning the ability of each air group to satisfy Command requirements are drawn from this analysis:

Table of Contents

Executive Summary. 1

Introduction. 3

Unilateral and Allied Operations. 4

Unilateral Operations. 4

Allied Operations. 4

Carrier Strike. 5

Command and Control. 6

Scenario:  A Blockade of the Hormuz Strait. 6

Setting the Scene. 6

Figure 1. Initial Disposition of Military Force. 7

Carrier Battle Group Constitution. 8

Planning. 8

Deterrence. 8

Air Defence. 8

Armed Reconnaissance over the Strait. 9

Limiting the Risk to Merchantmen. 9

Execution – Background. 10

The F-35C Air Group Capability. 10

Options Available to the Command. 10

Limitations. 11

Stealth Related. 11

Defence Suppression. 11

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs. 12

The F-35B STOVL Air Group Capability. 13

Options Available to the Command. 13

Deficiencies. 13

Defence Suppression. 14

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs. 14

The F-18E/F and EA-18G  Air Group Capability. 15

Options Available to the Command. 15

Defence Suppression – A Key Capability. 15

Figure 2.  EA-18G: key systems. 16

Capability available to the Command. 17

Limitations. 17

Execution – Discussion of Air Group Options. 17

Responsibilities. 17

Compatibility of the Air Group Options with Responsibilities. 18

Table 1. The capability or otherwise of each Air Group. 18

Conclusion 1. F-35B STOVL is incompatible with the Command’s needs. 19

Conclusion 2:  Defence Suppression – A Key Capability. 19

Annex A. Latent Trouble-Spots around the world East of Suez. 20

Near East. 20

Far East. 21

Annex B.  Air Power Capabilities and Roles – beyond NATO waters. 22

Annex C.  Sea Warfare – A Discussion. 23

Introduction.

“Whereas any European power has to support a vast army first of all, we in this fortunate, happy island, relieved by our insular position of a double burden, may turn our undivided efforts and attention to the Fleet.  Why should we sacrifice a game in which we are sure to win to play a game in which we are bound to lose?”

Winston Churchill.

1. One of the reasons that the Government and the Secretary of State considers Carrier Strike to be at the heart of Britain’s strategic defence policy is the proven operational effectiveness and flexibility of aircraft carriers and their deterrence value.

1. This paper is a follow-up to the earlier paper, “Why does Britain need aircraft carriers?” It provides an insight into future fast jet operations from an aircraft carrier in a likely combat theatre.

1. Intentionally, the combat theatre given is to the East of Suez where basing rights and over-flight rights might well not be easily available to land based air[2]. Operations to the West of Suez and within the NATO area of European influence may well be conducted with some efficiency from air fields where NATO bases are conveniently available for the support of unilateral or allied Expeditionary Force Operations.  This is not the case to the East of Suez where the perceived threat to our trade routes, our energy supplies and our overseas dependencies and interests has recently been brought into sharp focus.

1. The paper discusses the options and considerations that need to be taken into account by a Task Force Commander in pursuit of the early resolution of a crisis. It then goes on to examine the advantages and disadvantages of the three different air groups that could be embarked in the Queen Elizabeth class carrier.

1. It provides an understanding of:

a)    The necessary flexibility of air operations from a carrier deck.

b)    The critical importance of procuring the right air group/fast jet combat aircraft for such operations.

Unilateral and Allied Operations.

1. As an Island Nation, Britain has to place greater reliance upon maritime trade and seaborne energy supplies than our continental neighbours and needs to be able to protect and police the same on a global basis. It would be irresponsible and naive to rely upon other nations to protect our specific interests for us.

1. At the same time, it would be sensible for Britain to contribute to European commercial security and prosperity by being able to police global trade routes. The quid pro quo result of providing such a carrier strike capability should be for Britain to be able to rely upon our continental European neighbours to provide adequate military air and ground forces for the policing and protection of the European area itself.  This would save the taxpayer much nugatory expenditure.

Unilateral Operations.

1. ‘Carrier Strike’ provides Britain with the ability to deploy military, political and diplomatic influence and deterrence at will throughout the oceans of the world. It prevents the need to rely upon or comply with the sovereign will of other nations.

1. The current tension between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands demonstrates the possibility that Britain may once more be drawn into military action to protect its interests there. Such a contingency could arise this year or at any time in the future. But the retention of the Islands, albeit important, is just one example of why Britain needs to be able to deploy visible military power and deterrence. There are many more latent trouble-spots around the world East of Suez that would represent a serious and positive threat to our trade interests and energy supplies (see graphics at Annex A). We need to have the capability to contain such trouble-spots and to deter any escalation into full military action. If deterrence fails, then we need to be able to react with sudden and effective military force.

Allied Operations.

1. During and following the Cold War, the pre-eminent naval power that protected our interests was the United States. It provided a comprehensive strike capability and an umbrella of air defence for the majority of NATO military operations. Britain contributed to this strike and air defence capability with the fourth HMS Ark Royal up to the end of the 70s and with the Invincible class carriers up until the withdrawal of Harrier from service under SDSR 2010.

1. This withdrawal coincided with the public recognition within the United States that its NATO partners were ‘not pulling their weight’ with regard to investment in and the deployment of appropriate military resources. Britain’s investment in the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers will help redress this balance as well as giving Britain the necessary option for unilateral action when our interests do not coincide with those of the United States.

1. The reluctance of various European NATO nations to commit combat troops to action in support of recent Allied operations should sound a ‘warning bell’ to the British public and the British Government. It is fair to say that such recent operations[3] have been launched for the ‘common good’[4] (even though the justification for such interventionist operations continues to be debated) rather than the direct protection of Allied partners from attack. But the lack of full-blooded military support for such operations by powerful allies such as Germany is a clear indicator that if our specific national interests are threatened overseas, we cannot and should not rely on third-party assistance in defending those interests.

1. With the tangible move of US military interest away from Europe to the Pacific and the Far East (as well as a discernible possibility of a drift towards isolationism by United States if Europe does not begin to pull its weight), the umbrella of carrier strike and air defence provided so long by our transatlantic Allied superpower may not be available when we most need it.

Carrier Strike.

1. Whether in unilateral or allied operations, for seven decades aircraft carriers have provided Britain and its allies with a powerful first echelon^[5] carrier strike and air defence capability in the Middle East, Far East and the South Atlantic that enjoys a flexibility and utility that cannot be matched by land-based resources in terms of cost effectiveness and operational effectiveness.

1. The main body of this paper provides an insight into such carrier operations and their operational effectiveness. (A detailed summary of the many carrier roles that would be applicable East of Suez and in the South Atlantic is given at Annex B.)

Command and Control.

1. Of overriding importance to the success of any military operation over land or sea, whether in the form of fully fledged combat or deterrence, is for the in-theatre Commander to have full and immediate control of all resources associated with the task force operation (surface warships, submarines, aircraft and ground forces). Generically, there are two forms of warfare: ‘Over Land Warfare’ and ‘Sea Warfare’. A pertinent discussion of this is provided at Annex C.

1. It is part of the heritage of modern Sea Warfare that comprehensive command and control facilities are provided in our major warships at sea so that all surface, subsurface and air systems can be fully and effectively integrated and deployed within the theatre of operations.  There is no place here for the ‘left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing’.

1. The parallel to this command function in the civilian world is that a company or organisation has just one Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The company or organisation would founder if there were two CEOs in charge, each with a different viewpoint or perspective. For globally based companies, particular areas of the world would have a local CEO or Chief Operations Officer responsible for the effective tactical conduct of business in that area. Strategic control of the global interests of the company would remain vested in the CEO at Corporate Headquarters.

1. For military operations overseas, the Prime Minister is the strategic CEO based in corporate headquarters (Whitehall) and the Chief Operations Officer responsible for the effective tactical conduct of military operations in theatre is the on-site Commander of the Task Force.

Scenario:  A Blockade of the Hormuz Strait.

Setting the Scene.

1. Iran decides to hold back from any direct confrontation with the United States and creates a scenario in which it escalates tension with Britain alone and threatens to close access to the Hormuz Strait to all merchantmen and tankers carrying Britain’s vital energy supplies.

1. The first sign of Iran’s military intent is the harassment of British vessels transiting the Strait by numerous heavily-armed high-speed patrol craft.  Many are now permanently based in the Strait in anticipation of a need to conduct asymmetric warfare ‘swarm attack’ operations against the American fleet.

1. The United States sympathises with Britain’s predicament but “has escalating troubles within the Pacific region that it has to attend to”. It offers Britain moral support but indicates that this is a problem specifically of Britain’s making (as with the Falklands dispute) and is therefore something for Britain to sort out unilaterally.

1. Britain deploys a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) to the Arabian Sea.

1. Negotiations for the deployment of British military combat aircraft to Arab States such as the United Arab Emirates or to the Sultanate of Oman are bedevilled by the fear that such basing rights, if given, would attract a strong military response from Iran against those Gulf States. Eventually, after several weeks of intense negotiation, it is agreed by Oman that logistic support aircraft may use the airfield at Salalah as a transit base – but fast jet combat aircraft will not be allowed to operate from Omani territory. Meanwhile, the Carrier Battle Group has arrived rapidly on station close to the Gulf of Oman. See Figure 1, below.

Figure 1. Initial Disposition of Military Force.

Carrier Battle Group Constitution.

1. The carrier HMS Prince of Wales is escorted by a Type 45 missile destroyer, two general-purpose frigates, a hunter killer submarine armed with Tomahawk missiles and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker and support vessel.

1. The CVBG air group includes 24 multi-role fighter aircraft plus Merlin antisubmarine helicopters and Lynx surface attack helicopters.

Planning.

1. During transit to the theatre of operations the CVBG Command conducts a detailed Threat Reduction Exercise, analysing all available intelligence of Iranian force capability and disposition. This provides the Command with ‘worst-case’ threat scenarios for which the CVBG must be prepared to deter and/or repulse. Surface, subsurface and air threats are examined in detail.  These threat scenarios are continuously updated from active intelligence gathered in theatre and from satellite.

1. With this information in hand the Command is able to plan the most effective use of on-site resources[6] and to position the CVBG to its own advantage, i.e.

a)    Reducing the probability of direct attacks on the battle group itself and yet

b)    Still allowing maximum offensive firepower to be brought to bear in the Strait and on the Iranian mainland as and when the situation so dictates.

Deterrence.

1. The first duty of the CVBG is to deter any harmful action by Iranian forces against British merchantmen and tanker supplies transiting the Hormuz Strait. The very existence of the CVBG in the Arabian Sea represents the first level of deterrence. It demonstrates a significant show of force that will be used in the event of any attack on British shipping.

Air Defence.

1. It is important that the CVBG is able to stand off from the Strait at a distance which prevents the effective use of land-based air and missile systems against it. The initial distance from the Iranian mainland as shown in Figure 1, above, is less than the command would wish if full-scale military action does break out and so instead of moving further offshore, half of the embarked fighter aircraft are used to maintain a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) air defence barrier between the mainland and the Group.

1. The continuous presence of CAP aircraft with their state-of-the-art radar and sensors off the Iranian coast achieves four objectives:

a)    It demonstrates the sustained capability of the CVBG air group to defend against air attack;

b)    It allows for detailed air surveillance of the over land movement of aircraft, mobile surface-to-air and surface to surface missile systems thereby providing essential targeting information;

c)     It allows for the detailed surveillance of the coastal waters and the identification and position of threat surface units in those waters;

d)    It facilitates the early, positive identification of air contacts that might pose a threat to the fleet.

Armed Reconnaissance over the Strait.

1. The balance of embarked multirole fighter aircraft are tasked with armed reconnaissance missions over the narrow waters of the Strait. During the state of tension, these missions have three objectives:

a)    Deterrence through visible presence.

b)    Ascertain the position of and identify shore-based offensive and defensive weapons systems, whether mobile or static;

c)     Identify the number and disposition of threat fast patrol craft that might be used to enforce a blockade against British shipping.

Limiting the Risk to Merchantmen.

1. It is decided that a convoy system should be utilised for the merchantmen exiting and entering the Gulf in order that the most effective and concentrated protection can be provided.  The Command takes the decision that escorting these convoys with surface warships in addition to an umbrella of air defence would place those warships at unnecessarily high risk. It would provide Iran with the opportunity/excuse to conduct an overwhelming swarm attack “against military targets that threaten their national security”.

1. Fighter combat armed reconnaissance missions are timed to coincide with the passage of convoys through the Strait and the northern reaches of the Gulf of Oman. A continuous and sustained air presence is required during convoy movements.

1. Threat capability must be degraded by the jamming of all surveillance and missile direction radars on the Iranian mainland close to the Strait.

1. With the air threat countered by superior multi-targeting fighter air defence weapon systems and with the missile threat countered by airborne electronic warfare jamming, the most significant threat remaining to the safety of the merchantmen in convoy lies with the asymmetric force of well-armed fast patrol boats at the narrowest point of the Strait.

Execution – Background.

1. The effective execution of the plans drawn up by the CVBG Command will be governed by the capability of the embarked multirole fighter aircraft. It is envisaged that the constitution of the carrier air group could be either:

a)    F-35C aircraft with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability.

b)    F-35B STOVL aircraft without an air to air refuelling capability.

c)     F-18E/F/G aircraft with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability and a sophisticated Electronic Warfare Defence Suppression capability.

1. It is understood that the cost of conversion of the F-35C to provide it with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability is in excess of £1 billion. Such a conversion requirement is unique to the United Kingdom. The United States Navy does not need this capability because it plans to operate the F-18E/F aircraft (which has that capability already) alongside the F-35C.  Interestingly, the provision of a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability for the F-35B STOVL has not yet been addressed and, if it were possible, it is likely that it would cost the UK taxpayer at least as much as converting the Queen Elizabeth class carriers from a ramp to ‘cat and trap’.

The F-35C Air Group Capability.

Options Available to the Command.

1. The F-35C stealth fighter aircraft could provide the Command with many options/advantages, the principal ones of which are:

a)    The aircraft’s Low Observable (Stealth) qualities allow it to operate unseen by current threat radar: giving it considerable invulnerability to threat weapon systems[7].  Combat attrition of own air resources is therefore minimised.

b)    Combat Radius of Action for strike attack: unrefuelled – 720 nautical miles; refuelled – more than 1000 nautical miles.  This allows the CVBG to be stationed at a safe distance offshore/from the operating area whilst still enabling fighter aircraft to remain on task conducting armed reconnaissance/convoy protection (for at least one hour unrefuelled or more than two hours with buddy-buddy air to air refuelling – the latter being a very effective ‘force magnifier’).

c)     Air defence of the CVBG – time on station: unrefuelled – 2.5 hours; refuelled – more than four hours.

d)    Surface and air surveillance: state-of-the-art, excellent capability.

e)    Suppression of enemy air defence, missile guidance and surveillance radars: this is not yet a ‘given’.

f)     A full range of state-of-the-art air to air and air to ground/surface ordnance that can be carried internally, thereby preserving the stealth quality of the aircraft and its performance.

g)    A deep strike capability for attacking high-value targets within the Iranian mainland interior.

Limitations.

1. This aircraft is expected to have few limitations in the context its strike/attack capability in the context of Expeditionary Force Operations in the littoral.

Stealth Related.

1. Perversely, one of the limitations it might be perceived to suffer from is in the Deterrence Role and is a product of its stealth qualities. Aircraft without stealth qualities are easily detected by threat radar systems and as such can be used to demonstrate power and intent to an enemy. For example, aircraft operating in the air defence role off the mainland coast of southern Iran can demonstrate power and intent only if they are visible to the enemy on radar.

1. Fortunately, the Low Observable qualities of the F-35C can be overcome purposefully in several ways.  In the context of the air defence barrier placed by the Command between the Iranian mainland and the CVBG, one way to achieve this would be with the multiple external carriage of air to air missiles (AMRAAM). Whilst reducing stealth quality and making the aircraft more visible to enemy radars, this external carriage enhances the firepower of the aircraft considerably and strengthens the air defence cordon around the CVBG

Defence Suppression.

1. It has yet to be ascertained how capable the F-35C would be at the suppression of enemy air defence radars. Will it have a very broad spectrum capability equal to the F-18G Super Growler aircraft that enabled the rapid and complete suppression and, hence, the effective interdiction of air defence radars and missile systems on the establishment of the Libya no-fly zone?[8]

1. The Growler capability was fundamental to the destruction/incapacitation of Libya’s air defence capability thereby allowing unfettered access by Allied air support aircraft that would otherwise have been vulnerable to attack.

1. This type of capability would be invaluable, even possibly vital, for the safe conduct of effective operations over the Hormuz Strait. Significantly, it would also inhibit the capability of fast patrol craft (and shore-based missile systems) attempting to fire radar-laid missiles at our merchantmen.

1. The operational value of this capability cannot be overstated – denying the enemy the ability to launch state-of-the-art ordnance/missiles at own forces.

1. Further, when operating in conjunction with Tomahawk missiles launched from hunter killer submarines, the Growler capability endows the Command with the unique ability to provide a crushing first strike against the threat right at the commencement of any hostile military action.

1. As evidenced in Libya, if there is no intention of placing boots on the ground in the Hormuz Strait area, this defence suppression capability would appear to be of paramount importance – operationally necessary and extremely cost-effective.

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs.

1. With the F-35C air group, the CVBG Command could enjoy:

a)    Effective flexibility of movement of the battle group made possible by

1.                         i.         The long combat reach of the aircraft,
2.                       ii.         Its endurance in the air conducting air defence missions (providing for a lower number of aircraft launch and recovery cycles).

b)    State-of-the-art air, surface and ground reconnaissance/surveillance – enabling precise target identification and position.

c)     The ability to strike enemy targets with relative invulnerability (through the stealth characteristics of the aircraft).

d)    The ability to provide a continuous/sustainable air defence presence over convoys exiting and entering the Gulf.

1. However, a significant shortfall may exist within the air group capability if the F-35 does not indeed enjoy the full jamming capability of the EA-18 Super Growler aircraft. That is the ability to completely suppress Iranian surveillance and targeting radars. Whereas the aircraft itself may remain undetected by such radars, other units within or detached from the battle group (including helicopters, surface ships and possibly logistic supply aircraft) may remain visible and vulnerable to long-range attack. Significantly, within the Strait itself, the numerous fast patrol craft that represent the threat of asymmetric attack on merchant vessels may continue to have full use of their targeting radar.

The F-35B STOVL Air Group Capability.

Options Available to the Command.

1. The F-35B STOVL stealth fighter aircraft provides the Command with fewer options/advantages than the F-35C:

a)    The aircraft’s Low Observable qualities could allow it to operate unseen by threat radar: giving it considerable invulnerability to threat weapon systems.  Combat attrition of own air resources is therefore minimised.

b)    Surface and air surveillance: state-of-the-art, excellent capability.

c)     Suppression of enemy air defence, missile guidance and surveillance radars: this is not yet a ‘given’.

Deficiencies.

1. Compared with the F-35C, the STOVL ‘B’ aircraft is severely limited in the following areas:

a)    Combat Radius of Action for strike attack: 380 nautical miles – and no buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability. This restricts the flexibility of movement of the CVBG preventing it from being stationed at a greater/safe distance offshore.  The CVBG must remain within 380 nautical miles of the Hormuz Strait and therefore within the restrictive confines of the Gulf of Oman to enable the attack and interdiction of targets in that area. A conflict therefore exists between the safety of the CVBG and the effective conduct of strike/attack operations.

b)    The reduced combat radius of action prevents the aircraft from remaining on task over the Strait for the conduct of continuous/sustained armed reconnaissance/convoy protection missions.

c)     Air Defence of the CVBG – time on station: 1.25 hours.  For 24/7 operations this requires the ship to conduct 19 launch and recovery cycles every 24 hours. (As opposed to just under 10 launch and recovery cycles for the F-35C).

d)    If the stealth qualities of the aircraft are to be preserved during strike/attack missions, external ordnance cannot be carried. The internal weapons bay of the STOVL ‘B’ aircraft is shorter than that of the F-35C preventing it from being able to carry the same quantity as and/or some of the larger state-of-the-art air to surface weapons. This is likely to be a critical shortfall when attempting to counter the possible asymmetric swarm attacks that may be conducted by Iranian fast patrol craft on vessels in the convoys.

e)    It has no deep strike capability for attacking high-value targets within the Iranian mainland interior.

Defence Suppression.

1. Partially as a result of the more limited space within the airframe, it is possible that the ‘B’ STOVL aircraft may not be able to provide the defence suppression capability enjoyed by the Growler aircraft.

1. As explained at paragraphs 43 to 48 above, this would be a significant shortfall in operational capability: denying the command the ability to conduct a substantial first strike blow to the enemy air defences. The result of this would be a continuation of attacks on convoys until multiple attritional strikes by the STOVL ‘B’ aircraft have been flown (this could take many days, if not weeks – in which time Britain’s economy could have been brought to its knees through lack of energy supplies).

What the Command Can Rely upon/Meeting the Command’s Needs.

1. With the F-35B STOVL air group, the CVBG Command would probably experience:

a)    Less flexibility of movement of the battle group because of the shorter combat radius of the aircraft: increasing risk to the battle group.

b)    The inability to provide a continuous/sustainable air defence presence over convoys exiting and entering the Gulf without moving the CVBG dangerously close to the threat in the northern confines of the Gulf of Oman.

c)     As with the F 35C, the possible inability to completely suppress Iranian surveillance and targeting radars. Significantly, within the Strait itself, the numerous fast patrol craft that represent the threat of asymmetric attack on merchant vessels may continue to have full use of their targeting radar.

d)    Double the intensity of flight deck launch and recovery operations: introducing more fatigue for all concerned with such operations.

1. However, the CVBG Command would enjoy:

a)    State of the art air, surface and ground reconnaissance/surveillance – enabling precise target identification and position.

b)    The ability to strike enemy targets with relative invulnerability (through the stealth characteristics of the aircraft).

The F-18E/F and EA-18G  Air Group Capability.

Options Available to the Command.

1. An air group centred upon F-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Super Growler aircraft provides the Command with considerable flexibility and versatility.

Defence Suppression – A Key Capability.

1. The key advantage enjoyed by the Command with this air group is the availability of the EA-18G Super Growler electronic warfare variant that has additional electronics within the aircraft to help it detect and jam enemy radars and mounts 4 specialized ECM (Electronic Counter-Measures) pods under the wings. This aircraft replaces the EA-6B Prowler which has become the only Western electronic warfare aircraft capable of accompanying fighters into combat. A graphic representation of this aircraft’s EW and Jamming equipment is provided at Figure 2, below.

Figure 2. EA-18G: key systems.

1. The defence suppression capability of this aircraft may be said to negate the need for Low Observable/Stealth characteristics in the F-18E/F aircraft. However, the latter have received some low observable modifications that convey upon these aircraft the stature of a 4.5 generation aircraft. They have a lower radar signature than any fourth-generation fighter aircraft such as the Typhoon.

Capability available to the Command.

1. The F-18 aircraft would provide the Command with many options/advantages, the principal ones of which are:

a)    The Growler Electronic Warfare and Jamming capabilities allow friendly aircraft to operate unseen by threat radar: giving them considerable invulnerability to threat weapon systems. This offsets/compensates effectively for the aircraft’s lack of true Low Observable stealth qualities. Combat attrition of own resources is therefore minimised.

b)    Combat Radius of Action for strike attack: unrefuelled – approximately 400 nautical miles; refuelled – more than 600 nautical miles.  This allows the CVBG to be stationed at a safe distance offshore/from the operating area whilst still enabling the aircraft to remain on task conducting armed reconnaissance/convoy protection (for at least one hour with buddy-buddy air to air refuelling – the latter being a very effective ‘force magnifier’).

c)     Air defence of the CVBG – time on station: unrefuelled – 1.25 hours; refuelled – approximately three hours.

d)    Surface and air surveillance: state-of-the-art, excellent capability.

e)    A full range of state-of-the-art air to air and air to surface/ground ordnance.

Limitations.

1. This Air Group has few limitations in its strike/attack and air defence capability in the context of Expeditionary Force Operations.

1. Although the aircraft’s unrefuelled combat radius is similar to that of the F-35B STOVL, it does have a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability that is commonly used during all flight operations from the deck and this extends the combat radius of the aircraft to beyond 600 nautical miles. This is satisfactory for most Expeditionary Force Operations over the sea and in the littoral area. For example, 40% of all offensive air to ground operations in support of ground forces in Afghanistan is conducted from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers by the F-18 aircraft at a range of approximately 600 nm.

Execution – Discussion of Air Group Options.

Responsibilities.

1. The CVBG Command has two indivisible responsibilities:

a)    The protection of UK merchantmen and associated energy supplies transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

b)    Preserving the safety and integrity of the battle group itself.

1. The effective fulfilment of these responsibilities is directly related to the constitution and capability of the embarked air group. The Command must be able to deter hostile action against our shipping in the Strait. In a state of tension this requires the visible and sustained presence of armed reconnaissance combat aircraft over the Strait during convoy passage.

Compatibility of the Air Group Options with Responsibilities.

1. These responsibilities can be satisfied by an F-35C or an F-18 air group (whilst maintaining flexibility of movement and therefore, the safety of the battle group), both of which enjoy the advantages of buddy-buddy air to air refuelling for the extension of combat radius and endurance on task.

1. The F-35B STOVL air group has a relatively short combat radius and does not enjoy the capability of buddy-buddy air to air refuelling.  This combat radius is insufficient to provide an adequate convoy protection presence over the Strait of Hormuz without the carrier battle group being stationed in the restricted waters of the northern Gulf of Oman, close to the Iranian mainland and within range of Iranian threat weapon systems. This would place the CVBG at unacceptable political and military risk.

1. The key capabilities of each air group in relation to the needs of the command are given in Table 1, below.

Table 1. The capability or otherwise of each Air Group.

Conclusion 1.

1. The F-35B STOVL air group capability is incompatible with the indivisible responsibilities of the CVBG Command.

Conclusion 2:  Defence Suppression – A Key Capability.

1. The examination of the options available to the Command as given above clearly indicates that the safety and defence of all CVBG units/assets/weapon systems and the safety of our merchantmen transiting the Strait of Hormuz is best served by having a defence suppression capability at least as good as that of the EA-18G Super Growler available within the embarked air group.

1. This is a key capability for combating the hostile intent of Iranian military forces against British shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz (and in all other scenarios where military force may be used against our National Interest).

Annex A. Latent Trouble-Spots around the world East of Suez.

Near East.

Far East.

Annex B.  Air Power Capabilities and Roles – beyond NATO waters.

Annex C.  Sea Warfare – A Discussion.

1. The Armed Forces purpose is to ensure the Defence of the Realm and to project power to meet ‘The National Interest’ – the country‘s goals and ambitions economic, military, and cultural.  While primary is the State’s survival and security – the pursuit of wealth and economic growth and power are also important as is preservation of the nation’s culture.

1. Currently the UK has three Armed Services whose primary purposes are as follows:

a)    The Royal Navy to project power over the sea (Maritime) and to support the Army,

b)    The Army to project power over the land and

c)     The Royal Air Force to provide UK Air Defence and to provide air support to combat operations over the sea and over the land.

1. In keeping with HMG’s “Defence Reform” published on 18 July 2011 to align with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), MOD is being reorganised to ensure a leaner and less centralised organisation with devolved processes for greater accountability and transparency.

1. The restructured Defence Board will be responsible for the strategic direction of defence policy and the Service Chiefs empowered to run their individual Services more effectively as part of a clear framework of financial accountability and control.

1. MOD Head Office will be smaller and more strategic in its role and a new 4-star led Joint Forces Command is intended to strengthen joint warfare development.

1. In keeping with HMG’s requirement for significant cost savings together with political and military flexibility, there would be merit in blurring the edges of single Service responsibilities – particularly for the RAF’s procurement and operation to be more of a support provider for Over Land or Sea Operations – rather than is increasingly the case – “A thing apart”.

1. In the Maritime case there should be a move away from Naval Operational Commanders being insularly ‘old style’ to embracing all assets directly supporting power projection over the sea (surface, sub-surface and air).

1. As HMG has directed that there be major cultural change – particularly in procurement – there would be significant merit in the Land and Sea commanders having a direct input and some responsibility for the procurement of all assets – particularly those air assets which they will require for their discharge of full responsibility in envisaged operations in the Land / Maritime theatres.  Such a ‘support philosophy’- which some might see as radical – would totally align with the Service Chief’s new responsibilities, enable them to ‘get on with the fighting’, stop all inter-Service squabbles for limited resources and ensure Ministers were routinely presented with clear and unambiguous guidance, unfettered by single service interests, on that procurement necessary to project power over the Land and the Sea.

1. During subsequent operations where HMG requires the Armed Forces to project power in the National Interest there should be clear Unity of Command to ensure unity of effort so that, at all levels of war, employment of military forces can be conducted quickly to mass combat power toward a common objective.  This would require all the forces operating over land and over sea to be directed by one responsible land and one responsible sea commander in every theatre so the requisite authority was immediately available to direct all forces to maximum effect in pursuit of a unified purpose.

Introduction.

1. Britain and the Royal Navy will soon have two new capital warships in service: the Queen Elizabeth class Pocket Super Carriers[1]. They should provide the Royal Navy Air Force (more often and confusingly referred to as the Fleet Air Arm) with highly mobile and versatile platforms from which Britain will be able to project Foreign Policy (military, political and diplomatic power) across the oceans of the world in defence of our national interests as an Island Nation.

1. However, the strategic versatility and utility of the new carriers could be dramatically reduced over the next 50 years if short-term financial expediency (rather than stated policy and realistic capability) is allowed to control the configuration of the ship’s flight decks and the associated air groups that will be embarked.

1. The Naval Service needs the two carriers to deliver Carrier Strike and Amphibiosity from 2019 in accordance with SDSR 2010 policy. Operational wisdom and experience dictates that both roles cannot be conducted simultaneously by one carrier. Indeed the ship fittings and embarked support arrangements are quite different for each role: to the extent that, logically, they could reasonably be deemed to be mutually exclusive.

1. If one takes into account the limited number of F-35 aircraft that will be procured as well as the training requirement for Royal Marines and first echelon ground forces, it appears highly unlikely that both decks would be required simultaneously for carrier strike (F-35 operations). This draws the logical conclusion that one carrier should be dedicated to carrier strike operations and the other to amphibious operations, as an LPH.

1. Our carrier strike programme has already been dovetailed and de-conflicted with the French carrier strike programme to ensure that Europe always has a carrier strike capability available. It is understood (and quite logically so) that the United States would prefer to have such an arrangement with a full carrier strike capability rather than a much lesser capability being available from each of the two British carriers.

1. It is therefore of critical importance that the UK carrier designated for the full carrier strike role should be configured[2] to provide an optimum level of carrier strike capability.

1. This paper addresses this need.

Background.

1. In spite of opposition from the Royal Navy, early in the last decade the Government Defence Committee decided that the choice of fast jet combat aircraft to be flown from the new carriers was to be the F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft.  This required the fitting of a flight deck ramp for take-off – thereby enabling the aircraft to launch with a useable weapons payload.

SDSR 2010.

1. SDSR 2010 recommended that this had been the wrong choice and that the F-35C should now be procured for the carriers instead of the STOVL aircraft – and this would require an angled flight deck rather than a ramp-fitted flight deck. The logic behind this new way ahead was very straightforward and was strongly supported by the Royal Navy. In brief, the main arguments supporting the new way ahead were as follows:

a)    The F-35C has almost double the radius of combat of the STOVL B variant without Air to Air Refuelling (720 nautical miles v 380 nautical miles[3]).

b)    The F-35C has a 12,000lb payload advantage over the ‘B’ which is 6,000lb of fuel and 6,000lb of weapons with external stores.  This drops to a still very significant 9,000lb advantage when only internal stores are used (the ‘B’ is limited to less than half the weapons payload internally).  This translates into a ‘B’ aircraft which can carry far less ordnance, has a limited combat radius and has far less endurance on task.

c)     The through life cost of the F-35C is expected to be 25% cheaper than for the STOVL ‘B’ variant.

d)    The National Security Council may also have included in their deliberations that our carrier decks, being much thinner than those of US Marine Corps amphibious carriers, may be unable to withstand the excessive heat created by F-35B vertical landing.

DSTL Analysis.

1. DSTL analysis has also demonstrated that the F-35B would not be able to launch at all from a flat deck in the extremely hot climates that will be experienced East of Suez. And, critically, it may well not be able to recover on board at all to a flat deck or a ramp-fitted deck in such climates without ditching ordnance and expensive stores. (See paragraph 35, below for more detail.)

A Change in Course?

1. It is understood that the Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM), the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) department and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier[4] have now tried to persuade the Secretary of State to change course once again by reverting to the much less capable F-35B STOVL aircraft[5].

1. Of critical importance to the future capability of UK carrier strike is the configuration of the flight deck.

a)    The F-35B STOVL aircraft requires the flight deck to be fitted with a Launch Ramp. This makes the flight deck incompatible with the operation of other, conventional fixed wing carrier aircraft (other Fast Jet, AEW, ISTAR, fixed wing Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles and Carrier Supply).

b)    The F-35C requires an angled deck fitted with catapults and arresting gear. This makes the flight deck fully compatible with the operation of other, conventional fixed wing carrier aircraft (other Fast Jet, AEW, ISTAR, fixed wing Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles and Carrier Supply).

A Ramp-Fitted Deck.

History.

1. The reasons why Britain moved from aircraft carriers fitted with angled decks to smaller ships fitted with Ramps or Ski Jumps at the end of the 70s were:

a)    The government of the day realised that the decision taken in the 60s to discontinue our carrier fleet was a mistake.

b)    The fleet at sea could not be protected from the Soviet air threat by land-based air and needed to have embarked fast jet fighter aircraft to provide the requisite air defence capability.

c)     The most rapid resolution of this urgent need would be through the introduction to service of a modified Harrier aircraft.

d)    The Sea Harrier that was developed to meet the requirement needed a launch ramp in order to be able to get airborne with an adequate fuel and weapons payload.

e)    With the majority of defence funding going into defending the homeland base from the Cold War Soviet threat, the construction of a larger conventional carrier with an angled deck was then unaffordable.

1. The Ramp or Ski Jump was fitted to the Invincible class of carrier and to HMS Hermes in 1979 to enable the new Sea Harrier aircraft to take off with a larger fuel and weapons payload. It was later used by the Naval Air Force Harrier GR7/9 squadrons to the same purpose.

1. If we are to operate the F-35B STOVL aircraft from our new carriers, a Ramp or Ski Jump will be required for the same reason.

1. These ramp-fitted carriers were fully tested in combat during the Falklands War of 1982 but although the Navy Sea Harrier won the air to air war against considerable numerical odds by shooting down 25 Argentinian aircraft in combat (and losing none to the Argentinian fighter aircraft), the carrier air groups lacked the services of Airborne Early Warning aircraft (AEW) and Air to Air Refuelling tankers (AAR). The land-based AEW and AAR aircraft did not have the reach to support Operation ‘Corporate’.

Limitations and Consequences already experienced.

1. The lack of embarked AEW and AAR capability severely restricted the ability of the Command to:

a)    Detect and monitor the movement of threat aircraft (whether fighter/attack, air intercept, reconnaissance or logistic support).

b)    Extend the reach/radius of action of its embarked multirole Sea Harrier fighter aircraft.

1. The Sea Harrier did not have a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability nor did it have a modern long-range radar with look down/shoot down capability (this would have compensated in part for the lack of a specialised embarked AEW aircraft).

1. These limitations placed the carrier battle group at much higher risk, restricted its ability to move further away from threat aircraft bases and this directly resulted in the loss of HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor. It also reduced the ability of the Command to:

a)    Detect and interdict the logistic air supplies being delivered to Argentinean ground forces on the Islands.

b)    Provide a sustained and robust air defence barrier around the amphibious landing operations taking place in San Carlos Water – arguably leading to the tragic loss of HMS Ardent, HMS Coventry and HMS Antelope.

The Queen Elizabeth Class Carrier fitted with a Ramp.

Operational/Capability Limitations.

1. The ramp configuration of the Queen Elizabeth class carrier is only necessary to facilitate the operation of the F-35B STOVL fast jet aircraft. But, at the same time, it will severely restrict the configuration and capability of the embarked air group:

a)    The F-35B does not have a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling capability to extend its combat radius and endurance on task.  Providing it with this capability may not be possible owing to its specialist STOVL configuration – and if it were possible:

1.                         i.         It is likely to cost more than the buddy-buddy conversion cost of the F-35C.
2.                       ii.         It will add weight to the aircraft thereby further reducing its combat radius/weapons payload (see paragraphs 9 a) and b), above).

b)    No other carrier capable aircraft will be able to operate from the deck thereby preventing the embarkation of specialist AEW, ISTAR and/or AAR aircraft – and indeed is likely to prevent the future operation of cost-effective Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles (UCAVs) and/or Carrier On Board logistics/delivery aircraft.

Discussion.

1. It should be clear from paragraphs 13 to 19, above that the fitting of a Ramp to Britain’s new Pocket Super Carriers:

a)    Reduces the reach and strike/attack capability of the embarked air group – and prevents the extension of this with the future embarkation of Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles.

b)    Considerably reduces the flexibility of movement and therefore the safety of the carrier battle group and associated naval forces (NB the loss of Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor).

c)     Drastically reduces the ability of the air group to defend itself and associated naval forces through the lack of embarked AEW and AAR capability (NB the loss of Ardent, Coventry and Antelope).

d)    Relegates the capability of these capital ships from effective strike carriers to that of amphibious air support vessels.

1. Britain therefore:

a)    Is paying for a super carrier capability that, if properly configured, would enable our nation to project Foreign Policy (robust power and influence) and to defend our overseas interests for decades to come – but, through poor advice,

b)    Could negate much of this strategically necessary capability by fitting the flight deck with a ramp.

The Angled Deck.

Background.

1. Following the end of the Cold War, successive Defence Reviews recognised that Britain’s Foreign Policy did indeed require the services of conventional aircraft carriers for:

a)    The projection of Foreign Policy in terms of military, political and diplomatic power,

b)    The deterrence of those that would do us harm and

c)     The protection of our trade routes, energy supplies and overseas interests.

1. At the same time, the requirement for a Joint Strike Fighter was confirmed and Britain decided to opt for the F 35 Lightning II stealth fighter that was being developed by the United States for its land-based air force, its naval air force and its US Marine Corps air force. Three variants were to be available: F-35A for land-based use only; F-35B Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) for amphibious operations with the Marine Corps; F-35C for strike carrier operations.

1. The variant that the Royal Navy needed and wanted was the F-35C. The aircraft would have many more blue water roles than just supporting amphibious operations and these would be better fulfilled by the ‘C’ variant. Naval warfare experts also fully understood the serious implications and limitations associated with a STOVL aircraft that needed to operate from a ramp fitted carrier flight deck (as summarised at paragraph 21, above).

1. Unfortunately, Britain had a joint requirement for an aircraft to satisfy the needs of both the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy Air Force and only one common variant was to be procured.  The loudest voice on the Government Defence Committee (that decided the choice of aircraft type) was that of the Royal Air Force who insisted on opting for the F-35B – against the express wishes of the Naval Staff.

The Change to the F-35C and the Angled Deck.

1. During SDSR 2010 deliberations, it was realised that the F-35C should have been chosen in the first instance because:

a)    It had a much greater radius of action – providing Britain with an extremely flexible deep strike capability in addition to that of the submarine launched Tomahawk.

b)    It could be fitted with a buddy-buddy air to air refuelling system thereby providing the safety factor during deck landing operations and dramatically increasing the endurance on task and range of the aircraft for combat operations. (It is doubtful whether such a buddy-buddy refuelling system can be provided for the F 35B without inordinate cost and unacceptable further weight penalty.)

c)     It could launch with a much greater weapons payload than the ‘B’ and remain on task longer.

d)    It could recover to the deck without jettisoning very expensive weapons/stores in extremely hot climates/high-temperature environments – whereas it is likely that the ‘B’ will not be able to: particularly as their engines age and become less powerful.

e)    Its greater range capability provides the Command with much greater flexibility of movement and therefore safety of the carrier battle group.

f)     An angled flight deck with catapults and arresting gear would allow the operation of specialist AEW aircraft, ISTAR aircraft, logistic support aircraft and, significantly, Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles which are likely to provide a carrier battle group with very much enhanced ISTAR and deep strike capability at relatively low cost.

1. There were other favourable factors related to the F-35C variant and the angled deck:

a)    The through life cost of the aircraft was estimated to be 25% less than that of the F-35B.

b)    The preservation of Royal Navy Air Force carrier operating expertise was being made available through exchange appointments with the United States Navy – with our aviators and engineers operating the F-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft from the decks of U.S. Navy super carriers. Such invaluable expertise would not be available at the same level from exchanges with the F-35B operating from US Marine Corps amphibious carriers/warships.

Implications of a Further Change Back to a Ramp Fitted Flight Deck.

1. It is considered highly probable that those who have suggested to the Secretary of State that Britain should now revert to the F-35B STOVL aircraft and the associated ramp-fitted deck have not paid due regard to the severe and negative operational capability (and therefore cost-effective) implications of such a way ahead and the effect that this could have in the long term for the projection of British Foreign Policy.  What is very certain is that if a decision is now taken to revert to the F-35B this would relegate the capability of our two new Pocket Super Carriers to the limited capability of amphibious support vessels. It is doubtful whether this is what the Right Honourable Philip Hammond MP envisaged when he stated that the two new carriers were at the heart of Britain’s defence strategy.

1. Lord Levene’s Defence Reform Unit has stressed that those responsible for such fundamentally important procurement decisions must be held accountable. It would therefore be wise and prudent for the Secretary of State and his colleagues to take a much closer and more critical look at the advice that he has received concerning this matter. He must ascertain whether that advice is based on misleading information and/or on the wilful omission of various facts.

1. He may be aware of a recent paper published by one of the leading Research Fellows at RUSI. (Reference:  “Choosing Plan B: Reviewing the UK’s Choice of Joint Strike Fighter” by Elizabeth Quintana, Senior Research Fellow, RUSI. http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F6C9D5A2F291/).  This triggered many critical responses (e.g. http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2012/03/rebuke-at-rusi-over-f35b-article/ ). It is understood that many in Whitehall were also disturbed/unimpressed with some of the misguided opinions, facts and conclusions expressed in the paper. It is further understood that the well-respected author received much of the misleading information from the sources within Whitehall/MoD that may also be advising Mr Hammond.

Key Points That May Not Have Been Addressed to the Minister.

1. The United States does not consider the ‘B’ to be a strike capable aircraft. Instead it is looked upon logically and narrowly as a Close Air Support platform for specific use by the US Marine Corps in Amphibious Operations. One of the important reasons that the F-35C was the preferred choice in SDSR 2010 was because it enjoyed the deep strike capability that the ‘B’ does not.

1. The ‘B’ aircraft will not be available/cleared to return to the United Kingdom for in service duty until the third quarter of 2018. At that juncture the only weapons clearance it will have is for the Pave Way IV bomb. In the same timescale, the ‘C’ will have a full strike capability with a wide range of weapons up to a size of 2500lb cleared for use. (It is understood that the ‘B’ will also have to undergo a rigorous UK flight and weapons test program at considerable expense and delay before its full inventory of weapons will be cleared – the ‘C’ will be exempt from such weapons clearance tests.)

1. Deck operations – Launch.  DSTL analysis has shown that for the F-35B the deck run required for a flat deck launch increases significantly in high sea states, high temperatures and with low wind over the deck – to an extent that often the aircraft will not be able to launch in the conditions to be expected East of Suez. The ‘C’ is not affected by this. Therefore, in switching to the ‘B’ the UK is considering reverting to an aircraft which does not deliver carrier strike, has less endurance, carries less payload and which cannot launch from a flat deck under the very climatic conditions expected to be experienced during power projection carrier strike operations.

1. Deck Operations – Recovery. In the same conditions referred to at paragraph 34, above (high ambient temperatures and sea states), the weight of the ‘B’ and its limited available thrust is likely to prevent it from being able to hover before landing. In order to get back on board ship it will therefore need to conduct a new flight procedure known as Ship Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL).  This is ‘un-cleared and unfunded’ and the landing systems required to enable this have not been fully tested and developed. Indeed at night this is expected to be more challenging than a vertical or arrested recovery. This must be considered a very high risk area for the ‘B’ – and possibly high extra cost.

1. Costs. Through lack of oversight and accountability (the blame for which cannot be placed at the door of the Naval Staff but more to the changes forced on the latter by MoD at the highest level), the cost of preparing the two flight decks for the ‘C’ may indeed be approaching £2 billion. For political reasons and short-term expediency, it would appear that this figure has been highlighted in isolation. What needs to be considered as well is that so much has already been stripped from the Queen Elizabeth that to reverse course and get her back to an operating capability with a ramp (and without a ramp the ‘B’ may be inoperable in hot climates) will itself be extremely expensive – and therefore the ‘cost gap’ between the two alternatives significantly narrows. The cost of preparing to take a ramp is substantial and is the subject of work on-going. It is thought that it will cost in excess of £0.5 billion alone just to get the Queen Elizabeth to a very limited operating capability to take helicopters, troops and her own mission systems, let alone rewire and get ready for fast jet ‘B’ operations.  These costs must be considered as well and set against the predicted costs of installing ‘cat and trap’ for the ‘C’.

1. Accountability. It is not the EMALS catapult launch system that is being redesigned, but the ship – and British Aerospace Systems are supposed to have costed the ‘for but not with’ design into the initial cost of the ship. Why did they not do this?

1. Interoperability.  The Statement of Intent (SOI) signed by the Secretary of State in January clearly stated interoperability as a desired outcome. Therefore this work has progressed within the SOI working groups – based on the choice of the F-35C. 5 levels have been identified for the integration of support and mission systems in each other’s ships. The US and UK have a desire for level 4 and with the French at level 2 (training/Carrier Qualification) only. A reversion to the F-35B would prevent UK compliance with the SOI.

Summary.

1. The configuration of the Queen Elizabeth class flight deck (Angled Deck or Ramp) will define whether Britain will enjoy the capability of:

a)    An extremely versatile and powerful angled deck strike carrier or

b)    A much more limited ramp-fitted warship with little more than a capability for amphibious support operations.

The F-35C aircraft will endow the former with the majority of its versatility and power.

The F-35B aircraft would severely limit the versatility and power of our new capital warships. Compared to the ‘C’ it has a very limited weapons payload, radius of combat action and endurance on task – thereby limiting the freedom of movement/safety of the associated carrier battle group.

It is considered that the suggestion to the Secretary of State ‘that SDSR 10 should be overturned and that Britain should now revert to procurement of the F-35B’ is not based upon all the available facts concerning aircraft/ship capability and costs. Indeed, it is considered that the advice received by the Secretary of State is flawed and omits important data and information.

Conclusion.

From a review of all the data and the implications associated with reverting to the F-35B, it is concluded that such reversion would be against the national interest and would lead to a severe reduction in Britain’s planned strategic ability over the next 50 years to project Foreign Policy in terms of military, political and diplomatic power.

Recommendation.

It is most strongly recommended that a U-turn is not made concerning the choice of aircraft and flight deck configuration for the Queen Elizabeth class carriers.